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LEGAL AND POLICY FACTORS GOVERNING
THE IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS ON
ACCESS TO AND JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN-FLAG VESSELS IN U.S. PORTS
John T. Oliver*
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the most important engines driving global economic
development and progress in recent years is the freedom to engage in
seaborne trade throughout the world. Relatively unhindered access to
the world's ports is a vitally important component of the global
economic success story. At the same time, the grave threats that
international terrorism and rogue states pose to global order give rise to
overriding national security concerns among port states, which argue
against an unfettered maritime open-door policy. Other vital concerns,
including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, unsafe oil tankers,
illegal fishing and other threats to the marine environment, and
violation of customs and trade laws, also prompt port states to take
actions that impose conditions on port access, leave to exercise greater
jurisdiction in port, and even leave to restrict traditional freedoms of
Dr. John T. Oliver, J.D., LL. M., S.J.D. Dr. Oliver is currently
serving as an Attorney-Advisor in the Maritime and International Law
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard. He is a retired Navy captain and
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the International Law Division, Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General;
Acting DoD Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs; Officer-in-Charge,
Sending State Office for Italy; and Chief Judge on the Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals. He graduated from Stanford University in 1973,
obtained a J.D. from the University of Washington School of Law in 1980, and
received an LL.M. in 1987 and a S.J.D. in 1993 in Ocean Law and Policy from
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navigation in coastal waters. Recent examples include proposed speed
restrictions on vessels operating off the eastern seaboard of the United
States to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whale from deadly
"ship strikes" and Australia's mandatory pilotage requirements in the
ecologically fragile Torres Strait.
In addition to providing a thorough background discussion on the
general topic area, this paper seeks to answer three complex questions:
(1) What principles of international law govern the restrictions that a
port state may impose on those foreign-flag vessels that desire to enter
port? (2) Does international law permit a port state to exercise
jurisdiction over the actions of a foreign-flag vessel committed outside
of its waters based on the subsequent presence of the vessel in one of
its ports? and, (3) If so, what are the limits international law imposes on
the exercise of such jurisdiction?
As a general rule, international law presumes that the ports of
every state should be open to all commercial vessels. However,
international law generally permits an exception if the port state
considers that one or more important interests require closure,
necessitate imposing conditions on access or exit, or dictate the
exercise of greater jurisdiction over foreign vessels in port. A port state
may restrict the port access of all foreign vessels, subject only to any
rights of entry clearly granted under an applicable treaty and those
vessels in distress due toforce majeure. At the same time, international
law presumes that the port state will not restrict access to foreign
commercial vessels or impose sanctions upon those that enter port,
even those designed to promote important societal goals, which are not
reasonably related to ensuring the safe, secure, and appropriate entry or
departure of the vessel on the occasion in question. Moreover, any
effort by the port state to exercise jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels
present within its waters must be consistent with well established,
fundamental principles of international law. To do otherwise would be
an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of state sovereignty over
foreign-flag vessels that would give rise to various sources of redress,
including diplomatic protests, retaliatory restrictions, dispute settlement
procedures, and, under some circumstances, liability for damages.
As a key policy goal, all states must cooperate to develop and
implement efficient and effective conditions on port access to ensure
the security of the port state and the international commercial system.
Overly restrictive conditions would have a deleterious effect on global
trade and the world's economy.
However, overly permissive
conditions on entry, such as faulty cargo screening, could result in a
security breakdown and a devastating terrorist attack on a port city.
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Such a disaster renders virtually inconsequential the debate over
restrictions on port access to achieve political, environmental, safety,
law enforcement, or other goals. Even so, international lawyers and
policy makers must seek to ensure that access to the ports of the world
is fundamentally free and only restricted by on conditions directly,
effectively, and reasonably related to the significant interests of the port
state and the world community at large.
II. INTRODUCTION AND COMPETING POLICY INTERESTS
This paper discusses general principles of international and
domestic law governing the condition of port entry as a basis for
regulating foreign vessels entering ports in the United States and other
select countries as examples of state practice. Additionally, the paper
addresses the bases under which a port state may exercise jurisdiction
over foreign-flag vessels, their operators, and their activities. It also
addresses the policy consequences of imposing legally permissible
restrictions or requirements that could have the practical effect of
infringing unreasonably on maritime commerce or would lead to
concerns in the international community and might result in diplomatic
protests and political concerns. The goal of the paper is to develop an
analytical structure that encourages a rational review of any proposed
conditions on entry to ports to help ensure any such requirements are
legal, acceptable, reasonable, and wise. In addition, this paper attempts
to answer three difficult legal and policy questions: (1)What legal
principles govern the restrictions that a port state may impose on those
foreign-flag vessels that desire to enter port? (2) Does international law
permit a port state to exercise jurisdiction over the actions of a foreignflag vessel committed outside of its waters based on the subsequent
presence of the vessel in one of its ports? (3) If so, what are the limits
international law imposes on the exercise of such jurisdiction? In a
post-9/11 world that remains dependent on international trade for
economic prosperity, achieving an effective, balanced, legal, and
workable port-entry regime is a vitally important goal.
As a general rule, international law presumes that the ports of
every state should be open to all commercial vessels calling on them.
As Professors McDougal and Burke observed 45 years ago: "The chief
function of ports for the coastal state is in provision of cheap and easy
access to the oceans and to the rest of the world ... [T]he availability
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of good harbors ... remains a priceless national asset."' At the same
time, each port state has the sovereign right to deny access and to
establish reasonable conditions related to access to its internal waters,
harbors, roadsteads, and ports. 2 For example, a port state may restrict
access of warships, fishing vessels, or private recreational craft on any
basis it chooses, whether reasonably or not.3
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 4 "contains no restriction on the right of a state to establish
port entry requirements . .. ." Indeed, Article 25, entitled "Rights of
protection of the coastal State," provides: "In the case of ships
proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal
waters, the coastal state ... has the right to take the necessary steps to
prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships
to internal waters or such a call is subject.",6 The port state's authority

1 MYREs S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE OCEANS 90 (1962) (footnote omitted). As used in international and
domestic law, the term "port" has a broad definition. Under 47 U.S.C. §
153(19), "port" means "any place to which ships may resort for shelter or to
load or unload passengers or goods, or to obtain fuel, water, or supplies." This
includes harbor facilities, whether natural or manmade. But the term also
includes internal waters into which a foreign vessel may enter, anchor, or take
shelter, as well as roadsteads or other offshore facilities over which the United
States exercises jurisdiction. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100,
122 (1923): "It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere
that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its
dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the
sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line
outward [to the outer limit of the territorial sea]."
2 "Coastal states have a sovereign right to grant or to deny access to
their ports to any foreign vessel." Louise de La Fayette, Access to Ports in
InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L J. MARNE & COASTAL L. 1, 2 (1996).
IId. at 1, 12, 22. A.V. Lowe, The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports
in InternationalLaw, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 597, 606-07 (1977). Moreover, a
port State has the sovereign right of "port nomination" and may designate a
port as the only one or one of several ports open to foreign vessels. Id. at 607.
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 25(2), available at http://www.un.org/Dept/los/
conventionagreements/texts/unclos/clos,index.htm (entered into force Nov.
16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
5 Bernard H. Oxman, The TerritorialTemptation: A Siren Song at Sea,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 844 (2006) (footnote referring to UNCLOS, arts. 25(2)
and 211(3), omitted).
6

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 25(2). The United States has not yet

ratified UNCLOS. However, this same principle is codified in art. 16(2) of the
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has long included conditioning access to a port or departure from the
port on compliance with laws and regulations governing "the proper
conduct of the business of the port."7 While the United States signed
the "Part XI Agreement" that incorporated almost all of UNCLOS in
1994, the U.S. Senate has not yet ratified or acceded to it. Nor has it
even signed the 1923 Convention and Statute on the International
R6gime of Maritime Ports. Even so, the United States has long
considered the navigation-related principles contained in UNCLOS to
reflect customary international law, which is binding on all states.8
Every modern state has a general obligation to engage in
commercial intercourse with other states and, absent an important
reason, none should deny foreign commercial vessels reciprocal access
to its ports. 9 In a much-quoted (yet often criticized) statement, an
arbitral tribunal observed in the Aramco case in 1958: "According to a
great principle of public international law, the ports of every State must
be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the
vital interests of the State so require."' 10
In his widely respected
treatise, Dr. C.J. Colombos wrote that "in time of peace, commercial
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, to which the United States is a party.
7 Statute on the International Rdgime of Maritime Ports, art. 3, annexed
to the Convention on the International Rdgime of Maritime Ports, Geneva, Dec.
9, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 115. The United States is not party to either the Statute or
the Convention on the International Rdgime of Maritime Ports. "[A]lthough
ratified by only a small number of states, [the 1923 Convention] reflects largely
customary rules of international law." ARND BERNAERTS, BERNAERTS' GUIDE
TO THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

(2006).

8

11

See President Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Ocean

Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983), reprinted in 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
619 (1983); see also BERNAERTS, supra note 7, at 14-15.
9 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 512 rep. n. 3 (1987)[hereinafter

RESTATEMENT]; see PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (7th rev. ed. 1997) ("Although a coastal state has

the right to forbid foreign merchant ships to enter its ports, most states are keen
to support trade, the therefore welcome foreign ships to their ports.");
MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 99-100.
10 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), Award
of Aug. 23, 1958, 27 I.L.R. 117, 212 (dictum).

This statement represents

commercial policy and comity and, according to one expert, has no
"substantive basis" in international law. Lowe, supra note 3, at 621.
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ports must be left open to international traffic" and that the "liberty of
access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and
unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers."" The
Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
summarized the legal principle as follows: "In general, maritime ports
are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity.... but the coastal
State may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for
imperative reasons ....
Apart from these pronouncements, however, there is little actual
support, as a fundamental principal of customary international law, for
the broad statement that ports can only be closed for "vital interests" or
"imperative reasons" as a fundamental principle of customary
international law.' 3 After carefully examining the relevant authorities
cited in support of such a principle in the Aramco case, Professor A.V.
Lowe concluded that international law does not so severely restrict the4
authority of a port state to close a port or impose conditions on entry.'
He convincingly distinguished between a right of access and a
presumption of access, concluding that
the ports of a State which are designated for
international trade are, in the absence of express
provisions to the contrary made by a port State,
presumed to be open to the merchant ships of all
States . . . [S]uch ports should not be closed to
foreign merchant ships except when the peace, good
order, or security of the coastal State necessitates
closure.15
Another knowledgeable observer went even further: "There is a
presumption that all ports used for international trade are open to all
11 C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 181, 176

(6th ed. 1967). "The entry of foreign merchant ships may thus be reasonably
regulated provided no hindrance is put in the way of international trade and no
discrimination made between States so as to favour some at the expense of
others." Id. at 177.
12
13

RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 512, cmt. c (1987).

Professors Churchill and Lowe have commented that the "dictum [in
the Aramco case] is not supported by the authorities cited by the tribunal, and
there is almost no other support for the proposition." R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V.
LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 62 (3d ed. 1999).
14 See Lowe, supra note 3, at 597-625.
KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION:
PORT STATE REGIME 1-22 (1993).

15 Lowe, supra note 3, at 622 (footnote omitted).

See also GEORGE C.
EVOLUTION OF THE
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merchant vessels, but this is practice only, based upon convenience and
commercial interest; it is not a legal obligation ... Pursuant to [their
sovereignty over their internal waters], states have absolute control
over access to their ports."' 16 The U.S. Supreme Court observed that
the internal waters and territorial sea are "subject to the complete
sovereignty of the nation, as much as if they were a part of its land
territory, and the coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude
foreign vessels altogether."' 17 In another case, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress had "the power... to condition access to our
ports by foreign-owned vessels upon submission to any liabilities it
may consider good American policy to exact."' 18
Whether states view port access as an international obligation or
one granted based on international comity and domestic self-interest,
they typically do not undertake to deny access to their ports without
good cause. States must have good policy reasons before restricting
access to their ports. "Vital interests," "imperative reasons," or factors
that may "necessitate closure" or constitute "good policy" include
national security and public health. However, acceptable state practice
includes closing a port to enforce an embargo, to sanction hostile
behavior by another state, to impose a political reprisal,' 9 or to promote
other significant interests as the port state may determine appropriate
and necessary.2 ° Protection of the coastal state's maritime environment
is a policy goal of particular importance today, particularly in the

La Fayette, supra note 2, at I (emphasis in original).
United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22 (1969).
18 Laurizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592-93 (1953).
19 An embargo is one of the tools available to the international
community, or a nation state, to seek to change the behavior of another. U.N.
Charter, art. 41. So is a reprisal. In 1984 the U.S. closed its ports to vessels
flying the Nicaraguan flag as part of a rather ineffectual economics sanctions
package in retaliation for the guerilla war that the Government of Nicaragua
was waging against its neighbors. Dan Morgan, Why the Nicaragua
Embargo?, WASH. POST, May 5, 1985, at C5.
20 According to one Federal appeals court, U.S. cases contain no
precedents that "the law of nations accords an unrestricted right of access to
harbors by vessels of all nations." Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l
Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960). "In any event, the law of nations
would not require more than comity to the ships of a foreign nation," and in the
specific context the court addressed, it noted that American vessels were
harassed in the ports of the U.A.R. Id.
16
17
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United States.2 1 It boils down to what the concerned state considers to
be sufficiently important to close off or burden international trade, so as
to subject itself to increased costs, or, in the event the port closure or
restriction is considered unjustified, to diplomatic protests, retaliation
in the form of economic sanctions or reciprocal restrictions on port
access, and, perhaps, damages following a hearing before a domestic or
international tribunal.
In the United States, Congress may condition access to ports on
such condition as it deems most appropriate. In 1903, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that "the implied consent to permit [foreign
vessels] to enter our harbors may be withdrawn, and if this implied
consent may be wholly withdrawn, it may be extended upon such terms
and conditions as the government sees fit to impose. 22 The Third
Restatement summarized this legal principle as follows:
[The port State] may condition entry of a foreign ship
into its internal waters or ports on compliance with its
laws and regulations.
[It] may also exercise
jurisdiction to enforce international standards with
respect to some activities that occurred prior to entry
into its ports or internal waters (for example, illegal
discharge of pollutants).23
Many federal statutes and regulations put this principle into practice
and govern issues ranging from national security to pollution control to
enforcing customs laws to ensuring navigational and operational
safety.24
There is also a good deal of foreign state practice supporting the
imposition of a broad spectrum of conditions governing port access and
exercise jurisdiction in port. 25 Today, there is general agreement "that

21

"In the case of the United States... such control [through port entry

requirements to protect the marine environment] now effectively applies to the
overwhelming majority of ships operating off its coast." Oxman, supra note 5,
at 844.
22 Paterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 178 (1903).
23 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at § 512, cmt. c (1987) (citing
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 218).
24 Examples include the Magnuson Act of 1950 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
191), and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 122 1-1236), and regulations established under their authority.
25 For a good example of one state's approach, see the 1995 Norwegian
Regulations Governing Pilotage and Entry to Norwegian Waters, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/ntrvol 13.html.
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the coastal state has full authority over access to ports and is competent26
to exercise it, virtually at will, to exclude entry by foreign vessels.

Among appropriate access conditions are complying with pilotage
requirements, obeying traffic separation schemes, and paying customs
fees. Moreover, this position is fully consistent with the approach
taken in international tribunals. In its Nicaragua Mining decision, the
International Court of Justice noted that internal waters are subject to
the sovereignty of the port State and that it is "by virtue of
its
27
sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports.

Port states have even greater rights to limit or control access with
respect to certain categories of vessels, such as warships, nuclearpowered vessels, fishing boats, and recreational craft. Absent an
agreement between the states concerned, foreign warships have no
general expectation of access 28 and must request permission to make a
port call in each case.29 In 1985, suspecting that certain U.S. military
vessels might be carrying nuclear weapons and concerned about the
potential dangers of nuclear power, and in the absence of an official
U.S. denial that the vessels carried nuclear weapons, New Zealand
announced that it would refuse entrance to nuclear-powered warships

26 CHURCHILL & LOWE,

supra note 13, at 107 (footnote omitted). See

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 125
(international law does not grant a right of access to internal waters for the
purpose of passage, even those previously used by foreign vessels for
navigation).
27 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 111 (June 27). Although the case was rather
controversial, particularly in the United States, there was no criticism for this
point of law. In 1984, the U.S. closed its ports to vessels flying the Nicaraguan
flag as part of a rather ineffectual economics sanctions package in retaliation
for the guerilla war that the Government of Nicaragua was waging against its
neighbors. Dan Morgan, Why the Nicaragua Embargo, WASH. POST, May 5,
1985, at C5.
28 "In the case of warships, the assertion of comprehensive authority to
exclude most frequently takes the form of establishing limiting conditions for
entry, with particular emphasis upon the necessity for giving notice of intended
visits." McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at 94, 114-115.
29 "[T]he right [of port States] to exclude foreign warships is
undoubted." CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 61. See also Louis B.
SOHN & JOHN E. NoYEs, CASES & MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 377-78
(2004) (noting that treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation usually do
not provide access for warships).
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into its ports. 30 Although disconcerting to the United States and
detrimental to the bilateral and multilateral relations with its ANZUS
and SEATO allies, New Zealand had the sovereign right to take this
action.
International law also permits a port state to impose special
restrictions on nuclear-powered ships or vessels carrying particularly
dangerous cargoes. 3' In this regard, the Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Nuclear-Powered Ships provides that "nothing in this
Convention shall affect any right which a contracting state may have
under international law to deny access to its waters and harbours to
nuclear ships licensed by another contracting state, even when it has
formally complied with all the provisions of this Convention. 32
International law also permits port states to deny or condition access as
they see fit to foreign-flag fishing boats 33 and private recreational
craft.34 Some port states may consider that the domestic political costs
of approving nuclear-powered vessels access to their waters to be too
high, while granting port access to warships, fishing vessels, and
private recreational craft does not promote the overriding interests of
the port state in international trade that foreign-flag commercial vessels
serve.
30

SOHN & NOYES, supra note 29 at 365-66; see 21 WEEKLY COMP.

PRES. Doc. 146-147 (Feb. 6, 1985); see also ANZUS Pact, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007), available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-

9007952/ANZUS-Pact (discussing the effect of New Zealand's policy of
banning port access to nuclear-armed vessels on military ties between the two
countries); STUART MCMILLAN, NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY: THE NUCLEAR
SHIPs DISPUTE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1987).

31 UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 22(2), 23.
32 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear-Powered Ships,
Belgium, art. XVII, May 25, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 275 (1963).
33See, e.g., Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement,
art. 23, Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1567 (1995)("Measures taken by a port
State").
34 Foreign-flag recreation vessels do not engage in international trade or
other activities of significant benefit to the port state. At the same time, they
represent a threat to import illegal aliens, illicit drugs, and terrorist and
weapons. Moreover, it is far more difficult to keep track of them. La Fayette,
supra note 3, at 12. See V.D. Degan, Internal Waters, 17 NETHERLANDS Y.B.
INT'L L. 3 (1986). "The general practice of the free access of merchant ships of
almost all nations to almost all commercial ports is based upon convenience
and economic interest, and in the absence of treaty provisions, it is not based
upon any sense of legal obligation. . . . [A] coastal state can impose special
regulations with regard to fishing boats and privately owned pleasure and
racing yachts and boats. For this reason, they form separate categories." Id.
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Just as there is a presumption that a port state may not properly
bar a foreign commercial vessel from access to its ports absent
adequate justification, the affected flag state and the international
community would view with concern the imposition of unreasonable,
arbitrary, discriminatory, or prohibitive requirements for access. 35 "It
is ...

possible that closures or conditions of access which are patently

unreasonable or discriminatory might be held to amount to an abus de
droit, for which the coastal State might be internationally responsible
even if there was no right of entry to the port." 36 However, both
conventional and customary international law permit a state to impose
reasonable restrictions on access.37 The possible conditions on entry
range from those historically justified to those essential to the orderly
operation of a busy port, such as assurances that the vessel and crew are
free from infectious diseases, customs duties have or will be paid, and
promises to use the services of a pilot when entering or exiting port,
and moor or anchor as directed. These also include those securityrelated concerns so important in a post-9/l 1 world, such as submission
of passenger and crew lists and cargo manifests, and a willingness to
wait beyond the limits of the territorial sea until an inspection of the
vessel with radiation monitoring equipment can be completed. 8
Under the fundamental international legal principle ofpacta sunt
servanda, states must comply with international agreements to which
they are party. Hundreds of bilateral friendship, commerce, and
navigation (FCN) treaties govern the circumstances under which those
35 "There is a presumption that ports traditionally designated for foreign
trade are open to all ships and that the arbitrary closure of a port gives rise to a
right of protest and, under certain circumstances, liability for damages."
Ademuni-Odeke, Port State Control and UK Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 657,
660 (1997) (footnote omitted).

36 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 63. See also Ademuni-Odeke,
supra note 35, at 660.
37 "A coastal state can condition the entry of foreign ships into its ports
on compliance with [its] laws and regulations." RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §

512 rep. n. 3.

38 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1,
1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S.276, XI-2, Reg. 9/2.1.6 [hereinafter SOLAS
Convention]; International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Part B
4.39. For details on the current status of the SOLAS Convention and its
amendments, see http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topicid = 257
&docid=647. See also Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-474, § 2, 92 Stat. 1472 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(5) and implemented
by 33 C.F.R. §§ 160.201 etseq.)
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parties to the agreements provide port access to the other. '9 Such FCN
treaties support the general presumption that ports will be open and
unrestricted by unreasonable conditions. For example, the FCN treaty
between the United States and Belgium provides:
Vessels of either Contracting Party shall have liberty,
on equal terms with vessels of the other Party and on
equal terms with vessels of any third country, to
come with their cargoes to all ports, places and
waters of such other Party open to foreign commerce
and navigation. Such vessels and cargoes shall in the
ports, places and waters of such other Party be
accorded in all respects national treatment and mostfavored-nation treatment.
Whether these bilateral FCN or "most-favored-nation" treaties
concerning commerce and navigation reflect customary international
law or may have helped established a rule of customary law, there is a
general expectancy that, when entered into, commercial vessels of
either party will be able to trade with any foreign port and will need to
comply only with standard and necessary port access conditions and
expectations. 4 ' Here again, international practice is to exclude warships
and fishing vessels from the general presumption of access.42 Whether
at sea or in port, warships and other sovereign immune vessels are
39 An FCN treaty usually provides guarantees for the access of foreign

vessels to ports and their subsequent departures. See, e.g., Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, arts. XIX(3) and XX(l),
Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2256, 2284. Even then, however, FCN treaties do not
preclude a port State from denying access to vessels flying the flag of the other
State party. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 109. The provisions of
most FCN treaties provide for restricting access when "necessary for the
protection of the essential interests ... in time of national emergency." Treaty
of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. XXI, Apr. 2,
1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063.
40 Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, U.S.-Belgium,
art. 13(1), Feb. 21, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 1284, available at http://tcc.export.
gov/Trade Agreements/AllTradeAgreements/exp_00278 l.asp.
41 Professors Churchill and Lowe opined that the power to condition
access could be limited. CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 13, at 63. See also
Ademuni-Odeke, supra note 35, at 660 ("[Tlhe arbitrary closure of a port gives
rise to a right of protest and, under certain circumstances, liability for
damages.").
42 The normal practice in these bilateral agreements is to exclude
fishing vessels and warships from the provisions on port access, except for
distress. McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at 109-10 & n.59.
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subject only to the enforcement jurisdiction of the flag state.43 If a
sovereign immune vessel engages in an activity in violation of the law
of the port state, local authorities may direct that the vessel to leave
immediately and may seek damages through diplomatic channels
resulting from the actions of foreign sovereign-immune vessels. 44
Although a port state has a right to condition entry to its ports
based on a broad spectrum of concerns, any such restrictions entail
costs. The costs include those directly involved in administering the
conditions, from processing the paperwork to conducting any ship
inspections that may be necessary. Such direct costs may be fully or
partially offset with appropriate port-entry, pilotage, mooring, or
anchorage fees.
But the most significant burden involves the
economic, political, and other costs involved in slowing, complicating,
or otherwise interfering with the smooth and efficient flow of
international trade. A nation's port-access scheme may require a
merchant vessel to wait outside port until it receives clearance, embarks
a pilot, or agrees to submit to a search, or it may impose such an
extensive planning, inspection, or reporting system on shipping
companies or ship masters making it no longer attractive to do business
with a certain nation or port. Any such conditions on port access make
international trade more time-consuming, difficult, and costly. The
1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic
(FAL Convention), following earlier international efforts to facilitate
international air traffic, emphasizes the importance of simplifying and
reducing to a minimum the administrative burdens imposed on
international shipping "to facilitate and expedite international maritime
traffic . . . ,,45International legal principles also expect that port states
43 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note

13, at 65, 98-99. See The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812) ("a public armed
ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign, . . .should be exempt from the
jurisdiction of the country."). See also UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 30-33,
95-96.
44 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 457, rep. n. 7, and § 512, rep. n. 6;
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 99 ( "[T]he flag State is responsible for
" See also UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 30-33 and
loss to the coastal State ....
42(5).

45 London Convention on the Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic art. 1, Apr. 9, 1965, 18 U.S.T. 411, 591 U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter FAL
Convention]. See Jochen Erler, The New Convention on Facilitation of
International Maritime Traffic, 13 MCGILL L. J.323, 323-328 (1967). Cf
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 255 ("States shall adopt reasonable rules,
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will extend "equality of treatment" and prohibit discrimination in all
rules governing port access46and conditions and procedures applied to
foreign commercial vessels.
Given the crucial importance to international trade in today's
global economy, the cumulative impact of incremental costs, short
delays, or minor disruptions can have a profoundly adverse impact.
Harmonizing and coordinating conditions on port entry throughout the
world community, with similar expectations, requirements, forms, and
procedures, can achieve the desired goals without imposing as much of
an administrative burden.
The benefits achieved from imposing
conditions on port entry, such as intelligently devised security
requirements, must be balanced against the costs and burdens
associated with each. As one commentator observed, with respect to
the broader efforts to protect the nation's security against potential
terrorist attacks: "Ultimately, getting homeland security right is not
about constructing barricades to fend off terrorists. It is, or should be,
about identifying and taking the steps necessary to allow the United
States to remain an open, prosperous, free, and globally engaged
society. 47 Promoting relatively unrestricted oceangoing trade is
essential to the continued economic vitality of the world. As Dr. James
Carafano, senior fellow for National Security and Homeland Security at
the Heritage Foundation, observed:
Global commerce is the single greatest engine in
economic growth and it's the single most important
thing that raises the standard of living for every
human being on the planet. If there is one thing that

regulations and procedures to promote and facilitate marine scientific research

[including], subject to the provisions of their laws and regulations, access to
their harbours .... ).
46 See FAL Convention, supra note 45, art. 16. See also COLOMBOS,
supra note 11, § 181, at 177. "The entry of foreign merchant ships may thus be
reasonably regulated provided no hindrance is put in the way of international
trade and no discrimination made between States so as to favour some at the
expense of others." Id. Interestingly, UNCLOS does not specifically provide
for an equal-treatment port-access regime, except in the limited circumstances
of land-locked States. "Ships flying the flag of land-locked States shall enjoy
treatment equal to that accorded to other foreign ships in maritime ports."
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 131.
47 Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 66
(Jan.-Feb. 2002).
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you are going to protect in this world, it's the ability
to conduct global commerce.48
Policy makers and the attorneys and other subject-matter experts who
advise them must strive for effective and workable limitations on port
access directly related to promoting the important goals to be achieved
while avoiding unnecessarily burdensome restrictions and procedures
that merely hamper free international navigation and trade.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, CONTEMPORARY
CONTEXT, AND ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE
A. Historical Background. Seaborne commerce has been a
vitally important part of the world's economy ever since man began to
engage in substantial trade with his neighbor. Portuguese, Chinese,
Arabian, Indian, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, and English ships competed
with each other over the centuries to dominate key trade routes and
control the supply of commodities and other valuable goods. Global
maritime trade has been a vital component in stimulating international
relationships and economic growth. Perhaps the most impressive
structural development in the history of world growth and development
has been oceangoing trade. Particularly for goods carried in quantity or
bulk, water transportation has long been cheaper and more efficient
and, until the advent of railways, modem highways and trucks, and
airplanes, was usually much faster than the alternative transportation
modalities.
At the same time, history has demonstrated the risks
associated with maritime activities. Too often seagoing vessels were
engaged in less benign activities than mutually beneficial, arm's-length
trading. Pirates and privateers wreaked havoc on ships engaged in
peaceful trade. Coastal raiders, such as the Hittites in the 12th Century
B.C., and Vikings around the I0 th Century A.D., ravaged shipping,
ports, and peoples. Vicious oceangoing criminals have preyed on those
weaker than themselves along the coasts of Africa and Southeast Asia
for thousands of years. Powerful maritime states engaged in the
conquest of foreign lands and monopolization of vital shipping lanes
and key trading ports and nations. From seaborne attacks against ports
in the Mediterranean to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, states have
48

April Terreri, Int'l Trade is Less Secure Than You Think

WORLD

Sep. 4, 2006, at www.worldtrademag.com/CDA/Articles/
Feature_Article/d37c5947eOc7dOlOVgnVCM 100000f932a8c0.
TRADE

MAG.,
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sought to exploit coastal waters to wage aggressive warfare. History
has demonstrated that the tremendous benefits of international ocean
commerce must be balanced against the potential risks. Although
history has no doubt demonstrated the potential for adverse activities
and consequences, including imperialism, colonization, conflict, piracy,
and maritime terrorism, international ocean trade has long been a vital
component in promoting global economic growth and improving living
conditions worldwide.4 9
B. Contemporary Context. No period of history can rival

the scale on which the world community trades by sea today.
Moreover, world trade is growing 7-10 % each year. Ocean commerce
will no doubt become increasingly vital in years to come. Some 95 %
of the world's trade today is dependent on maritime commerce. If it
were not for ocean transport of key commodities, such as oil and
natural gas, cereal grains, such as wheat and rice, and construction
materials, many of the world's peoples would not have power for their
transportation and electrical systems, food for their tables, or homes for
their families. Increasingly, international trade has focused on highvalue items, such as automobiles, televisions, furniture, and expensive
entertainment systems. Specially constructed roll-on, roll-off vehicle
carriers, and container ships, carrying thousands of interchangeable
sealed containers,5 ° transport cargoes worth hundreds of millions of
dollars. Often, the value of the cargo far exceeds the value of the ship.
The nations of Asia, in particular, Japan, South Korea, Thailand,
Singapore, India, and, increasingly, China, via modem port facilities in
Hong Kong and, increasingly, on the mainland, dominate high-value
J. M. ROBERTS, HISTORY OF THE WORLD 73-99, 333-34, 441-505
See also BBC News, A Century of Free Trade, Feb. 12, 2003,

49 See

(1993).

available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/533716.stm;

International

Trade, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007), available at
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9106321/international-trade.
50 There are four standard lengths: 20, 40, 45, and 48 feet in length.
GlobalSecurity.Org, Container Ships, available at http://www.global
security.org/military/systems/ship/container.htm
Container
capacity
is
measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Thus a forty-foot container is
two TEU's. Some ships in service today can carry over 11,000 TEU. On such
ship, the Emma Marsh, launched in 2006, is 1,300 feet long.
Containerization,WIKIPEDIA,
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Containerization; see also MARK LEVINSON, THE Box: HOW THE SHIPPING
CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER

(2006); Alexander Jung, The Box That Makes the World Go Round, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 25, 2005, available at http://www.spiegel.

de/international/spiegel/0,1518,386799,00.html.
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ocean trade. 5' These states use a good portion of the profits from this
trade to purchase oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Middle East,
Indonesian archipelago, and parts of western Africa. Supertankers
transport huge amounts of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers
carry tremendous volumes of natural gas through restricted waters of
southeastern Asia to the vibrant but energy-dependent economies of
North and South America, Europe, and southern and eastern Asia.
Despite the tremendous worldwide economic growth exemplified
by China, India, Brazil, and several other developing states, the
American economy remains, by far, the largest and most dynamic in
the world. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the
maritime transportation component to this nation's economy. When
measured by volume, more than 95 % of international trade that enters
or leaves this country does so through the nation's ports and inland
waterways. In 2004, America's ports handled almost 20 million
multimodal shipping containers. 52 Container ships, which account for
only eleven percent of the annual tonnage of waterborne overseas trade,
account for 2/3 of the value of that trade. Several of the 326 or so
seagoing ports in the United States, including LA/Long Beach, New
York, Houston, San Francisco, and Baltimore, are among the busiest in
the world in one or more categories.53 In excess of 2 billion tons of
domestic and international commerce now are carried on the water,
creating more than 13 million jobs and contributing more than $742
billion to the gross national product.54
Multimodal freight
51 Andrew

Marshall, Waterway to the World, TIME ASIA MAG., Jul. 25,
2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/printout0,13675,
501060807-1218608,00.html.
52 John D. Haveman, Howard J. Shatz, & Ernesto A. Vilchis,
US. Port
Security Policy after 9/11: Overview and Evaluation, 2 J. HOMELAND SEC. &
EMERGENCY MGMT. 1 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/
jhsem/vol2/iss2/1.

"Multimodal" means the ability to transfer shipping

containers quickly to and from ocean vessels and other transportation
modalities, such as rail cars, trucks barges, and airplanes.
CALLS

53 OFF. OF STAT. & ECON. ANAL., U.S. MARITIME ADMIN., VESSEL
AT U.S. PORTS, 2004 ix-x, 16-20 (Jul. 2005), available at

http://www.marad.dot.gov/MaradStatistics/vcalls2004.pdf.
U.S.

54 U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION (MARAD), AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
MARINE
TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM
(1999), available at

http://www.maraddot.gov/publications/MTSreport/mtsfinal.pdfSee also U.S.
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 2003-2008 (2003), available
at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/docs/MARAD_2003_2008_strate
gic _plan.pdf.
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transportation accounts for nearly 15% of services the United States
trades internationally. Each year, some 7,500 vessels flying foreign
flags make 51,000 calls in U.S. ports.55
Energy is also a critical and growing import into the United
States. Large tankers that are American owned, operated, or both carry
oil from Valdez, Alaska, to terminals and refineries on the West Coast.
But a much larger volume of oil is imported into ports on the Gulf
Coast from Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Middle East.56
Increasingly, huge LNG tankers call on U.S. terminals to meet the
tremendous and increasing American appetite for natural gas.57
Presently, only six LNG terminals in the United States, but plans are
underway to build dozens more. 8 Because the volume of international
trade is expected to double by 2020 and because the maritime
transportation system is the nation's best means of accommodating that
growth, experts expect that the importance of seaports in the U.S.
59
economy will continue to grow dramatically over the coming years.
While trade has grown dramatically, the potential national
security risks are also far greater and more complex today than they
have ever been in the past. To illustrate, in December, 1941, the
Empire of Japan assembled a fleet consisting of six aircraft carriers,
thousands of men, hundreds of aircraft, and scores of supporting
vessels (including submarines and mini-subs) to attack the U.S. Navy
and Army infrastructure at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This surprise attack
55 THE WHITE HOUSE, SECURING AMERICA'S BORDERS FACT SHEET:

BORDER SECURITY 1 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020125.html.
56 EIA, Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries,
released
January
17,
2007, available at www.eia.doe.gov/pub/
oilgas/petroleum/data_publications/companylevel imports/current/import.ht
ml. Canada is the single nation providing the largest source of foreign oil to the
American market. Id.
57 U.S. LNG imports have been growing dramatically in recent years.
The primary sources of the LNG for consumption in the United States include
Trinidad and Tobago, Algeria, and Nigeria. Energy Information
Administration, US Natural Gas Imports by Country, last updated Jan. 18,
2007, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ngmoveimpc-sl-m.htm.
58 U.S.

COAST

GUARD, THE

U.S. COAST

GUARD

STRATEGY

FOR

MARITIME SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP 18 (2007). See Natural Gas

Intelligence, North American LNG Terminals, Nov. 7, 2006, available at
http://intelligencepress.com/features/lng/.
59 MARAD, supra note 54. See also Jeremy Firestone & James
Corbett, Maritime Transportation:A Third Way for Port and Environmental

Security, 9 WIDENER L. SyMP. J. 419, 422 (2002-2003).
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killed some 2403 service members and 68 civilians, seriously damaged
or destroyed 12 warships and 188 aircraft caused hundreds of millions
of dollars in damages to infrastructure, and plunged the United States
into the Second World War.60 Nearly 60 years later, a mere 15 AlQaeda terrorists hijacked four civilian airliners, caused the death of
nearly 3000 innocent civilians and wreaked incalculable financial costs
by intentionally crashing three of the aircraft into the World Trade
Center towers and Pentagon. As a result, the United States is now
engaged in a "global war on terrorism" (GWOT), with hundreds of
thousands
of casualties on both sides and hundreds of billions of dollars
61
in costs.
Even this level of death and destruction would pale compared to
the potential numbers of casualties, and the hundreds of billions of
dollars in potential destruction and disruption of global trade, were a
nuclear device, "dirty bomb," or other weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) to explode in a major port city such as Long Beach or
Baltimore.62 Experts fear that terrorists could hide such a device in one
of the many thousands of ubiquitous shipping containers imported into
the United States every day.63 Other scenarios, such as the possibility
that terrorists would hijack an LNG carrier and detonate the cargo in a
60 Pearl Harbor Attack ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007),

available at
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9058877/Pearl-Harborattack.
61 See Michael N. Schmitt, US. Security Strategies: A Legal
Assessment, 27 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 737, 73840 (2003-2004); Steven M.
Kosiak, The Cost and Fundingof the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Jan. 18,
2007,
available at http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0701kosiak.pdf
(testimony before Congress).
62

See MICHAEL E.

O'HANLON, PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND:

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 7 (2002) (explaining that not only would such a portsecurity disaster cause mass casualties and destruction, it would require
shutting down the U.S. maritime import and export systems, causing maritime
gridlock, the economic collapse of many businesses, and possible economic
losses totaling $1 trillion).
63 "It is feared that terrorists could use the ubiquitous, anonymous, and
largely innocuous steel boxes and their transport system to devastating effect."
MICHAEL D. GREENBERG ET AL., MARITIME TERRORISM:

RISK AND LIABILITY

111-114 (2006) (footnote omitted). See Justin Mellor, Missing the Boat: The
Legal and PracticalProblems of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 Am.
U. INT'L L. REV. 341, 348-51 (2002-2003); Stephen E. Flynn, Homeland
Security is a Coast Guard Mission, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Oct.

2001, at 72, 72-73.
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populated or industrial area, could also result in devastating
destruction. 64 Assuming a rational and effective connection between
restrictions on port access and efforts to prevent such a disaster, a port
state could condition port access on compliance with virtually any set
of security measures consistent with international law. Likewise, port
states could exert jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels voluntarily in
port, other than sovereign-immune vessels, to carry out virtually any
rational and effective security measure.
On the other hand, policy experts would argue that handcuffing
international trade with irrational, excessive, and ineffective restrictions
would be counterproductive, enormously disruptive, hugely expensive,
and fundamentally unwise.65 Moreover, if the U.S. were to adopt a
policy to conduct wide-ranging, intrusive security raids onboard
foreign-flag vessels voluntarily present in U.S. ports, such heavyhanded tactics would likely prompt international censure and, to some
extent, discourage trade. For national concerns of somewhat lesser
magnitude, such as to prevent customs violations or the importation of
illegal drugs, the imposition of intrusive pre-access requirements, while
legal, should also be directly and reasonably related to the goals to be
accomplished.
C. Analytical Structure. In evaluating the legal principles
governing the legal right of port states to impose conditions on port
entry, this paper will consider the fundamental questions of jurisdiction
of the port state to prescribe laws governing the activities of vessels
entering its ports. The paper will analyze each principle of jurisdiction,
ranging from territoriality to universality. It will then analyze the
nature of the underlying activities, beginning with the most longstanding ones that are directly related to the vessel's visit to the
particular port and proceeding through those which have only recently

64

Terrorist

Council on Foreign Relations, Liquefied Natural Gas: A Potential
Target?,

Feb.

27,

2006,

available

at

http://www.cfr.

org/publication/9810/. See also August Grimmins, Seaports Seen as Terrorist
Target; US. Will Secure Harbors, but Actions Likely to Hurt Trade, WASH.
TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2002, at Al.

There have been disturbing reports of terrorists hijacking supertankers,
practicing handling them, and then stealing manuals on vessel operations
before leaving the ship. See Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Terrorism Goes to Sea,
FOR. AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 61, 68-70.
65 See Mellor, supra note 63, at 348-51. See also Paul W. Parformak,
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues for Congress,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 25-26, Mar. 16, 2005, available at
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05mar/RL32073.pdf.
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been considered as conditions for restricting port entry, such as
requiring other flag states to cooperate in the global war on terrorism.
The more traditional, commonly required, and obvious the condition on
port entry, the more likely it will meet standards of international law
and also the more likely it will be widely regarded as prudent and
necessary.
After analyzing the question of jurisdiction and the various types
of underlying activities, this paper will next consider the nature of the
conditions to be imposed, from something as unobtrusive as requiring
the vessel to notify port authorities of its arrival, to a requirement to
provide a list of the names and nationalities of all passengers and crew
members, to outright denial of access to the port. The conditions may
extend beyond the immediate visit of the vessel to the port state, and
include activities of the vessel on other occasions, of other ships of the
shipping company, or even to that of other vessels of the flag state.
Finally, the paper will consider a list of sixteen relevant
questions that a port state and the international community should ask
with respect to any proposed condition regulating entry into its ports to
ensure that it is reasonable and necessary. The questions deal with a
variety of factors, ranging from the importance of the goal the
regulatory scheme is designed to achieve, to the geographical and
temporal nexus between the vessel and the port state, to the
effectiveness of the proposed regulation, to the acceptance of similar
regulations by the competent international organization and the
international community. The paper will then analyze each of these
sixteen questions with respect to the mandatory pilotage scheme that
Australia is imposing on all larger commercial vessels and tankers
transiting the Torres Strait as an example of how far coastal states are
willing to go to promote domestic policy goals that they deem
important. This paper's goal is to develop and consider objective
criteria to evaluate the legality and wisdom of conditions on port entry.
IV. BASES FOR EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER
COMMERCIAL VESSELS
Before seeking to prescribe or enforce laws and regulations,
international law requires that a state have jurisdiction, or the legal
right and power to impose its national will on another person or entity
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under various circumstances. 66 For seagoing commercial vessels
plying the world's oceans, often far removed from the territory of the
flag state, this basic question becomes one of particular importance.
This portion of the paper will analyze the various bases for exercising
jurisdiction over vessels engaged in international commerce.
A. Territoriality Principle. Territoriality is the jurisdictional
principle that virtually everyone understands. The New York cop on
the beat has jurisdiction - the physical power combined with the legal
right - to arrest and take into custody a malefactor who violates a law
in his or her "territory," such as Manhattan or Queens. The nationality
principle, "law of the flag," gives the flag state jurisdiction over most
aspects of the vessel wherever it may be.67 At the same time, the
primary jurisdictional basis for prescribing and applying criminal laws
and domestic regulations to seagoing vessels voluntarily within the port
or internal waters of another state is the territoriality principle.68
International law does not extend the territoriality principle to permit
the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over warships and government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes "because of the immunity
that they enjoy under customary international law."69 With respect to
foreign-flag commercial vessels voluntarily, if only temporarily,
present in U.S. internal waters, the exercise of jurisdiction over matters
of vital importance to the port state based on the territoriality principle
is not controversial. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in 1923:
A merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering
another subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the
latter. ...

Of course, the local sovereign may out of

considerations of public policy choose to forego the
exertion of its jurisdiction or to exert the same in only

66 RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, at 230-32, 235-37, 304-05, 320-21

(discussion of the principles of jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and
enforce).
67 See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 154-55 (1933) (under
the
nationality principle, the law of the flag a ship is entitled to fly governs all
crimes committed on board).

supra note 9, § 402, cmt. c. But see Lauritzen, 345
U.S. at 584 (territorial principle "usually is modified by the more constant law
of the flag.").
69 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 99 (citation to UNCLOS, art.
68 RESTATEMENT,

32, omitted).
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a limited way, but that is a matter resting solely in its
discretion. 70

For example, if the master of a foreign-flag merchant vessel
violates a criminal law or regulation of a port state while it is at anchor
or alongside the pier, the port state has jurisdiction because the offense
was committed within its territory. This territoriality principle, in
which the coastal state exercises sovereignty, extends at least to the
outer limit of the territorial sea, which usually extends to 12-nautical
miles (nm) from the coastline. 71 For certain offenses, such as illegal
fishing, sovereign rights to prescribe and enforce to protect resources
extend out to the outer limit of the coastal state's EEZ, usually 200-nm
from the coastline.72 While port states generally decline to exercise
jurisdiction when the crime committed on the vessel only affects the
"internal discipline" of a vessel,
certain crimes, such as murder, are
so infamous as to fall under the jurisdictional cognizance of the port
state, even over the objections of the vessel's master and diplomatic
representatives of the vessel's flag state. This is because such offenses
disturb the "peace and tranquility of the country to which the vessel has
been brought." 74

70 CunnardS.S. Co.,

262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923). See Benz v. Compania

Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 142 (1957) ("It is beyond question that a
ship voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another country subjects itself
to the laws and jurisdiction of that country."). See also MCDOUGAL & BURKE,
supra note 1, at 156 ("It is universally acknowledged that once a ship
voluntarily enters a port it becomes fully subject to the law and regulations
prescribed by the officials of that territory.")
71 Id. at 122. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 2(I) ("The sovereignty of a
coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters ... to an
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.") See also United States v.
Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1980).
72 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 56 ("sovereign rights" and "jurisdiction"
within the EEZ).
73"[lit would be beneficial to commerce if the local government would
abstain from interfering with the internal discipline of the ship, and the general
regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel,
or among themselves." Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus' Case),
120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
74Id. (U.S. domestic law applied to a murder committed on board a
foreign ship while it was present in an American port over the objections of the
vessel's master and the flag State). See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at
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Most of the issues that involve imposing conditions on port
entry, such as complying with customs requirements, equipping and
manning the vessel properly so as to ensure navigational safety, not
trafficking in drugs or illegal immigrants, and not importing illegally
taken fish clearly take place within the territory of the port state and
potentially affect the state's vital interests. Although international law
limits the enforcement jurisdiction of the port state over vessels simply
engaged in passage through its territorial sea, contiguous zone, or
archipelagic waters, the port state reasonably would have jurisdiction if
the foreign-flag vessel were to enter port after having committed an
offense within waters subject to its jurisdiction. For example, a
commercial vessel that discharged oily water into the territorial sea
while entering San Francisco Bay in violation of the Clean Water Act,
as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), and failed to
report it as the Act and implementing regulations require would be
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. laws and administrative sanctions
under the territoriality principle." Indeed, the most common violation
of vessel pollution laws may be the failure to maintain an accurate Oil
Record Book. Although the illegal discharge may have occurred on the
high seas, it is an offense subject to U.S. jurisdiction to enter port with
an inaccurate Oil Record Book that the vessel presents to Coast Guard
inspectors as accurate.76 On the other hand, states are reluctant to
impose rules and regulations with respect to vessel construction,
manning, safety, and pollution control which diverge markedly from
international standards, even when the vessel is present within its
territory.7 Although the United States in the past has chosen to impose
66-67 (citing cases for the proposition that "local jurisdiction will be asserted
when the offense affects the peace or good order of the port either literally...
or in some constructive sense.")
75 The Federal Water Pollution Control of 1977 (FWPCA), a amended
by the Oil Polluton Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330, as well as the
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-15 apply, inter
alia, to foreign vessels operating in U.S. navigable waters or while at a port or
terminal within U.S. jurisdiction. See United States v. Hyundai Merchant
Marine Co., Ltd., 172 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally 33
C.F.R. pts. 151 & 153.
6 33 U.S.C. §§ 1907(a), 1908(a) (violations and criminal penalties); 33
C.F.R. §§ 151.09, 151.25. See United States v. Abrogar, 459 F.3d 430, 437 (3d
Cir. 2006) (noting in dicta that the "'offense of conviction' - taking into
account the text of the relevant provisions of the APPS and accompanying
regulations - was the 'failure to maintain an accurate oil record book while in
U.S. waters or in a U.S. port."')
77 See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 21(2) (laws and regulations adopted
by the coastal State "shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or
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certain more stringent construction standards and equipment
requirements for vessels engaged in trading in the lucrative American
market, the international norm is to require conformity only with the
minimum standards that the International Maritime Organization has
established. Finally, even though territorial jurisdiction may exist, U.S.
and international law requires that states not regulate activities on board
affecting only the "internal affairs" or "internal economy" of the vessel,
such as those related to labor, wages, shipboard discipline, or other
personnel matters.78
B. Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Law. As a
general rule, "the coastal State has no jurisdiction over vessels for acts
which took place during navigation on the high seas. 79 Under certain
circumstances, however, international law permits extraterritorial
application of domestic penal laws and administrative regulations. In
the United States, federal courts have repeatedly held that such
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be constitutional.8 0 Indeed, federal
courts have held that, if it chooses to do so, Congress may legislate
with respect to conduct outside the United States beyond the limits
imposed by international law. 81 However, because there is a

equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted
international rules or standards."); see also id., art. 211 ("Pollution from
vessels").

Laurizen, 345 U.S. at 593. See Jason M. Schupp, The Clay Bill:
Testing the Limits of Port State Sovereignty, 18 MD. J.INT'L L. & TRADE 199,
78

211 (1994) ("The United States... has adopted the internal economy doctrine
as an obligation imposed by international law.") (footnote omitted). See also
id.
at 221-226 (discussing cases in which Federal law was not applied to labor
and personnel matters).
79 Degan, supra note 34, at 26. Dr. Kasoulides notes that normally the
port State's "customary competence is not extended to incidents preceding the
entry of the vessel into any state's jurisdictional zones, [but that] a sequence of
drastic changes in law and practice has contributed in fact to an enhancement of
the port regime even in this respect." KASOULIDES, supra note 14, at 183.
80 The Supreme Court has held that extraterritorial jurisdiction
exists
over aliens when a conspiracy had for its object crime in the United States and
overt acts were committed in the United States by co-conspirators. Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 624 (1927). See also United States v. FelixGutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pinto-Mejia,
720 F.2d 248, 261 (2d Cir. 1983).
81 United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982) (the U.S. Congress "may violate international law
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presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction, U.S. courts will not
construe that congressional statutes have extraterritorial application
unless the Congress has8 2clearly manifested its intent to do so in the
statutory language itself.
In analyzing whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate in
a particular case, U.S. courts undertake a two-part inquiry: (1) Is it
clear from the text of the statute that Congress intended to apply it
outside the territory of the United States? (2) Would the extraterritorial
application of the statute on the facts presented be consistent with
relevant principles of international law? 8' The first of these questions
requires that the law make congressional intent to impose
extraterritorial application sufficiently clear to overcome the
presumption that laws generally apply only to the territory of the
country in which they were enacted. For example, in 14 U.S.C. §
89(a), Congress specifically authorizes the Coast Guard to search
vessels and make arrests on the high seas for violations of certain
offenses." Likewise, the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States" includes the high seas for a limited set of criminal
offenses.85
The second question ensures that the application does not violate
fundamental principles of international law, particularly those
involving due process. At least as applied in the United States,
international law recognizes that states have jurisdiction to prescribe
laws and sanction conduct committed outside the territory of the forum
state on five separate principles. These "five well-recognized bases of
principles to effectively carry out this nation's policies."); see also United
States v. Gaitlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211-212 (2d Cir. 2000).
82 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993). "That
presumption has special force when we are construing treaty and statutory
provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President
has unique responsibility." Id. See also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949). The Supreme Court recently called this the "clear statement"
requirement.
(2005).

Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 129

United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d. 419, 421 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-99 (1922).
84 For an interesting discussion of whether the exercise of such Coast
Guard jurisdiction is consistent with the U.S. Constitution, see Megan Jaye
Kight, ConstitutionalBarriers to Smooth Sailing: 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) and the
Fourth Amendment, 72 IND. L.J. 571 (1997).
85 18 U.S.C. § 7; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a) ("Abusive sexual
contact").
83
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criminal jurisdiction"8 6 include: (1) the objective territorial principle
(the "effects principle"); (2) the nationality principle; (3) the protective
principle; (4) the passive personality principle; and (5) the universality
principle.87 Unless one or more of these jurisdictional bases exist in a
particular factual situation before it, a U.S. federal court would likely
find a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in
convicting a defendant for an action that took place outside the territory
of the United States. s This paper will now consider each briefly as it
relates to extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign vessels.
(1) Objective Territorial Principle. Jurisdiction with respect to
the activity of a vessel that takes place outside the port state, but that
has (or could have) substantial effects within the state's territory, falls
under the objective territorial principle.8 9 This is also known as the
"effects principle." 90 For example, if a foreign-flag vessel knowingly
discharges oil on the high seas or within a coastal state's 200-nm EEZ
in violation of MARPOL, and the discharged oil subsequently pollutes
the coastline or substantially damages the natural resources of the
coastal state, international law grants the coastal state jurisdiction to
prescribe sanctions. 9' If the vessel is voluntarily in port or at an offshore terminal, the port state may "institute proceedings in respect of
United States v. Yousef 327 F.3d 56, 91 n.24 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402 and cmts. a-g.
87 In 1935, an influential article first suggested these five bases for
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes. Draft Convention on Research in
International Law of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 467 (Supp. 1935).
88 Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 259.
See generally Christopher L.
86

Blakesley, ExtraterritonalJurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50-

81 (2d ed.1999).
89 See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d. 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980)
(extraterritorial application of statute appropriate under the objective territorial
principle).
90 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402, cmt. d. See United States v.
MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 (1Ith Cir. 1998) ("objective territorial" or
"effects" principle provided jurisdiction over a conspiracy by Canadian citizen
to import cocaine into the United States).
9' See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 ("Oil and hazardous substance liability"). See
generally Jim Rubin & Shata Stuky, Fighting Black Markets and Oily Water:
The Department of Justice's National Initiatives to Combat Transnational
Environmental Crimes, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 21, 25-26 (2004)

("Vessel Pollution Initiative").
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any violation of its laws and regulations adopted.., for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution from vessels when the violation has
occurred within the territorial sea or the exclusive economic zone of
that state."92 Moreover, for those serious pollution incidents, "[w]here
there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating in the
exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea" has committed a
violation causing or threatening "major damage to the coastline or
related interests of the coastal state," the coastal state may "institute
proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its
laws. 9 a Any such coastal laws, however, must be implementing, 9or4 at
least consistent with, "applicable international rules and standards.
The coastal state also may take such additional extraordinary
measures as may be necessary beyond its territorial sea "proportionate
to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution
following upon a maritime casualty

. . .

which may reasonably be

expected to result in major harmful consequences. 95
This
extraordinary power of the coastal state gives rise to a jurisdictional
principle that both customary and conventional law recognize. The
principle stems from international approval of the British actions to
protect its coastline from the massive oil spill following the Torrey
Canyon incident in 1967, when British authorities bombed the
commercial tanker to set fire to its hazardous cargo. 96 The perceived
need to respond in similar incidents led the international community to
adopt the Convention Related to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases
of Pollution Casualities in 1969.97 Although many foreign states
object, U.S. courts have also held that the objective territorial principle
permits the coastal state to exercise jurisdiction over economic
activities intended to have a substantial effect within the territory of

92

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 220(1).

See generally Tatjana Keselj,

Port State Jurisdictionin Respect of Pollutionfrom Ships: The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memorandum of Understanding,30
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 207,216-27 (2000)
93UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 220(6).
94 Id., arts. 219, 220(3).
See Emeka Duruigbo, Reforming the
InternationalLaw and Policy on Marine Oil Pollution, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM.
65, 76-77 (2000).
95 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 22 1(1).
96 CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 13, at 216.
97 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 970 U.N.T.S.
211.
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that state, such as a conspiracy among foreign shipping companies to
monopolize trade in a particular commodity in the forum state.
(2) Nationality Principle. The nationality principle provides for
jurisdiction over the extraterritorial acts committed by a state's own
citizens outside the boundaries of the forum state. 99 Although normally
applied to individuals, that principle extends as well to juridical
persons, such as a corporation or a registered vessel flying the flag of
that state.l1° Under the law of the sea, the flag state has the near
exclusive right to exercise legislative and enforcement jurisdiction on
the high seas over those vessels to which it has granted the right to sail
under its flag.' 0' Moreover, the jurisdiction of the flag state extends
wherever vessels flying its flag happen to find themselves. Even in a
foreign port, the flag state governs crimes and regulatory violations that
affect the "internal affairs" of the ship, and concurrent jurisdiction over
crimes over which the port state may insist on the exercise of
jurisdiction. 0 2 The flag state has an international legal obligation to
impose requirements on its flag vessels with respect to international
conventions to which it is a party. Although port state control is
increasingly effective, it is incumbent upon the state of registry to adopt
98 See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d. 1287,

1292 (3d. Cir. 1979). However, several States, notably the United Kingdom,
have objected to application of the effects principle of jurisdiction to economic
offenses, such as shipping legislation, that do not constitute a crime in the other
country. See A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 260 (1981)
(British opponents contended that the U.S. was violating international law, and
not just principles of comity, in extending jurisdiction over shipping).
99 RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, § 402, cmt. e.

1oo Id. See CunnardS.S. Co., 262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923) (observing that
a flag State's jurisdiction over a vessel "partakes more of the characteristics of
personal than of territorial sovereignty.")
But see HAIJANG YANG,
JURISDICTION OF THE COASTAL STATE OVER FOREIGN MERCHANTS SHIPS IN

INTERNAL WATERS AND THE TERRITORIAL SEA 26 (2006) (noting "some debate

as to the nature of flag State jurisdiction" and concluding that it "should be
considered a jurisdiction sui generis." Id.).
101 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92(1). See also CHURCHILL & LOWE,

supra note 13, at 208-09.

See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963). See also YANG, supra note 100, at 83, 92 ("the
unpleasant truth is that restraint in coastal State jurisdiction appears to have
diminished, if not totally evaporated." Id. at 83.).
102
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national laws and regulations governing vessels flying its flag to ensure
efficient and safe transport of passengers and cargo, monitoring and
enforcing compliance with a variety of obligations to
ensure safe ships,
03
manned by qualified officers and competent crews.1
The nationality principle is particularly important in today's
world because it permits the flag state to authorize other states to
exercise jurisdiction.01 4 The United States takes full advantage of such
authorization to pursue maritime drug traffickers on foreign-flag
vessels with which it has an agreement with the flag state. The United
States Code provides:
"For purposes of this section [governing
narcotic offenses on vessels], a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States includes- . . . (C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation
where the flag nation has consented or waived objection to the
enforcement of United States law by the United States."' 0 5 While this
extension of the nationality principle is currently commonly used in
combating maritime trafficking in illegal drugs and illegal fishing
activities,'0 6 it has the potential to be used in other important contexts
in which international cooperation is vital, including countering
maritime terrorism and in efforts to locate weapons of mass destruction
carried on foreign-flag vessels engaged in international trade. 10 7
An interesting application of the nationality principle applies in
cases of vessels operating on the high seas without nationality.
According to international and domestic law, all vessels must have a
nationality. As Professors Churchill and Lowe have observed, "Ships
without nationality are in a curious position."'' 08 Whether the basis is a
borrowed nationality or an application of universal jurisdiction, a
103

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 94(3). SOHN & NOYEs, supra note 29,

at 149-50.

104 See United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 402-03 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 969 (2002) (Panama authorized U.S. Coast Guard
authorities to detain, search, and seize Panamanian-flag vessel carrying cocaine
bound for Canada. The court concluded that there was no due process
violation, nothing fundamentally arbitrary or unfair, in exercising jurisdiction
with the express permission of the flag State.)
105 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1).
On Oct. 6, 2006, Congress
recodified, without substantive change, 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903 and many other
sections of existing law. Pub. L. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1485.
106 See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(44).
107 See generally Stephen J. Adler, Fighting Terrorism in the New

Age: A Call for ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Over Terrorists, 18 UNIV. SAN
FRANCIsCO MARITIME L. J. 171-199 (2005-06).

108 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 214.
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stateless ship is not entitled to the protection of any state, and may be
subject to the jurisdiction of any state that has an interest in prosecuting
an offense it has committed. 1° 9 Similarly, a ship that sails under the
flag of two or more states, using them according to convenience, is not
entitled to the protection of either state, "and may be assimilated to a
ship without nationality."' "10 In various types of legislation, Executive
Orders, and regulations, the United States exerts jurisdiction over
stateless vessels. For example, the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act
of 1995 gives the United States the ability to prosecute vessels without
nationality found on the high seas violating any international
conservation and management measure the United States recognizes."'
(3) Protective Principle. Under the protective, or security,
principle, international law recognizes the right of a state to exercise
jurisdiction to punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its
territory by persons who are not its nationals." 2 The protective
principle "permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose
conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security or
could potentially interfere with the operation of its governmental
functions."' 1 3 An additional requirement for the proper application of
109

Id. See H. Edwin Anderson III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags

of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 MAR. LAW. 139,
141-43 (1996).
110 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92(2).
1
High Seas Fishing Compliance Act of 1995 §§ 103, 106, and 107,
Pub. L. No. 104-43, 109 Stat. 367 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§

5502(10), 5505, and 5506). The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act of 1980
(MDLEA) § 4, Pub. L. No. 96-350. 94 Stat. 1160 (codified as amended at 46
App. U.S.C. § 1903(c)), included similar provisions to define and provide
jurisdiction over vessels without nationality. See United States v. MartiniezHidalgo, 993 F.2d. 1052, 1054-55 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1048
(1994).
112 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402, cmt. f. See Chua Han Mow v.
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) (United States had
jurisdiction to prosecute alien defendant even though all unlawful acts were
committed in Malaysia, both because the effects of the crime would be felt in
the U.S., and the need to protect U.S. interests against illegal drugs).
"3
United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d. 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985)
(finding extraterritorial application of the MDLEA constitutional, particularly
given the High Seas Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
10. The protective principle permits a State to assert jurisdiction over aliens for
any crime committed outside its territory impinging upon the security,
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the protective principle is that the conduct prosecuted must be
"generally recognized as a crime under the laws of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems."'" 14 In defining the "Special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" for certain
criminal offenses, Congress included "[a]ny place outside the
jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense . . . against a
'
national of the United States." 115
Examples of such offenses are those
directed against the security of the state, or other offenses threatening
the integrity of governmental functions that developed legal systems
recognize as crimes, such as counterfeiting currency or forging
passports. 116

U.S. federal courts have held that the "protective principle" of
jurisdiction in international law justified the exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign ships on the high seas to enforce narcotics legislation "to
such an extent and to so great a distance as is reasonable and necessary
to protect itself and its citizens from injury .

.

.

.,1

Federal

jurisdiction is proper under the protective principle "if the activity
threatens the security or governmental functions of the United States.
Drug trafficking presents the sort of threat to our nation's ability to
function that merits application of the protective principle of
jurisdiction."'" 8 However, other federal courts have held that the U.S.
Constitution requires the Government to demonstrate an adequate
nexus between the prohibited activity and the United States."19

territorial integrity, or political independence.); United States v. Marino-Garcia,
679 F.2d. 1373, 1381 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983).
114 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 936 (1968) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 33 (1965)).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) ("Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States defined").
116 United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811-12 (4th Cir. 1972) ( "The
protective principle . . . provides an appropriate jurisdictional

base for

prosecuting a person who, acting beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States, falsifies its official documents.").
"' Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 939 (quoting United States v. Romero-Galue,
757 F.2d. 1147, 1154 n.2 (I Ith Cir. 1985)).
118 United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
"9
United States v. Perlaza, 493 F.3d 1149, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006); see
also United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (questioning the
reasonableness of a overly broad reading of the "protective principle" because
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As the world community increasingly views international
terrorism as a serious threat to global peace and security, it is likely to
recognize exercises of jurisdiction to interdict the means, methods, and
personnel designed to accomplish a terrorist attack as prudent and
necessary.120 Likewise, the protective principle of jurisdiction would
be used as a jurisdictional basis to interdict the transportation of
weapons of mass destruction or missile technology on the high seas,
even in cases of vessels flying flags from states that are not party to the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or other relevant international
agreement.
If the protective principle applies in cases of drug
conspiracies on the high seas, it would certainly apply when the
potential threat involves weapons of mass destruction being transported
on the high seas for use by international terrorists.
Even so,
coordination with the flag State in such circumstances would be
consistent with international expectations.
(4) Passive Personality Principle.
Under the passive
personality principle, a state may assert jurisdiction over criminal
activity committed outside its territory by non-nationals where the
victim of the crime is one of its citizens. 121 Although not generally
applied to ordinary crimes and tortious conduct, 122 this principle is
increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks
on a state's citizens by reason of their nationality, or at least where the

such a reading would allow the United States to police any international
conduct "against [any] important state interests".).
120
See Yousef 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding jurisdiction
over a terrorist conspiracy made in the Philippines to blow up foreign-flag
aircraft outside the United States under the protective principle). See also id.,
at 86. "Moreover, the presumption against extraterritorial application does not
apply to those 'criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent
on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction."' (quoting Bowman, 260
U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
121

United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d. 1121, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(applying the passive personality principle where the victim in an air hijacking
was targeted because he was an American citizen).
122

See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th

Cir. 1994) (holding that the passive personality principle applied in the case of
a murder in Mexico of two members of the Drug Enforcement Agency, but

observing, "[i]f the evidence at trial only suggested that two tourists were
randomly murdered, extraterritorial [jurisdiction] would be inappropriate.")
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state has a particularly strong interest in preventing the crime.' 23 In an
effort to combat terrorism outside the territory of the United States, the
Congress relied upon the passive personality principle in enacting the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 124 and the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.125 In the
international context, the 1984 Convention Against Torture authorizes a
state to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction "when the victim is a
national of that State if that State considers it appropriate." 26 Congress
has extended the passive personality principle to permit the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime of sexual contact with a
minor on a foreign-flag cruise ship; in 2002, the 9th Circuit upheld this
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least in a case where the
victim was an American
citizen and the cruise was scheduled to begin
127
and end at a U.S. port.

(5) Universality Principle.
The "universality principle"
provides for jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts that are so heinous as
to be universally condemned by all civilized nations. 28 These include
piracy, 129 genocide,' 3 0 engaging in the slave trade and apartheid-like
123

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, § 402, cmt. g; United States v.

Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1216 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137
(1985) (court invoked passive-personality principle in prosecution of
Colombian citizen convicted of killing U.S. agents in Colombia).
124
See, e.g., The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA). 110 Stat. 1214, § 722 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2280(b)).
125 18 U.S.C. §§
2331-2332b.
See Patrick L. Donnelly,
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad:
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 599 (1987). "The statute bases jurisdiction on the passive personality
principle . . . rather than concepts of territoriality or nationality." Id.at 599
(footnotes omitted).
126 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5(l)(c), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85.
127 18 U.S.C. § 7(8); United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 422 (9th Cir.
2002).
128 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 404 & cmt. a.
129 All States have a duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 100. Punishment of piracy is the responsibility of
the State that seizes the pirate(s), a principle recognized in the U.S. since the
early days of the Republic. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
161-62 (1820). See CHURCHILL& LOWE, supra note 13, at 209-11.
130 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Although the Convention defines
"genocide" and makes violating it a universal crime, states Party to it must
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practices, hijacking of and attacks on passenger aircraft in flight, and
other universally recognized "crimes against humanity."'131 Some
scholars have even found universal jurisdiction evidenced in the text of
several international conventions, such as the 1988 Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation.
In many cases, the relevant international agreement
requires that party states prosecute or extradite suspects. 3 3 However,
largely because of the lack of precise definitions of these crimes,134 the
universality principle has not yet extended more broadly to include
such offenses as drug trafficking, terrorism,1 35 human trafficking, 136or
the physical or sexual abuse of children. 137 Moreover, if used

establish an international tribunal to try those accused of it, unless the crime has
taken place within the territory of one of the States. See art. 6.
131 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction of International
Crimes: Historic Perspectivesand ContemporaryPractice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
80, 108-124 (2001-2002).
132 Id. at 126-27.
See Rome Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 7(4, 5), Mar. 10,
1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201, reprintedin 27 1.L.M. 668 (1988).
133 See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Seizure of Aircraft, art. 4(3), Dec, 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
The United States is usually party to such treaties.
134 Professor Bassiouni would extend greatly the concept of universal
jurisdiction, including these and other jus cogens offenses, such as "war
crimes" and torture, that the international community has had some difficulty in
defining. See Bassiouni, supra note 131, at 125-28.
135 One person's despicable "terrorist" is another's revered "freedom
fighter." See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Summer, 1986, at 901-04 (discussing the difficulty in reaching agreement on
defining terrorism and outlawing terrorists in the modem age). See generally
Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy
and Terrorism in the Wake of September 1 1 h, 27 TUL. MAR. L. J. 257, 257-276
(2002).
136 See Terry Coonan & Robin Thompson, Ancient Evil, Modern Face:
The Fight Against Human Trafficking, 63 GEORGETOWN J. INT'L AFF. 43, 43-51
(Winter-Spring 2005) (discussing recent international and domestic efforts to
implement effective criminal measures against human trafficking, "a shadow
slave industry that annually yields an estimated $9 billion in profits." Id. at
45.)
137 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 404, cmt. a. See, e.g., United States

v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (In affirming the conviction of an
American pedophile who committed his crimes in Cambodia, the court relied
on the nationality, rather than universality, principle).
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indiscriminately, and/or for political or propaganda reasons, the
universality principle of jurisdiction could create considerable friction

between states. 138
C.
Limitations on Jurisdiction and the Concept of
Reasonableness.
The previous section discussed the fundamental
bases by which states may exercise jurisdiction, whether within the
territory of the state or beyond. In many cases, if not most, port state
jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce does not raise a problem.
However, there are other limitations on a state's jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce its laws.' 39 Whether the exercise of jurisdiction
over a person, vessel, or activity in a particular set of circumstances
comports with international law depends on whether such exercise is
reasonable and necessary so as to make it fundamentally fair or
unfair. 140
Determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate or
not depends on a variety of relevant factors. These factors include: the
nature and extent of the link between the person, vessel, or activity and
the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction; the character of the activity to
be regulated, including the importance to the regulating state; the
importance of the exercise of jurisdiction to the international
community; the possibility of conflict with another state's interests; the
costs associated with defending in the forum state; and the expectations
and traditions of the international legal system.14 ' Even where there is
a clear territorial nexus between the vessel and the regulating state,
another affected state may apply the relevant principles of international
law and conclude that it would be unreasonable to regulate activities on
138

Such potential underlies the concerns of the United States (and

certain other States) in signing the International Criminal Court (ICC). See
Symposium, Toward and InternationalCriminal Court? A Debate, 14 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 159, 160-197 (2000).
139
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 403 & cmt. a. As the ICJ stated in
the Anglo-Norwegian case, it is incumbent on the coastal State to conduct its
policy "within the bounds of what is moderate and reasonable ....
AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 142.
140
Id. See Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court 480 U.S.
102, 114 (1987) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction by a California court
over a Japanese corporation "in this instance would be unreasonable and
unfair."); see generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316-17 (1945) (discussion of "reasonableness" and "fairness" in an interstate
context).
141 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 403(2) (list of relevant factors),
cmts. b-g (discussion).
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the vessel. Any such attempt to do so could result in international
friction. For example, with respect to international safety standards for
vessels entering a U.S. port, it is perfectly proper to impose regulations,
and penalize any failure to observe them. However, it would be
counterproductive and unreasonable to seek to impose domestic law to
regulate the entire spectrum of labor relations of a foreign-flag vessel
that regularly calls on U.S. ports. In applying and interpreting the law
of the respective lands, governmental agents and domestic courts will
seek to avoid an expansive jurisdictional mandate unless the Congress
has made it manifest that is what should be done.
As Judge Learned Hand phrased it, courts should not assume that
Congress intended to "punish all whom [our] courts can catch, for
conduct which has no consequences within the United States."'142 The
extent to which a coastal state has jurisdiction to impose conditions on
port entry depends upon the reasonableness of the exercise of
jurisdiction, taking into account all of the relevant factors. The more
vital the interest and the more the exercise of jurisdiction is directly
related to protecting or promoting it, the more likely the international
community will respect it as appropriate. This paper provides a list of
useful questions to analyze the reasonableness of conditions on port
entry, and thus the legality, in a later section. 43 Before doing so,
however, it is appropriate to analyze various traditional and emerging
areas of state practice, particularly those of the United States, in
imposing conditions on entry or on the exercise of jurisdiction over
foreign vessels in the waters of the coastal state in various settings.
V. TRADITIONAL CONDITIONS ON ENTRY DIRECTLY
RELATED TO THE VESSEL'S PORT VISIT
A. Port Security. Historically, as well as presently, the most
vital single concern that a coastal state has had with respect to one or
more foreign vessels entering its ports and internal waters involves its
own security. As the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed it, "it is
'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more

142

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,

443 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally John M. Raymond, A New Look at the
Jurisdictionin Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1961) (discussing the criticism of

the "effects doctrine" as a basis for jurisdiction in international trade cases).
143

See infra Section IX.C.
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compelling than the security of the Nation."'144 As the English, Irish,
and French lookouts and private citizens stared awestruck out to sea in
the years around the turn of the first millennium, they did not wonder
whether the dozen or so longboats manned by Viking warriors they
observed rowing into their port or up their river were coming to engage
in peaceful and productive trade. Instead, they were convinced, based
on dreadful experience, that these Vikings were hell-bent on raiding
their port village, pillaging its riches, and abusing and murdering its
inhabitants. In short, the security of their homeland was in peril.
For what good it might do, a port or nation obviously has always
had the right to prohibit the entry of any vessel determined to inflict
death and destruction upon it. In like manner, the port state could
mandate a requirement that the pirate ship or foreign-flag raider disarm
itself before entering or sign a promise that no member of the crew
would engage in any violent or illegal activities while in port. The
problem was that, when faced with marauding Chinese pirates,
Phoenician raiders, or Vikings, the denizens of the beleaguered coastal
port usually did not have the resources to insist on anything of the sort.
Instead, the security forces and inhabitants could only run deep into the
forest, row or sail further up the river, or climb the nearest
mountainside, hoping that the raiders would not find the treasure
hidden in the cave or overtake and murder them as they fled.
Of course, pirates and other maritime raiders no longer represent
a direct threat to Los Angeles, Lisbon, or Sydney. Nonetheless, in the
wake of 9/11, national security concerns remain paramount throughout
the world. Experts conclude that the greatest single security risk to
America and its allies today is a surreptitious terrorist attack on or by
way of port cities using nuclear weapons. 145 To prevent the massive
number of innocent deaths, physical destruction, and financial
disruption that this would entail, 146 a coastal state may legally do
144

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v.

Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
145 Jonathan Medalia, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat
and Response, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1, 1-2 (Jan.

24, 2005); Mellor, supra note 63, at 346-47 (focusing on the problem of
weapons shipped into the U.S. in a cargo container); see Flynn, supra note 63,
at 72-73 (the United States has a pressing need to defend against terrorist
attacks at vulnerable seaports).
146 According to one study, a 10-kiloton weapon detonated in a major
seaport would kill as many as one million people and inflict as much as $1.7
trillion dollars in property damage, trade disruption, and indirect costs. Dr.
Clark C. Abt, ABT Associates, Executive Summary: The Economic Impact of
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almost anything reasonably necessary to protect against such a threat.
This paper will discuss in detail the various possibilities of how far a
port state may go to ensure port security during times of war or to
protect against actual or potential threats to national security, such as
from possible terrorist attacks. 147 Before doing so, however, this paper
will first analyze the traditional requirements for port access properly
demanded of bona fide commercial vessels to comply with domestic
laws to ensure good order and to protect the legitimate interests of the
port state.
B. Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitation, and Customs Laws and
Regulations. Beyond seeking to ensure the security of the port state,
the most long-standing, traditional requirements attendant to a
commercial vessel entering a foreign port facility are those that ensure
the ships have complied with port state laws designed to ensure
compliance with those involving fiscal, immigration, sanitation, and
customs (FISC) requirements. From the time that the city fathers of
Venice imposed taxes and fees on the foreign merchants seeking entry
to trade their wares, or the authorities of Tokyo required foreign ships
to comply with domestic laws related to sanitation and immigration,
coastal states have exacted financial requirements and imposed
requirements to ensure that the port state benefited from seaborne trade
rather than suffered adverse consequences.
All states today agree with the basic principle that a coastal state
may condition a foreign ship's access to port upon compliance with
laws and regulations governing "the conduct of the business of the port
... provided that these measures comply with the principle of equality
of treatment" provided foreign-flag vessels. 48 In the United States,
Congress has provided for a regulatory scheme related to each FISC149
related requirement, including: port clearance and entry procedures;

Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport

Vulnerability, Apr. 30, 2003, p. 3, available at www.abtassociates.
com/reports/ES-Economic-Impact of NuclearTerroristAttacks.pdf.
147
See infra Section V. ("Conditions on Entry Related to National
Defense, Homeland Security, Counterterrorism, and Law Enforcement
Concerns")
148
Convention and Statute on the International Rdgime of Maritime
Ports, supra note 8, art. 3; see also UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 25(2).
149
See, e.g., 46 App. U.S.C. § 91; 46 U.S.C. §§ 42107 and 52305
("Refusal of clearance and entry").
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several related to2

and sanitation and health regulations.)

restrictions on immigration;'
No one doubts the legal authority or, indeed the necessity of, denying
access to a foreign ship for entry to a port if passengers or members of
the crew on board carry a serious infectious disease, such as
tuberculosis or the plague. 5 3 Likewise, a port state may take necessary
and effective steps to ensure that the vessel is free of such diseases,
such as requiring that a local public health official first visit the vessel
to confirm that the crew and passengers are free of infectious disease
before granting port access. 154 International law grants to coastal states
the right to take necessary and appropriate actions to prevent the entry
into the port of stowaways, absconders, deserters, or other illegal
immigrants. i5 5 Among those are the rights to inquire as to the

"so

46 App. U.S.C. §§ 121-135. Note that tonnage duty is to be paid

based on the displacement of the vessel, while the tariff or customs duty is a
separate levy based on the value of the imported merchandise.
1
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181 ("Admission of immigrants into the
U.S."), 1281-1287 ("Alien crewmen").
"'2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 264-272, and 9 C.F.R. § 93.106 ("Quarantine
requirements" for animal and plants being imported into the United States.)
153 Congress has provided statutory authority for controlling infectious
diseases, including quarantining of suspect vessels and their crews and
passengers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 264-272. The President regularly updates the list of
communicable diseases subject to quarantine. Exec. Order No. 13,295, Apr. 4,
2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 264, as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,375, Apr. 1, 2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 17299 (Apr. 5,
2005). He has also delegated to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
his authority to carry out duties under the statute. Id. See also 42 C.F.R. pts 71
& 72.
154
See 42 U.S.C. § 267(a): "[The Surgeon General] shall from time to
time select suitable sites for and establish such additional ... anchorages in the
States and possessions of the United States as in his judgment are necessary to
prevent the introduction of communicable diseases into the States and
possessions of the United States." "It shall be the duty of the customs officers
and of Coast Guard officers to aid in the enforcement of quarantine rules and
regulations...." 42 U.S.C. § 268(b).
155 "The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty."
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950). In 1981, President
Reagan ordered the Coast Guard to interdict vessels on the high seas where
there was reason to believe the vessel was engaged in the transportation of
illegal immigrants. Pres. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107, 48,109
(Sept. 29, 1981). President Bush issued similar guidance in 1992. Exec. Order
No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). This policy remains in effect today.
See Gary W. Palmer, Guarding the Coast: Alien Migrant Interdiction
Operations at Sea, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 1565, 1569-72 (1997).
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nationality, demand to see each passport or other identify document,
and determine the status and intentions of crew members and
passengers.

For many years, each port state established its own paperwork
and procedural requirements for foreign vessels to complete and
submit. As international trade became more universal and essential, the
hundreds of different procedural requirements and forms became
burdensome, particularly where the failure to complete a particular
document in a particular way caused the responsible bureaucrat to deny
or delay port access or to delay departure. In some ports, a customs
official would "overlook" a missing document or "assist" a master in
filling out the required forms properly in exchange for an under-thetable payment. Even where no bribes or other chicanery was involved,
the cost, confusion, and delay inherent in complying with varying local
laws and completing a plethora of different documents were
considerable.
To help ameliorate the problem of burdensome forms and
differing port-access requirements, the 1965 FAL Convention
established standard practices with respect to documents and
procedures that a port state may require a foreign vessel to submit prior
to or upon port entrance. 56 Because it makes so much practical sense,
the international community has embraced this Convention. 157
In
implementing this Convention and promoting efficiency, the
International
Maritime
Organization
(IMO)
has
developed
recommended practices and prepared several standardized documents
for port states to use.158 Near universal agreement about what a port
state could impose with respect to fiscal, immigration, sanitation, and
customs requirements and standard forms and procedures has greatly
improved compliance and promoted international trade. While a port

156

FAL Convention, supra note 45.

The purpose of the FAL

Convention is "to facilitate maritime traffic by simplifying and reducing to a
minimum the formalities, documentary requirements and procedures on the
arrival, stay and departure of ships engaged in international voyages." Id.
(Preamble).
157 See Rosalie Balkin, The International Maritime Organization and
Maritime Security, 30 TUL. MAR. L. J. 1, 14 (2006) (noting the 2002
amendments to the FAL Convention entered into force on May 1, 2003).
158 Infonnation concerning IMO recommended practices and forms for
the FAL Convention are available at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/
contents.asp?topicid=259&doc-id=684#4.
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state not party to the FAL Convention could legally deviate from the
IMO FISC-related standards as a condition for port entry, to do so
would be self-defeating. No state wants to discourage international
seaborne trade or, without good reason, increase the costs and delays
associated with it.
As a result, virtually all port states use the
prescribed forms and follow these procedures.
C.
Navigation, Pilotage, and Mooring and Anchorage
Requirements. Ports states have also traditionally imposed on visiting
vessels the obligation to comply with requirements designed to ensure
safe navigation within their internal waters and the operational
efficiency of the port. As Professors Myres McDougal and William
Burke observed:
Once vessels enter internal waters and are within
state territory, states claim sole competence to
prescribe for activities relating to the use of the
waters. In the port, for example, coastal states claim
authority to regulate the myriad activities connected
with port operation such as the movement and
anchorage of vessels .... assignments of berths, and
numerous other events directly affecting the use of
the area. 159
Applicable requirements range from rules mandating use of a
pilot, often depending on the size of the vessel, its cargo, horsepower of
its plant, and conditions of weather or tide, to manning and equipment
expectations, to requirements as to where the vessel must anchor or
moor, to direct the movements of the vessel while in port.
As a foreign vessel, particularly any large and unwieldy vessel,
approaches the busy and restricted internal waters of a port, authorities
of the port state usually require that a pilot boat meet it several miles
from restricted waters. From the pilot boat emerges an expert mariner
who has an intimate knowledge and familiarity about the waters,
currents, shoals, winds, and other peculiarities of the port, and who is
comfortable in handling a wide range of merchant vessels in any kind
of weather, tide, traffic, current and light conditions. The United States
is one of many port states that condition a foreign vessel's right of
access to its ports upon compliance with non-discriminatory pilotage

159 McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 96 (footnote omitted). See
YANG, supra note 100, at 208-20.
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laws and regulations. 160 In a Federal law that traces its origins to 1789,
pilots and the laws concerning the use of pilots to enter U.S. ports are
generally governed by applicable state laws, rather than any federallymandated requirements. 16' The purpose of pilotage laws is to better
ensure that a vessel can enter and operate within a port safely. The
practice of requiring pilots in the major ports and restricted waterways
to ensure the safe entry and departure of larger commercial vessels is
increasingly common worldwide.
For example, among other
requirements, the People's Republic of China now requires
pilots for all
162
foreign commercial vessels calling on any of its ports.
Proper port management also requires that port state authorities
designate when, where, how, and under what circumstances a vessel
can navigate in inland ports and waterways.
Anyone who has passed
through the Panama Canal can attest to the scores of merchant ships
"waiting their turn" anchored at the Atlantic or Pacific side until such
time as the local authorities and a qualified pilot are ready to take

160 46 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8503. Compulsory pilotage requirements in
internal waters are among the accepted fights of a port State. Glen Plant,
InternationalLegal Aspects of Vessel Traffic Services, 14 MARINE POL'Y 71, 73
(1990).
161
"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, pilots in the bays,
rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in
conformity with the laws of the States." 46 U.S.C. § 8501(a). Although the
Constitution clearly gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, including regulating pilotage, Congress continues to let the
individual States most regulate pilotage matters. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 535 U.S. 151, 159-60 (1978) (States may not impose pilotage requirements
on "enrolled vessels" covered by Federal laws; but "it is equally clear that they
are free to impose pilotage requirements on registered vessels entering and
leaving their ports .... "); Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 225 U.S.
187, 196-202 (1912). But see 46 U.S.C. §§ 9301-9308 (a Federal regulatory
scheme governs pilotage on the Great Lakes), and 46 U.S.C. § 8502 (requiring
federally licensed pilots for vessels designated therein).
162

JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CImNA'S PRACTICES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA

32-33 (1992).
163
In the United States, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act provides
authority for the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a comprehensive
program for vessel traffic services in U.S. ports. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232.
This includes provisions for civil and criminal penalties, and authorizes the
Captain of the Port to deny entry or withhold clearance to depart for vessels
that fail to comply. Id. at § 1232. See also 33 C.F.R. §§ 160.1-160.111.
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them. 164 Managing vessel traffic in the busy, 56-mile-long Houston
Ship Channel is nearly as hectic. 165 Without some degree of
coordination and control over vessel operations, the complicated ballet
of ships navigating the channel, anchoring or mooring at the
appropriate places, and on-loading and off-loading cargoes could not be
done safely or efficiently. An obvious permissible condition on port
access is a vessel's willingness to use (and pay for) a qualified pilot and
to follow the rules of the port and directions from the harbor master and
other authorities as to when, where, and how to proceed. Failure to
comply with these requirements means that the vessel would not be
permitted to enter port or, once there, would be subject to port state
jurisdiction.
D.
Ability of the Vessel to Operate Safely.
Another
significant goal of the port state is to ensure, as a condition of entry,
that vessels entering a port will be able to navigate and operate
safely.' 6 Unsafe vessels present a major threat to the proper operation
of a port facility and the coastal waters nearby. This includes vessels
that are unseaworthy because they were not designed or constructed
correctly or do not have proper equipment, are inadequately
maintained, or have an improperly trained, manned, or certified crew.
It includes special precautions that a port state may impose with respect
to vessels carrying particularly hazardous materials, such as a cargo of
explosives, radioactive materials, or liquefied natural gas.167 Unless the
port authorities are convinced that a vessel transporting oil or other
hazardous materials has the ability to enter port, conduct business there,
and depart the area safely, they are under no obligation to grant
access.
Moreover, a port state has a right to insist, as a condition of
164 A total of some 14,000 vessels transit the Panama Canal each year,
carrying over 203 million tons in cargo. Panama Canal, WIKIPEDIA, available
at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama_Canal; see also Panama Canal,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007), available at http://www.britannica.
com/eb/article-9 110730/Panama-Canal.
165

See Houston Ship Channel, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/HoustonShipChannel.

166 See 33 U.S.C. § 1223 ("Vessel operating requirements"); 33 C.F.R.
§§ 164.11 ("Navigation underway: general"), 164.13 ("Navigation underway:
tankers").

167 The Transportation Safety Act of 1974 is the statutory framework
for such regulations. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 176 ("This
part prescribes requirements . . . to be observed with respect to the

transportation of hazardous materials by vessel.")

168 See 33 U.S.C. § 1228 ("Conditions for entry to ports in the United
States"). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 512, cmt. c, rep. n. 4.
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entry, that the vessel and its crew have demonstrated that they are
169
capable of doing so and have no track record of maritime accidents.
The LOS Convention imposes a "duty to detain" on port states which
have determined that a foreign-flag vessel within one of their ports is in
violation of applicable international rules and standards relating to
seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens damage to the marine
environment.170 Finally, a port state may require, as a condition of
entry, that the vessel is equipped with the latest
IMO-approved safety
7
technology to avoid collisions and groundings.1 1
International commerce would come to a virtual halt if the
authorities in each port took it upon themselves to impose unique
requirements as to how a ship should be constructed, equipped,
manned, trained, and operated.
As a result, the international
community has established detailed rules for most aspects of the
construction, equipping, operations, manning, and training of merchant
vessels above a certain size. Of all the conventions dealing with
maritime safety, the most important is the 1974 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as amended. 72 The
original version was adopted in 1914 in response to the sinking of the
luxury passenger liner RMS Titanic, and the resulting loss of more than
1500 lives.' 73 Under SOLAS, classification societies carefully survey
(inspect) vessels during and immediately after construction to ensure
compliance with international standards for strength, stability, damage
control, safety, and equipment. Defects must be corrected prior to
satisfactorily completing the survey. Only then does the classification
society issue a certificate documenting the conditions under which the
vessel may safely operate. Although the flag state has the primary
responsibility to ensure ships flying their flags are properly
documented, port states party to the SOLAS have a duty to "intervene"

See 33 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(1).
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 219 (the vessel will proceed for repairs
before being permitted to leave).
171 See Sean Poltrack, The Maritime Industry and Our Environment:
The Delicate Balance of Economic and EnvironmentalConcerns, 8 U. BALT. J.
ENVTL. L. 51, 74-75 (2001-2002) ("Vessel Safety Management").
172 SOLAS Convention, supra note 38. For details on the status of the
SOLAS Convention and its amendments, see http://www.imo.org
/Conventions/contents.asp?topic id=257&docid=647.
169

170

173

Titanic,

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE

http://www.britannicacom/eb/article-9072642/Titanic.

(2007), available at
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to prevent a vessel 74from sailing until the owners and crew correct any
unsafe conditions. 1

Another multilateral treaty, the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchstanding for Seafarers,
1978 (STCW),175 seeks to ensure that the vessel's crew members,
particularly the master and the vessel's other officers, complete
rigorous training in engineering, watch standing, ship handling,
maintenance, rules of the nautical road, firefighting and damage
control, and other emergency procedures. Only after satisfactorily
completing all aspects of training and demonstrating adequate
experience and confidence under instruction, is a crew member
certified as qualified to serve. A major revision of the STCW
Convention that the IMO completed in 1995 sought to provide an even
greater level of precision and standardization. The 1995 Amendments
also provided for greater port state control, providing a specific right of
intervention and detention in the case of a collision,
grounding, or other
76
casualty, or evidence of erratic ship handling.1
These STCW requirements provide qualification standards and
expectations for seafarers. Ideally, a French master in charge of a
supertanker sailing from the Persian Gulf to Europe and back will have
the same high level of qualifications as a South Korean master on a
container ship sailing to and from Singapore and Southern California.
Each should be able to safely navigate any vessel in his charge through
any weather or casualty that might arise. The STCW Convention
covers many other matters related to maritime safety, including
mandatory crew rest and periodic recertification. Under U.S. law, no
vessel may enter or operate in the navigable waters of the United States
unless the vessel complies with all 77applicable laws and regulations
designed to promote maritime safety. 1
From the perspective of the port state, the local authorities have
the right to inquire whether the vessel's SOLAS certification and
documentation is in order and if all crew members have their required

4.

174

SOLAS Convention, supra note 38, ch. 1, reg. 19(c) & ch. X1, reg.

175

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification

and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, with Annex (STCW), Jul. 7, 1978, S. Exec.
Doc. EE 96-1, C.T.I.A. No. 7624, 1361 U.N.T.S. 190.
176 See
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?docid=65 I &
topic id=257 (providing details on the current status of the STCW
Convention).
177 See 33 U.S.C. § 1228 ("Conditions for entry to ports in the United
States").
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and ug-to-date STCW certificates prior to allowing the vessel to enter
port.
Ensuring that a port visit will be completed safely is an
essential port state function, and any requirement reasonably related to
this goal is permissible as a condition on port entry. 179 If port state
authorities consider it to be essential or helpful to accomplish this
purpose, they may direct that the visiting vessel submit to a boarding to
verify the accuracy of the information provided and, in cases of doubt,
to physically check the seaworthiness of the vessel and qualifications of
its crew. Where a pilot is required to be on board, the pilot may not
proceed into port unless the appropriate authorities are confident that
the vessel is shipshape in every respect.
The U.S. Congress recently imposed a safety-related
requirement, which the Coast Guard has begun to implement, that
virtually all commercial vessels operating in U.S. navigable waters
carry a properly functioning Automatic Identification System (AIS).' °
"AIS-equipped vessels will transmit and receive navigation information
such as vessel identification, position, dimensions, type, course, speed,
navigational status, draft, cargo type, and destination in near real

78

33 C.F.R. pt. 164 ("Navigational safety regulations.") See, e.g., the

proposal by the EU to bar entry to its ports ships that failed to comply with the
SOLAS ISM Code, which has since been incorporated into Chapter IX of

SOLAS.

179 See COLOMBOS, supra note 11, § 181, at 177. Observing, "each
State has the right to enact laws controlling navigation within its national

waters. The entry of foreign merchant ships may thus be reasonably regulated
provided no hindrance is put in the way of international trade and no
discrimination made between States so as to favour some at the expense of
others." Id.
180 46 U.S.C. § 70114; 33 C.F.R. § 164.46 ("Automatic identification
systems"). AIS is defined as:
[a] maritime navigation safety communications system standardized by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and adopted by the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) that provides vessel information,
including the vessel's identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status
and other safety-related information automatically to appropriately equipped
shore stations, other ships, and aircraft; receives automatically such information
from similarly fitted ships; monitors and tracks ships; and exchanges data with
shore-based facilities.
47 C.F.R. § 80.5.
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time."' 18 1 AIS can prove essential to avoid collisions and groundings,
monitor vessel traffic flow, and, as discussed below, help identify and
track vessels of interest for security purposes as part of Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA). 182 "Once a potential threat has been
identified, a port or coastal state must have the capability to detect,
intercept and interdict it using patrol boats or maritime patrol aircraft.
Such action could disrupt planned criminal acts and prevent the
eventuality of a catastrophe before it threatens the port."'183 Other
safety-related technologies that the United States requires of most
commercial and certain other vessels calling on U.S. ports include
IMO-approved electronic position fixing devices,184 automatic radar
86
185
plotting aids (ARPA), and emergency communications systems.1
E. Voyage Information. Another area of inquiry that coastal
states usually make of vessels calling on their ports is that relating to
voyage information. One common condition of port entry is providing
a vessel's notice of arrival (NOA), including advance information as to
the date and time it expects to reach port. Under current U.S. Coast
Guard regulations, visiting ships must generally provide NOA
information 96 hours prior to arrival. 8 7 The information required in an
NOA is extensive, including the name of the vessel, flag state,

181 J.M. Sollosi, The Automated Identification System & Port Security,
PROCEEDINGS 36, 36 (Apr.-May 2003), available at http://www.uscg. mil/hq/g-

/nmc/pubs/proceednewpromagpage2OO5/q2 03.pdf
182 Brian Tetreault, Automated Identification System: The Use of AIS
in Support of Maritime Domain Awareness, PROCEEDINGS 27, 28-30 (Fall
2006), available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/proceed/newprom
agpage2005/fall%2006/FALL%2006/Fal106%2OPDFs/AutolD%20System.pdf.
183 Sollosi, supra note 181, at 38. "The AIS would contribute to this
[Maritime Domain Awareness] mission by enabling the shore authority to track
certain suspect vessels." See also Alexandra Marks, America's Ship-Tracking
Challenge, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0 131/p03s03-usgn.html.
'"
33 C.F.R. § 164.41 ("Electronic position fixing devices"). The
wide-spread availability of inexpensive and highly-accurate GPS receivers,
computers, and communications systems linked to these devices should help
make collisions and groundings a thing of the past.
185 33 C.F.R. § 164.38 ("Automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA)"); see
id., app. B.
186 46 C.F.R. § 184.502 (vessels required to comply with FCC
requirements).
187 33 C.F.R. § 160.212.
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18 8
registered owner, operator, charterer, and classification society.
Other voyage information required includes the names of the last five
ports or places visited, dates of arrival and departure, ports and places
in the United States to be visited, the current location of the vessel,
telephone contact information, detailed information on the crew and
others on board, operational condition of the essential equipment, cargo
declaration, and the additional information required
under the
89
International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS Code).1

The vessel must make an additional notice whenever there is a
hazardous condition, either on board the vessel or caused by the
vessel. 190 Failure to do so means that the vessel will be denied entry,
and will have to wait outside of the port until the Coast Guard and other
port authorities are satisfied that they can safely clear the ship. 9' Many
of the NOA requirements are related to port security concerns. The 96hour reporting requirement permits Coast Guard and other authorities
time to run the vessel through the appropriate automated data bases to
try to identify terrorist threats, suspected involvement in drug
trafficking or trafficking in illegal immigrants, suspicious or hazardous
cargo, and any other special vulnerabilities. By identifying the current
flag state, port state authorities can determine whether the flag state is
party to international procedures to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack,
whether the vessel in question has been prescreened at its previous port
of call, and whether there is an applicable agreement permitting at-sea
searches. The NOA regime also provides adequate time to arrange for
pilotage and tug escorts and plan for the optimal use of limited port

Id. § 160.206 (Table 160.206). See J. Ashley Roach, Container
and Port Security: A Bilateral Perspective, 18 INT'L J.MARINE & COASTAL L.
341, 355-57 (2003) ("Advance Notice of Arrival").
189 33 C.F.R. § 160.206 (Table 160.206).
The ISPS Code is a
comprehensive set of measures that the IMO adopted in response to the threats
to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
The ISPS Code requires ships and ports to develop and implement an approved
security plan to prevent, among other things, terrorists hiring on as crew
members and smuggling weapons, explosives, and other such contraband into
target ports. MTSA-ISPS Information Site, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/mp/mtsa.shtml.
190 33 C.F.R. § 160.215; see also 46 C.F.R. subpt. § 4.05-5 (notice
requirement in case of a marine casualty).
'9' See 33 U.S.C. § 1228 ("Conditions for entry to ports in the United
States"); 33 C.F.R. § 160.107 ("Denial of entry").
188
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law clearly permits port states to require
provide such information directly related to
of entry, particularly where the IMO has
mandatory for all vessels engaged in

VI. CONDITIONS ON ENTRY RELATED TO NATIONAL
DEFENSE, HOMELAND SECURITY, COUNTERTERRORISM,
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS
A. Vessels from Enemy, Hostile, Unfriendly, or Rogue States.
A port state has an absolute right to deny access to its ports to foreign
warships and certain other categories of ships it considers
threatening. 194 Although their sovereign status gives warships special
immunities from enforcement jurisdiction, a port state is within its
rights to require prior authorization, deny access for any cause or no
cause at all, or condition access, such as limiting the number of
warships that may be in port at any one time or requiring that the vessel
enter and leave port only during daylight hours. 1 95 Even where there is
an FCN treaty granting each party reciprocal rights to enter each other's
ports, the provisions usually exclude routine access rights for "vessels
of war."' 196 Article 13 of the Statute on the International Rdgime of
Ports specifically excludes its application to warships. 197 This is due to
192 Since 1979, the People's Republic of China has established an
extensive set of regulations on port access for both security purposes and to
foster international trade. Mark S. Hamilton, Negotiating Port Access: The

Sino-US. Opportunity for Leadership in the Maritime Transport Services
Industry, 3 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 153, 155-56 (2002). For example, a

vessel must request permission at least one week before the visit, must comply
with a host of conditions on port access, must use the services of a pilot, and
must pay various port fees for services and customs. Failure to do so can result
in denial of access, fines, or even detention. JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA'S
PRACTICE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 31-34.
193 See Hartmut G. Hesse, Maritime Security in a MultilateralContext:

IMO Activities to Enhance Maritime Security, 18 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL

L. 327, 332-33 (2003).
194 McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 94, 100-01, 114.
'9' Id. at 102-03. See also Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of
Danzig, to Polish War Vessels, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), no. 43, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1931.12.1 Idanzig/.
196 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
U.S.Japan, art. XIX(7), Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063.

197 1923 Convention and Statute on the International R6gime of
Maritime Ports, supra note 7.
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the special sovereign-immune character of warships and the potential
threat that they might pose to the security of the port state. 198 As a
general rule, therefore, warships must make special arrangements and
obtain prior permission before entering a foreign port. 99
The power to deny access to enemy or potentially hostile vessels
is an obvious security precaution that states have followed for
centuries. However, warships are not the only vessels to which a port
state may deny access for security reasons. Recently, the Japanese
Government barred all vessels from North Korea from entering any of
its ports due to the "gravest danger" represented by the underground
nuclear-weapons test in that rogue state. 20 0 Australia is reported to
have followed suit, "banning [all North Korean] ships from entering its
ports, except in dire emergencies., 20 1 The United States has taken even
broader action. In its most recent Maritime Operational Threat
Response Plan, which is published as part of the National Strategy for
Maritime Security, the U.S. Government listed six States as non-entrant
countries. These are Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria.20 2 The Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with denying
access to all such vessels "to the internal waters and ports of the United

198

McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at 100-03. "[Tjhe coastal state

ought to be accorded relatively complete discretion in deciding upon the
permissibility of the entry of [warships into port]." Id. at 100.
199 "Before a warship enters a foreign port, it is generally required that
her State or the naval officer in command should notify in advance the
territorial State of her proposed visit. The number of warships belonging to the
same Power which may remain at the same time in a foreign port and also the
period of their stay is usually regulated by the territorial State." COLOMBOS,
supra note 11, § 274, at 262.
200
Associate Press, "Japan Sets Sanctions on N. Korea to 'Protect the
Peace,"'
Oct.
11,
2006, available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/asiapcf/10/1 1/korea.nuclear.japan.ap/index.html//.
Indeed, it has
been reported that "the Japanese delegation also proposed that North Korea's
ships ... be turned away from [all] international ports." Betsy Pisik, China
Hints Agreement On North Korea, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20061011-120355-5512r.htm.
201
Ng Han Guan and Audra Ang, China Boosts N. Korea Border
Inspections, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.washington
post.com/wpyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101 600665.html.
202

NATIONAL

STRATEGY

FOR

MARITIME

SECURITY:

MARITIME

OPERATIONAL THREAT RESPONSE PLAN, App. B to Annex I (Oct. 2006).
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States and, when appropriate, to the territorial seas of the United
States. 2 °3
The right to deny port access in times where perceived threats to
national security arise is well established in international law. In 1904,
Venezuela closed its ports to the vessels of a single U.S. shipping
company during a period of revolutionary activity in Venezuela. The
steamship company filed suit before an arbitral tribunal, complaining
that the denial of access to Venezuelan ports was arbitrary and
discriminatory, particularly since those same ports remained open to
vessels from other companies.2c 4 Venezuela claimed that it had denied
port access to that company's vessels to prevent rebel forces from
receiving support and supplies, and that the steamship company in
question was the only one friendly to the rebels. The umpire found that
the prohibition was permissible, opining that "the right to open and
close, as a sovereign on its own territory, certain harbours, ports, and
rivers in order to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws is not and could
not be denied to the Venezuelan Government, much less this right can
be denied when
used . . . in defence of the very existence of the
20 5
Government.,

At the same time, U.S. Government officials may not act
arbitrarily in denying port access, even when based on security
concerns. In 1950, President Truman, acting under the authority of the
Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 191, issued Executive Order 10,173,
granting to cognizant officials of the U.S. Coast Guard the authority to
deny access to U.S. ports of foreign flag vessels, or direct their
anchorage and movement in U.S. waters, as may be "necessary

. .

. to

prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters
In Canadian Transport Co. v. United
of the United States ....
States, a Canadian corporation brought action against the United States
for damages for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit a merchant vessel
having a Polish master and officers entry to harbor in Norfolk, Virginia
on the basis that the presence of Communist-bloc officers might pose a
risk to national security.20 7
The District Court entered summary

203
204

Id., Annex I, at 2.
Orinoco Steamship Co. Case (U.S. v. Venezuela), Venezuelan

Arbitrations of 1903, at 72 (1904), 9 R.I.A.A. 180 (1903).
20
Id. at 95-96, 9 R.I.A.A. at 203.
206 Exec. Order No. 10,173, §§ 6.04-5 & 6.04-8, 3 C.F.R. 356, 357
(Oct. 18, 1950).
207 Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1083-84
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
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judgment against plaintiff for failure to state a claim.2 °s However, on
appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that "if the Coast Guard officers acted
arbitrarily and in violation of regulations in diverting [the foreign
merchant vessel], the United States is not immune from a damage
action .... ,,209 The Court returned the case to the District Court for a
factual hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of the Coast Guard's
decision.
B. Denial of or Restrictions on Entry Related to Terrorism
Concerns. In recent years, international terrorism has replaced the
Cold War as the focus of greatest global security concern. Three trends
- economic globalization, diffusion of nuclear weapons technology,
and well-funded and fanatical terrorism - present an unprecedented
security threat to the United States, its trading partners, and the whole
world. 21 0 Given these trends, coastal states must do all they can to keep
foreign merchant ships out of their coastal waters if they represent any
kind of security risk - the stakes are simply too high. 21' According to
Dr. Stephen Flynn, the current Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in
National Security Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations and an
expert on the risk terrorists pose to international trade, the essence of
the terrorist strategy is global economic havoc: "There is a public
safety imperative and a powerful economic case for advancing
international trade security. ,,.212 Terrorism experts, and the terrorist
organizations themselves, consider seaports to be particularly
susceptible to attack.213
208
Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 430 F.Supp. 1168, 1171
(D.D.C. 1977).
209
Canadian Transport Co., 663 F.2d at 1091.
20 Dr. Clark C. Abt, ABT Associates, Executive Summary: The

Economic Impact of Nuclear TerroristAttacks on Freight Transport Systems in

an Age of Seaport Vulnerability, Apr. 30, 2003, p. 2, available at
www.abtassociates.com/reports/ES-EconomicImpact of NuclearTerrorist_
Attacks.pdf.
211
See Flynn, supra note 47, at 70-74.
212
Quoted in April Terreri, Int'l Trade is Less Secure Than You Think
WORLD

TRADE

MAG.,

Sep.

4,

2006,

at http://www.worldtrademag.

com/CDA/Articles/FeatureArticle/d37c5947e0c7d010VgnVCM 000001932a8
co
NET

213
Al-Qaida Training Manual Shows Seaports Top Target, WORLD
DAILY, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.

com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35327 (Osama bin Laden's terrorist
network has focused on seaports as top-level targets for several years).
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Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them,
dramatically increase the threat. Osama bin Laden is reported to have
described the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by al Qaeda as a
"religious duty." 214 An improvised nuclear weapon or "dirty bomb"
hidden in a shipping container, secreted into a port city, and then
detonated there or after it has been loaded on a train or truck and in the
transportation network could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths,
hundreds of billions of dollars in destruction, and incalculable damage
to the world's confidence in the global trading system. To prevent a
terrorist attacking with a weapon of mass destruction is necessarily of
top priority, both within the United States and the international
community. 215 Moreover, traditional containment and deterrence
strategies that worked during the Cold War are no longer likely to
succeed against fanatical terrorist groups. 2 16 Appropriate measures to
reduce the risk of such an attack include any conditions on port access
or outright denial of such access, designed to detect and deter terrorists
from entering a port state, nuclear weapons and other instrumentalities
of mass destruction, and other weapons, supplies, and materials used by
terrorists.
However, while an attack with a nuclear weapon secreted on a
container ship or otherwise introduced into the transportation system
poses the gravest danger to a port state, a terrorist group could cause
incalculable damage using weapons widely available to them, such as
conventional explosives and rockets. Before 9/11, for example, who
would have guessed that a small group of committed, suicidal terrorists
could have caused so much death and destruction by commandeering
civilian jetliners and crashing them into the World Trade Center and
Pentagon? 217 Although there are increasingly stringent security
214

A World Wide Web of Nuclear Danger,ECONOMIST, Feb. 29, 2004,

at 25.

215 On April 28, 2004, the U.N. Security Council agreed on a
Resolution declaring all Member States were under an obligation to adopt and
enforce laws making it illegal for non-State actors to "manufacture, acquire,
possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes." S.C.
Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
216 "Containment and traditional deterrence ..
are clearly no longer

adequate to deal with the new world of terrorists armed with weapons of mass
destruction." Binding the Colossus, ECoNoMIST, Nov. 20, 2003, at 25,

availableat http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2003/l 120colossus.htm.
217 Note, however, the similar plot in Tom Clancy's novel, DEBT OF
HONOR (1994), where the pilot of a Japan Airlines 747 intentionally crashed his
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measures in place to prevent such a scenario, a small terrorist group
could conceivably take control of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier
as it approached a U.S. port. If the terrorists placed explosives at
critical points and set off the cargo in a highly populated and/or
industrialized area the death, destruction, and disruption could be
similar to that resulting from a low-yield nuclear weapon. 218 Various
terrorist cells are no doubt speculating even now on vulnerabilities in
existing port security plans and developing plans to exploit them.
A port state has the right to deny access, or impose conditions on
access, to its ports when it determines such action to be necessary to
protect the port or coastal state and the security of the population
against terrorist or other attacks. Indeed, under the "vital interests"
analysis discussed above, this fundamental principle is self-evident.
Nothing could be more "vital" than defending the homeland against a
massive terrorist attack. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the
U.S. Congress appropriated funds and passed laws, the Department of
Homeland Security and other cognizant Agencies implemented new
policies and procedures, and airport, border, coastal, and port security
authorities have strengthened precautionary measures considerably.
Even so, experts agree that much more work needs to be done to make
our nation's ports and borders truly secure and prepared.219
There is an additional international legal basis for taking action
against potential terrorist attacks - the right of self-defense. Article 51
of the United Nations Charter provides: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations .

. . ."

While the United Nations originally visualized this

provision as applying to defending against armed attacks initiated by
other nation States, such as Nazi Germany's attack on Poland on
aircraft into the Capital building during a joint session of Congress, killing
nearly everyone in the Government except the newly-named vice president,
Jack Ryan.

218
Mark Reynolds, Lloyd's Executive Likens LNG Attack to Nuclear
Explosion, ENERGY
BULLETIN,
Sep.
20, 2004, available at
http://www.energybulletin.net/2202.html. See also Eben Kaplan, Liquefied
Natural Gas: A Potential Terrorist Target?, Feb. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/.
219
Haveman et al., supra note 52, at 15-21. See also Flynn. supra

note 47, at 60-74;

STEPHEN

RESILIENT NATION

(2007).

E. FLYNN,

THE EDGE OF DISASTER: REBUILDING A
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September 1, 1939, or the invasion of South Korea from communist
North Korea in June, 1950, it seems proper to extend the right of selfdefense to deter attacks by sub-national terrorist groups, such as AlQaeda. In the United States today, the emphasis has changed from
enacting treaties, enforcing the law, and responding to attacks, to
anticipating and preventing such attacks.22 ° International law limits
what a nation state may do to protect itself against an armed attack by
shooting first 221 or taking preemptive military measures beyond its own
222
territory.
However,
that paradigm
may be attack.
changing with respect to
preemptive action
in anticipation
of a terrorist
"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists...
rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass
destruction ....To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 223
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."
In order to better protect homeland security against a terrorist
attack, individual states and the international community must have
adequate means to identify and track weapons, vessels, cargo,
passengers and crew, and to take appropriate action against those that
pose a threat. Some of the new programs designed to improve coastal
and port security against potential terrorist attacks include the (1)
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); (2) Container Security Initiative
(CSI); (3) Automated Identification System (AIS); (4) Long-Range
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of Ships; (5) International Port
Security (IPS) Program; and (6) other initiatives to identify personnel
and vessels that pose a security threat to the United States and its
220

"The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive

actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. ... [I]n an age
where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most
destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers
gather." THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA

15 (Sep. 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
701-02 (6th ed. 2003)(use of forces under the doctrine of preventive self221

defense is problematic).

See generally Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-

Defense: Hegemony, Equality, and Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J.POL.
PHIL. 171 (2003).
222

See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50

VILL. L. REv. 699, 706-16 (2005) (discussion of four different schools of
thought on the issue).
223

THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA
house.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

15

(Sep.

2002),

available at http://www.white
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trading partners and to devise and improve processes to detect and deter
these agents.224
One key reason for advancing the requirement of foreign vessels
to provide a notice of arrival (NOA) at least 96 hours before they plan
to enter a U.S. port is to ensure adequate time to check the accuracy
and veracity of the details the vessel has provided. In the United States,
watchstanders at the National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC)
monitor the data and evaluate and promulgate possible threats.225
However, the decision to approve or disapprove port entry is left to the
discretion of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP).226
Implementing and improving processes to identify and track vessels
and their cargoes, and to ensure the reliability of their crews, will
continue to be a key factor in ensuring the security of the global
transportation network in the United States and around the world.227
This paper will now briefly consider several of these initiatives and
programs.
(1) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). For many years, the
United States and its allies were justifiably concerned about the
prospect of certain categories of weapons and delivery systems falling
into the hands of terrorists and rogue States.
Various initiatives,
including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically addressed
the concern of proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems. The concern that outlaw states or international terrorists could
get their hands on weapons of mass destruction intensified following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on
May 31, 2003 as a "new effort to fight proliferation" through
international agreements "to search.., ships carrying suspect cargo to

See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 59, at 431-33; Haveman et al.,
supra note 52, at 15-21.
225
See 33 C.F.R. § 160.210.
Vessels may submit NOA's
electronically on the NVMC web site, availableat http://www.nvmc.uscg.gov/.
226 33 C.F.R. pt. 160. In addition, COTP's have broad authority under
the Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. §§191-198, and the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236, to issue orders and take actions to protect the
security and safety of vessels and facilities within their area of responsibility.
227
For a comprehensive analysis of port security initiatives involving
224

the Coast Guard, see Rachel B. Bralliar, Protecting U.S. Ports with Layered
Security Measuresfor ContainerShips, 185 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1-68 (2005).
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seize illegal weapons or missile technologies., 228 The PSI was
designed to help fill in the gap in international law by banning the
secretive and dangerous trade in nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles,
other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and
component material S.229
The impetus to develop the PSI concept was largely due to the
circumstances surrounding the interdiction of the North Korean
freighter So San some 600 miles off the Yemeni coast, which
demonstrated the lack of international legal tools available.230
American satellites and Navy ships had tracked the So San since it left
North Korea in mid-November 2002. Since the vessel was not flying a
flag and intelligence information revealed that it was carrying ballistic
missile components to Aden, Spanish naval vessels, in coordination
with the United States, stopped and boarded the So San on the high
seas. 23 1 The crew contended that the vessel was carrying a legal cargo
of concrete to Yemen. However, a subsequent search uncovered Scud
ballistic missile components hidden beneath the concrete, and
chemicals necessary to fuel the missiles. After Yemen contended that
the cargo was perfectly legal pursuant to a sales and shipping contract,
Spanish and American authorities eventually had to acquiesce in the
vessel continuing to its destination.232
There was a general consensus
particularly within the Department of
unacceptable result and that something
existing law and operational procedures
228

within the Administration,
Defense, that this was an
had to be done to change
to permit the interdiction of

President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People

of Poland, Wawel Royal Castle, Krakow, Poland, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531 -3.html (May 31,
2003). The PSI concept envisions the interdiction of illicit cargoes in air and
land-transportation modalities, but its greatest focus has been at sea. Michael
A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation
and the Interdiction ofShips at Sea, 46 HARv. INT'L L. J. 131, 134 (2005).
229 Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The ProliferationSecurity
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526, 527-28 (2004).
230 Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30 YALE J.
INT'L L. 507, 508-09 (2005).
231 See Thomas E. Ricks & Peter Slevin, Spain and US. Seize N.
Korean Missiles: Scuds Were on Ship Boundfor Yemen, WASH. POST., Dec. 11,
2002, at AI.
232 Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation,and International Law, 30 YALE J.
INT'L L. 507, 509 (2005).
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such shipments.233
In consultation with other concerned states,
President Bush developed and announced the Statement of Interdiction
Principles that states participating in PSI are "committed" to
undertake. 234 Among those steps the Statement lists as appropriate is
that the states will stop and search suspected vessels and "enforce
conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying [prohibited]
cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry." 235 Although the
Statement specifically provides that any actions taken under the PSI
will be "consistent with national legal authorities and relevant
international law and frameworks, including the United Nations
Security Council. . . ," some governments and observers are concerned
that aspects of the PSI interdiction efforts beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction may violate international law.236 However, if done with the
cooperation of the flag state, there would not be any legal problem.
Moreover, the United States and its allies could use failure of the flag
state to cooperate in the PSI as the basis for denying or restricting port
access to vessels registered in that state.

(2) Container Security Initiative (CSI).
Another recent
initiative to combat the risk of international terrorist attacks on U.S.
ports is the Container Security Initiative (CSI). 237 The CSI allows U.S.
customs agents, in coordination with foreign governments, to prescreen
233

Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The ProliferationSecurity

Initiative, 98 AM. J.INT'L L. 526, 527-28 (2004).
234
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
ProliferationSecurity Initiative, Statement of Interdiction Principles,available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/print/20030904-1 1.html
(Sept. 4, 2003).
235
Id. See also Ted L. McDorman, An Information Note on the
ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI), 36 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 381-86 (Oct.-

Dec. 2005).

236
See Timothy C. Perry, Blurring the Ocean Zones: The Effect of the
ProliferationSecurity Initiative on the Customary InternationalLaw of the Sea,
37 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L 33, 33-53 (Jan.-Mar. 2006); Daniel H. Joyner, The
Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation,and
International Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 507, 509 (2005); see also Michael
Evans, US Plans to Seize Suspects at Will, TIMES (LONDON), Jul II, 2003, at
23.
237
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, New CSI Port Becomes

Operational, U.S. CusToMs & BORDER PROTECTION TODAY, May 2006,

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2006/may/new-csiport.xml.
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high-risk cargo containers at the port of departure.238 Today, the CS]
process results in the preclearance of some 90 percent of the containers
that enter U.S. seaports and is in place in at least 50 major international
seaports around the world. 239 The CS1 process consists of four key
elements: (1) using automated information to identify and target highrisk containers; (2) pre-screening those containers identified as high
risk before they leave foreign ports; (3) using up-to-date detection
technology to quickly and efficiently pre-screen high-risk containers;
and (4) developing and using "smarter," more secure, tamper-proof
240
containers.
American citizens and allied nations expect that the United States
will adopt port access requirements that are reasonably related to the
real threat, effectively designed to respond properly to it, and no more
costly or intrusive than reasonably necessary.
For example, a
requirement that every vessel bringing containers into a U.S. port must
wait at a point 200 nm from our shores until the U.S. Coast Guard
boards the vessel and opens and inspects every container on board,
would not violate international law. 24 ' However, given the millions of
containers in transit, the practical impossibility of searching them while
on board a vessel underway, and the costs and delays that any such
242
effort would entail, this would be an unworkable and unwise policy.
238

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release:

Protecting America's Seaports and Securing Cargo Shipments, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO4/O2/2OO402O5-4.html (Feb. 5,
2004) (CSI "allows DHS to prescreen cargo" before it reaches U.S.). See also
Jessica Romero, Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security
Initiative, 4 CHi. J. INT'L L. 597, 597-605 (2003).
239
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet: Container
Security Initiative, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border-security/
internationalactivities/csi/csi-in brief.xml (Sep. 30, 2006).
240 Id. See Roach, supra note 188, at 343.
241 No such legal authority currently exists, and there are no serious
proponents to adopt any such proposal. However, if Congress chose to impose
such a requirement as a condition of port entry based on a reasoned national
security justification, it would meet the requirements of international law.
242 When Trade and Security Clash - Container Trade, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 6, 2002, at 69 (There are over 15 million containers in shipment at any one
moment. Cargo shipped by container constitutes 90 percent of international
trade by value).
242 Larry Greenemeier, IBM Launches Wireless Shipping Security,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Sep. 20, 2005, available at http://www.informationweek.
com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=171000325.
Of course, IBM's prototype
represents just the first generation of such devices. Improvements are sure to
be coming soon.
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The CSI, on the other hand, focuses on a relatively small number of
containers that security experts have determined to be "high-risk."
Trained screening personnel, using the latest high technology
equipment, prescreen these "high risk" containers while they are
readily accessible, before they are loaded on the vessel en route to the
next port of call. Among other things, the recently enacted Security
and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Act) codifies the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a publicprivate sector initiative that offers international shipping companies
benefits such as expedited clearance through U.S. ports in exchange for
improvements in their internal security measures.243
Giving
preferential access to vessels from CSI ports is an efficient, effective,
legal, and relatively inexpensive way to lower the threat of international
terrorism.
Perhaps the most promising option is to use the latest sensor and
computer technology to continually monitor the location, status, and
cargo of each container. A requirement that every container entering
the United States carry a fully functional, self-contained, TamperResistant Embedded Controller (TREC) in each container would also
be a reasonable condition of port entry, particularly if the industry were
to agree to participate voluntarily or if it were part of an IMO vessel
security initiative. The technology is rapidly being refined and
becoming available. IBM recently developed a TREC that operates a
Linux operating system and acts as an intelligent, real-time tracking
device. These devices are capable of detecting radiation, reporting
tampering of the container, and, when coordinated with shipping plans
entered into a computer, of identifying other anomalies. 24
Even
though the cost to install a TREC on every container would be
significant, competition and mass-production would likely bring the
prices down dramatically. In addition, the resulting enhanced level of
security would be worth the costs. Moreover, the expected benefits
would transcend security.
If a comprehensive system were
implemented
universally,
shippers,
vessel
operators,
port
243

See 6 U.S.C. §§ 961-968. See also K. Lamar Walters, II, Industry

on Alert: Legal and Economic Ramifications of the Homeland Security Act on
Maritime Commerce, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 311, 318-19 (2006) ("Customs-Trade

Partnership Against Terrorism").

Lloyd's List, Freedom and Security: The Dilemma of Vessel
Tracking, SECURITYWATCH.COM, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.securityinfowatch.
244

com/article/article.jsp?id=7983&siteSection-386.
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administrators, and customers would be able to keep track of every
container, pallet, and box within, wherever it is located in the world.245
Although the international community must expect growing pains as
CSI becomes fully operational, initiatives to prevent the "bomb in a
box" scenario from becoming a reality are important tools to protect
homeland security and the international transportation network against
the threat of such terrorist attacks.
(3) Automated Identification System (AIS). Modem detection,
information, and communications technologies provide the potential
capability to accomplish much of what needs to be done to enhance the
security of the global maritime transportation system. Although
initially introduced as a collision avoidance and maritime safety tool,
the IMO has recently promoted AIS "as a mandatory prescription to the
shipping industry's fear of terrorism.

2 46

Although growing pains

existed as the technology was developed, AIS has proven to be very
helpful, both to mariners and flag and port state authorities. Even
before the emphasis shifted to combating terrorism, maritime experts
identified satellite-based vessel monitoring systems (VMS's) as an
invaluable tool for managing fisheries and for promoting maritime
safety. 247
The Department of Homeland Security has statutory
authority to implement regulations to fully implement AIS in the
United States.2 4 The Coast Guard also recognizes the need for such
AIS information to improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) by
monitoring vessels approaching the U.S. coastline and, ultimately, to

245

"The core technology is called a tamper-resistant embedded

controller (TREC). It is attached to the cargo door of the container and can be
programmed, unlike passive or active radio frequency identification tags. It
can detect the opening of the container and can control a host of sensors located
inside .... All this transforms each container into an intelligent and mobile
warehouse." Robert Malone, The Container That Could, FORBES, Aug. 8,
2006,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/06/smart-shippingcontainers-cx rm 0808ship.html?partner=yahootix.
246 Lloyd's List, Freedom and Security: The Dilemma of Vessel
Tracking, SECURITYINFOWATCH.COM,

Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.security

infowatch.com/article/article.jsp?id=7983&siteSection=386.
247 See Erik Jaap Molenaar & Martin Tsamenyi, Satellite-Based Vessel
Monitoring Systems for Fisheries Management: InternationalLegal Aspects,
15 INT'L J.MARINE. & COASTAL L. 65, 67 (2000).
248 See 46 U.S.C. § 2101; 33 C.F.R. § 164.46.
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develop
the intelligence necessary to help deter terrorist attacks on U.S.
249
ports.

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002250 and the
Coast Guard and Maritime Safety Act of 2004251 required the Coast
Guard to develop and implement a comprehensive vessel identification
system. This system will enhance the Coast Guard's capabilities to
monitor vessels that could pose a threat to the United States. 25 2 AIS is
a relatively mature technology, and was a key component of IMO's
marine safety system for years. All vessels using the Vessel Traffic
Service (VTS) while entering or leaving major ports in the United
States must now employ AIS. Consistent with internationally agreed
vessel equipment standards, AIS is compulsory on all large commercial
vessels worldwide. Moreover, U.S. law and regulations require that it
be operational on larger vessels entering U.S. waters.253 The United
States and its trading partners may further exploit AIS to keep track of
vessels with satellite AIS tracking on the near-term horizon.254
(4) Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of Ships.
The Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of Ships system is
another IMO initiative under SOLAS.255 LRIT requires certain ships

249
"Intelligence ... is the first line of defense against terrorists...
[and such] information becomes the basis for building MDA." U.S. COAST
GUARD, MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 18 (2002).
250

Maritime Transportation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116

Stat. 2082 (2002).
251
Martime Transportation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 108-293, 118
Stat. 1080 (2004).
252
See Joe Pappalardo, Federal Agencies Tackle Maritime Security,
Ports First, NAT'L DEF., June, 2005, available at http://www.nationaldefense
magazine.org/issues/2005/Jun/federalagencies.htm.
253 46 U.S.C. § 70114 (Supp. 2002) ("Automated identification
systems"); 46 U.S.C.A. § 70115 (West 2007) ("Long-range vessel tracking

system").

254
Aliya Stemstein, Coast Guard Gets Satellite Help, FED. COMPUTER
WK., Nov. 8, 2004, available at http://www.fcw.com/article84497-11-07-04Print.
255
Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, Res. MSC.202(81) (May 19, 2006); Imo, Revised
Performance Standards and Functional Requirements for the Long-Range
Identiication and Tracking of Ships, Res. MSC.Z63 (84) (May 16, 2008). Long
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(passenger ships, cargo ships over 300 gross tons, including high speed
craft, and mobile offshore drilling units on international voyages) to
transmit their identity, location, and date and time of the position.256
That information may be accessed upon payment of the costs thereof by
port states for those that evidence an intent to enter ports of that state.
Most significantly, coastal States may obtain access to the information
when the ship is a designated distance off that state's coast not to
exceed 1000 nautical miles. 57 As presently planned, there will be no
interface between LRIT and AIS. One of the more important
distinctions between LRIT and AIS, apart from the obvious one of
range, is that whereas AIS is a broadcast system available to all within
range, data derived through LRIT will be available only to the SOLAS
Contracting government recipients who are entitled to receive such
information. As a result, the LRIT regulatory provisions have built-in
safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of the data and prevent
unauthorized disclosure or access.
LRIT will be another tool to keep track of vessels that might
represent a security threat.
Traditional freedom-of-navigation
principles prevent a coastal state from requiring AIS or LRIT
information on foreign-flag vessels merely navigating on the high seas
or within the EEZ, or engaged in innocent or transit passage through
the territorial sea.
However, by adopting the AIS and LRIT
amendments to SOLAS, contracting governments may obtain available
AIS and LRIT information from other contracting States. Vessels from
States that choose not to participate may be subject to additional
scrutiny and delay, port access requirements, or even outright denial of
port access.
(5) International Port Security (IPS) Program. In December
2002, the IMO adopted a new set of rules for all States and

Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), available at http://www.imo.org/

Safety/mainframe.asp?topic-id-905.
256 Congress authorized the development and implementation of an
LRIT system in 46 U.S.C..§ 70115, to be fully effective to provide "the
capability of receiving information on vessel positions at interval positions
appropriate to deter transportation security incidents" by Apr. 1, 2007.
257 As an example, Australia's zone extends 1000 miles from its coast
and involves the identification of vessels seeking to enter port as well as vessels
merely transiting Australia's EEZ. See Natalie Klein, Legal Implications of
Australia's Maritime Identification system, 55 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 337, 337-

368(2006).
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international shipping companies. 258 These rules included changes to
the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) through adoption of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). These
went into effect on July 1, 2004. The ISPS Code requires States to
assess the security risks at all port facilities and to ensure that port
operators prepare and implement security plans. Shipping companies
have to evaluate risks to their vessels and develop prevention and
response plans. Moreover, ISPS requires that ships install AIS,
develop ship security alert systems, create a permanent display of their
vessel identification numbers, and carry a valid International Ship
Security Certificate (ISSC). Assuming that vessels comply with the
ISPS requirements, port states may not take enforcement action against
the vessel, including denial of port access, unless there are "clear
grounds" for concluding that a vessel represents a security threat to the
port state. Even then, international procedures encourage the port state
to require the vessel to rectify the non-compliance.
Under U.S. law, the Coast Guard is responsible for determining
whether foreign ports are maintaining effective anti-terrorism
measures. 259 To do this, the Coast Guard created the International Port
Security (IPS) Program. It generally uses a state's implementation of
the ISPS Code as the key indicator as to whether it has effective antiterrorism measures in place.260 When the Coast Guard determines that
a foreign port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures
(normally by its failure to fully implement the ISPS Code), the Coast
Guard imposes conditions of entry on vessels arriving in the United
States from a port of that state. These conditions of entry usually
require that the vessel take additional security measures, both while in
the foreign port and in the United States, to rectify the apparent noncompliance. In addition, the Coast Guard issues a Port Security
Advisory (PSA) concerning that port and publishes a notice in the
Federal Register to provide public notice of its determination. Should a
vessel not meet those conditions or there are additional "clear grounds"
for concern, the vessel may be denied entry into the United States.
258

IMO Adopts Comprehensive Security Measures, http://www.imo.

org/About/mainframe.asp?topicid=583&docid =2689. See also Maritime
Security, http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_ id=55.
259 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 46 U.S.C.A. §

70108 (West 2007) ("Foreign port assessment").
260 46 U.S.C.A. § 70110(a) (West 2007). The Secretary of DHS
(Coast Guard) is also charged with notifying the foreign country about security
deficiencies it has observed at the port. Id. § 70109(a).
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Before entering the first U.S. port of call, the Coast Guard must
board and inspect each high-interest vessel before it enters the
territorial sea or, depending on local conditions, shortly thereafter.
Before the Captain of the Port (COTP) will permit the vessel to enter
the U.S. port, the inspection team must first determine that the vessel
has complied with special security conditions in the foreign port(s),
conduct an inspection using radiation monitoring equipment, and
impose certain additional security requirements.261 If the vessel is
unwilling to subject itself to any of these conditions or the inspection
fails to resolve any security concerns, the COTP has the authority to
impose various "control and compliance measures," including denial of
access to the port.262 Presently, the Coast Guard requires that foreignflag vessels list the five previous foreign ports on which they have
called.263 Since these measures are designed to effectively reduce the
risk of a terrorist attack on a U.S. port, imposing such nondiscriminatory conditions on port access comports with international
law. Vessels that meet the requirements of the ISPS Code and have
called upon ports that are in compliance with the ISPS Code generally
will not be considered to be of "high interest" and will not typically be
required to undergo inspections beyond the U.S. territorial sea.
The effect of the ISPS Code and efforts to implement it around
the world means that today the IMO, the United States, and the rest of
the international shipping community have a much better handle than
ever before on where all commercial vessels are at any one time, the
nature of the potential security threat, how to avoid a terrorist incident,
and how best to respond to various other emergency situations.
(6) Other Programs Designed to Improve Vessel and Port
Security. At the IMO, within the U.S. government, and in various
international fora, responsible policy experts are engaged in an ongoing
effort to review and improve programs designed to enhance the security
of commercial vessels and ports. Time and space do not permit a
comprehensive review of all the various proposals. Suffice it to say
that whatever international agreements the international community
develops to improve security against potential terrorist attacks must
include appropriate legal and policy bases on which to impose
conditions on entry into port or the exercise of jurisdiction over
foreign-flag vessels.

26'
262
263

33 C.F.R. §§ 101.400-101.410 ("Maritime Security").
33 C.F.R. §101.410(b)(5) (2008).
33 C.F.R. § 160.206 (2008).
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C. Denial of or Restrictions on Entry Related to Suspected
Criminal Activity. Coastal States have a right to require that vessels
seeking to call on their ports will comply with relevant criminal laws
and regulations designed to protect the peace and security of the port
state. Port state authorities may deny access to, or impose extensive
controls on, commercial vessels seeking port access as they may deem
necessary to ensure that any such vessels are not promoting criminal
activities.
There are a vast array of potential criminal activities that can be
promoted through port entry, ranging from the importation of illegal
drugs, trafficking in women and children for various criminal purposes,
maritime terrorism, illegal immigration, and other violations of customs
laws and regulations. To combat such illegal activities, coastal States
may require vessels visiting their ports to submit to law enforcement
boardings and investigatory screenings.
Moreover, if flag States,
particularly "open registry" or "flags of convenience" States, are
unwilling to take appropriate action to ensure vessels that they have
registered are not engaged in criminal enterprises, a port state could
appropriately deny access to vessels from such States.264 All States
naturally see effective crime prevention as a vital state interest that
justifies appropriate investigation and exercise of the sovereign right to
close or protect access to its ports.
If a coastal state is aware that a particular vessel, the vessels of a
particular company, or the vessels operating under the flag of a
particular state are engaged or likely to be engaged in criminal activity,
the authorities of the port state may deny entry to that vessel or that
group of vessels. 26 Likewise, these authorities may require that those
vessels submit to a records review, or to a thorough search, personnel
or cargo screening, as a precondition for entry. To increase security in
the transportation industry, the U.S. Congress established a requirement
that all "crewmembers on vessels calling at United States ports ...
carry and present on demand any identification that the Secretary
decides is necessary. 26 6 This has evolved into the Department of
264

Michael Richardson, Crimes Under Flags of Convenience: In a

Depressed Shipping Market, Poor Nations Sell Flagsfor Criminal Ventures,
YALE GLOBAL, May 19, 2003, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?

id=1633.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(2) (2006) ("Conditions for entry to ports
in the United States"); 33 U.S.C. § 1232(e) (2006) ("Denial of entry").
266
46 U.S.C.A. § 7011 ](a) (West 2007).
265
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Homeland Security's initiative to establish a transportation workers
identification credential (TWIC) for workers in the maritime
industry. 267 In the SAFE Port Act of 2006, Congress directed that
persons convicted of certain crimes could not obtain a TWIC, and that
the TWIC process be in place at the 10 most vulnerable U.S. ports by
July 1, 2007, and that the process be in place for the 40 most vulnerable
ports by July 1, 2008.268 The benefits of requiring and screening lists
of crew and passengers in an NOA include the opportunity to detect
those individuals with criminal records. All of these conditions on
entry are well established in traditional state practice.269
VII. CONDITIONS ON ENTRY TO PROTECT THE MARINE

ENVIRONMENT
A.
Denial of or Restrictions on the Entry of Vessels
Representing a Pollution Risk. Protecting the marine environment of
the internal or coastal waters of a state is often cited as another of the
vital interests that can legally support coastal state jurisdiction over
ocean space, including restrictions on port access. 270 Except for the
unusual case of force majeure, a vessel has no right to enter a state's
internal waters, particularly where it presents a real pollution threat. In
1971, various European ports denied access to the Dutch freighter
Stella Mars because it was carrying a load of toxic vinyl chloride
waste for dumping at sea. 27 ' As a general rule, therefore, a coastal state
may deny access or impose any regulations it deems appropriate
consistent with its rights and obligations under international law.2 72 For
instances of pollution beyond the coastal state's territorial waters that
have no effect within its jurisdictional zones, customary international
267
268

33 C.F.R §§ 101.105, 101.514, 101.515 (2008).
SAFE Port Act of 2006, 6 U.S.C.A § 901. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70105

(West 2007).
269

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182 ("Inadmissible aliens" includes persons

with criminal records and/or terrorist affiliations).
270 See Ted L. McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements:
Some Issues of International Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 207, 208-09
(2000).
271
KASOULIDES, supra note 14, at 22 n.125; SEBASTIAN A. GERLACH,
MARINE POLLUTION 56 (SPRINGER-VERLAG 1981) (1976).

272 UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 211(3) and 220. See Craig H. Allen,
Federalism in the Era of International Standards: Federal and State
Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United States (Part11), 29
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 565, 567 (1998); A.W. Anderson, Nationaland International
Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV.
985, 1001 (1976).
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law does not give the coastal state a basis to exert jurisdiction over the
vessel involved, even when it enters into the internal waters of that
state. As one scholar observed, "[T]he traditional principles of state
do not support such an application of jurisdiction" in such a
jurisdiction
3
case.

27

At least for States party to UNCLOS, Article 218, "Enforcement
by port states," creates a potential enforcement authority for a port state
in situations where a foreign-flag vessel discharges a pollutant on the
high seas or in a foreign state's EEZ in contravention of existing
international standards, even where the port state has suffered no direct
harm from the discharge.274 But, since it exceeds the traditional
principles of jurisdiction discussed above, "[iut is highly questionable
whether Article 218 ...has emerged as part of customary international

law., 275 It is probably only a matter of time, however, before port
states seek to exercise jurisdiction over vessels voluntarily present in
one of their ports to protect the "global commons.,

276

At least among

States Party to UNCLOS, Article 218 provides international authority
to do so. In any case, the port state could certainly deny access to any
foreign-flag vessel that it determines has polluted, failed to take
adequate steps to prevent pollution, even with respect to an incident
beyond its EEZ.

273

KASoULIDES,

supra note 14, at 34. "However, where an activity of

a foreign vessel, such as a pollution discharge, takes place on the high seas or
in the waters of a third state, and the activity does not affect the port state,
customary international law does not permit a host state to enforce its laws
regarding that activity against a visiting foreign vessel in its ports."
McDorman, supra note 271, at 216.
274
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 218 ("Enforcement by port States").
See Ted L. McDorman, Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 28 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 305, 314-15
(1997).
275 McDorman, supra note 270, at 216-17. "Moreover, few countries
have extended their law to embrace a port state enforcement power of this type
.Id.

See David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?
Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the Marine Environment, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 534, 555-57 (1997-1998); Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 47, 57 (1995) ("The idea of expanding the use of domestic
courts for international environmental law enforcement against citizens and
governments of other countries is a more recent and interesting concept.")
276
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For most coastal States, including the United States, the
MARPOL Convention and its Annexes provide for international vessel
construction standards and operational requirements designed to
minimize the risk of pollution.27 States party to MARPOL must adopt
domestic laws and regulations to implement these requirements. In the
United States, several statutes and regulations, including the Act to
Prevent Pollution from Ships of 1980 (APPS), 278 implement MARPOL.

APPS requires that United States flag vessels operating anywhere and
foreign-flag vessels operating in the navigable waters of the United
States comply with the requirements of Annexes I and II of MARPOL.
There are several other statutes designed to protect the marine
environment from pollution, whether created by catastrophic incidents,
minor spills, or other practices that, combined together, jeopardize the
port or coastline. These statutes include the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972,279 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,
(commonly called the Clean Water Act),280 the Port and Tanker Safety
Act of 1978,281 and the Federal Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990.282
Following the Exxon Valdez disaster in Prince William Sound in
March 1989 and several other disasters, Congress passed the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90). 283 Among other things, this law
established a phase-out schedule by which most tank vessels entering
the ports of the United States must have double hulls. 284 While the
IMO, through amendments to MARPOL 72/78, subsequently
established double-hull requirements to be phased in, the regulations
implementing the U.S. law remain stricter in some respects than the
international standards.

277
278

See Rubin & Stucky, supra note 91, at 2 1.
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships of 1980, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-

1905 (2006), amended by Maritime Pollution Prevention Act of 2008. Pub. L.
No. 110-280, 122 Stat. 2611 (2008). For a good discussion of this and other
marine pollution prevention statutes, see Allen, supra note 272, at 575-613.
279 Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236
(2006) (implementing regulations can be found at 33 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-.215
(2008)).
280 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (2006).
281
Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1222-1232
(2006).
282 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006).
283
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380,104 Stat. 484
(1990).

284

46 U.S.C.A. § 3703(a) (West 2007).
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"While the [stricter standards] are in accordance with the
jurisdiction of port states under both customary law and the Law of the
Sea Convention, it may be questioned how far it is in accordance with
the spirit of the Convention, which is to discourage unilateral design
and construction standards for ships. '285 Since owners of oil and
product tankers would like the option of engaging in trade by entering
ports in the United States, the effect of the stricter American regulation
is to make it the defacto international standard.
In addition to prohibiting the discharge of oil, the requirement to
report any such discharges, no matter how small, and an obligation to
maintain an accurate Oil Record Book, MARPOL 73/78 and Federal
law require that most commercial vessels prepare and carry shipboard
oil pollution emergency plans (SOPEP's) as a condition of port
entry.286 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990,287 directs the establishment of a regulatory
scheme to mitigate and respond to maritime accidents that threaten the
maritime environment. This is the primary statute under which the
Coast Guard promulgated the oil pollution prevention regulations for
vessels, including foreign-flag vessels, operating in U.S. waters. Those
regulations detail equipment, manning, procedures, recordkeeping, and
other operational requirements consistent with the provisions of the
relevant international agreements.288 Subpart D of 33 C.F.R. part 155
sets out the rules that require tankers to develop tailored vessel
289
response plans (VRPs) and conduct exercises in carrying them out.
These plans are considerably more detailed than a standard MARPOL
SOPEP. However, if foreign-flag vessels are in U.S. navigable waters
while engaged only in innocent passage (or transit
290 passage), the more
demanding U.S. provisions do not apply to them.

285
286

CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 353.

MARPOL, Regulation 26 requires oil tankers of greater than 150
tons, and other commercial vessels of greater than 400 gross tons, to carry a
SOPEP. Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plans, APPS implemented
MARPOL, including Regulation 26, for vessels operating in the navigable
waters of the U.S. See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(2); 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 ("Oil
Record Book") (2008).
287
Federal Water Pollution ct of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006).
288 33 C.F.R. pts. 151, 155 (2008).
289 33 C.F.R. §§ 155.1015(a), 155.1035 (2008).
290 33 C.F.R. § 155.1015(c)(7) (2008).
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An interesting question is how to balance the application of these
provisions to vessels that are engaged in innocent or transit passage
through one part of U.S. territorial waters, but that subsequently enter a
U.S. port. For example, imagine a Russian flag vessel sailing from
eastern Siberia bound for Houston with a load of crude oil. Following
the Great Circle Route through the Bering Sea, the vessel would
normally sail through Unimak Pass about halfway up the Aleutian
Island chain in Alaska. Unimak Pass, the major shipping route between
the Bering Sea and the North Pacific Ocean, narrows to a little over 10
nautical miles. 29 1 Several thousand vessels use the Unimak Pass each

year, mostly fishing vessels passing from the Bering Sea to the Gulf of
Alaska, but increasingly container ships and other commercial vessels
utilizing the Great Circle Route from East Asia to the West Coast of the
United States. The Unimak Pass is an international strait overlapped by
the 12-nim territorial sea of the United States and used for international
navigation. Under basic principles of customary international law to
which the United States subscribes, the regime of transit passage
applies to such straits.292
Once it clears the Gulf of Alaska, the vessel would then normally
sail through Canada's EEZ, pass through the EEZ off the Western
Coast of the United States, continue through Mexico's EEZ and the
EEZ's and territorial seas of Central American states on the way to the
Panama Canal. After passing through the Panama Canal, such a tanker
would normally proceed through the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of
Mexico on the way to Houston. Once in a U.S. port, Coast Guard
officials are likely to ask the vessel's master to show the VRP, not only
for the Gulf Coast of Texas, but also for Alaska and the other U.S.
zones through which it passed. Although the Coast Guard regulations
recognize the right of innocent and transit passage for foreign-flag
291

Unimak Pass Vessel

Analysis, Sept.

1984,

available at

www.mms.gov/eppd/socecon/techsum/ak/TR-108.DOC (last visited Apr. 3,
2009). The Unimak Pass is one of "[t]he main navigational lanes through the
[Aleutian Island] chain ......
Aleutian Islands, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
ONLINE
(2007),
available
at
http://www.britannica com/eb/article9005580/Aleutian-Islands.
292 UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 37-38. When President Reagan
extended the U.S. territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, he preserved the inclusive
navigational rights through international straits. See Proclamation No. 5928,
54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988)("In accordance with international law, as
reflected in the applicable provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, within the territorial sea of the United States, the ships
of all countries enjoy the right of innocent passage and the ships and aircraft of
all countries enjoy the right of transit passage through international straits.")
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vessels that voluntarily enter U.S. internal waters, there is an obligation
to comply with U.S. laws imposing conditions on port entry, including
having a VRP appendix for each geographical COTP zone of the
United States through which the vessels may operate.293 The fact that a
vessel sailed outside of U.S. waters, and may even have made a port
call in another country does not insulate it from having to comply with
U.S. law as a condition of port entry.
Indeed, imagine that a foreign-flag tanker vessel bound for a U.S.
port passing through Unimak Pass during one of the frequent violent
storms in the area loses power and is subsequently blown onto the
rocks, causing a major environmental disaster on Alaska's shores. If
the vessel failed to have the equipment mandated by U.S. law, or had
no VRP for that coastal area of the United States and any such failure
caused or aggravated the disaster, one can imagine the deafening public
outcry. Although requiring each oil tanker planning a voyage to the
United States to be properly equipped and have prepared a VRP for
each coastal region of the United States through which it plans to pass
would add somewhat to the expense of the voyage, this would merely
be part of the cost of doing business. In this regard, most large foreign
tankers doing business in the United States must ensure that they have
double hulls that meet the more strict requirements of the OPA, even
though they may be more stringent than MARPOL may require. So
long as they take into account international standards, the coastal state
is well within its rights to insist on such stringent equipment and
construction requirements and comprehensive planning as a condition
of port entry and to take necessary action to enforce the regulations
once the vessel arrives in port.
The discharge of ballast-water is another issue that coastal States
could control as a condition of entry. The Nonindigenous Aquatic
Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990,294 recognized the

problem of ballast water from ships engaged in international trade
introducing alien species, such as the zebra mussel, invading U.S.
waters. The Coast Guard has promulgated a regulatory scheme to

293

33 C.F.R. § 155.1030(a) (2008) ("The [VRP] must cover all

geographic areas of the United States in which the vessel intends to handle,
store, or transport oil, including port areas and offshore transit areas.")
294
Nonindigenous Acquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-646, 104 Stat. 4761 (1990) (current version at 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 4701-4751 (West 2007)).
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implement that Act. 295 A complete flushing of the ballast water tanks
at sea is one method to limit introduction of invasive species.
Researchers are considering other proposals, including on board
ballast-water treatment, ozone treatment, and routing tank gasses
through ballast water tanks underway, to kill any aquatic organisms.
Once a practical solution is found to the problem, concerned coastal
States may certainly require that the vessel comply with any
implementing regulations as a condition of port entry. Of course, the
fact that a port state may have the legal right to implement stringent
port entry requirements does not answer the question of whether such
requirements make the best policy sense.
B. State and Local Requirements to Impose Conditions on
Port Entry to Prevent Water and Air Pollution. Particularly when
state and local officials view the Federal government as acting too
slowly or cautiously to protect the marine environment effectively,
some individual states and localities have sought to protect the
environment by requiring that visiting vessels comply with local laws
designed to protect the marine environment along their coastlines and
within their internal waters. However, "state and local governments
within the United States are limited in the extent to which they may
impede a foreign vessel's access to United States ports where the
federal government has permitted such access by international
agreement or other federal law." 296 The U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently determined that federal supremacy principles mandate
preemption of efforts of state and local governments to impose
conditions on port
In United
297 entry that federal laws already cover.
States v. Locke,
for example, the Supreme Court overturned the
decisions of the lower courts that the state of Washington could require
vessels entering Puget Sound to comply with local requirements for
ship construction, manning, casualty reporting, and crew training and
certification. Failure to comply with the state rules could have resulted
in "sanctions includ[ing] statutory penalties, restrictions on the vessel's
operations in state waters, and a denial of entry into state waters. 298
Relying upon its earlier holding in a similar case, Ray v. Atlantic

295

See 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.2041-151.2045 (2008). ("Ballast Water

Management for Control of Nonindigenous Species in Waters of the United
States"). This requires arriving vessels to report ballast water history and
status.
296 Allen, supra note 272, at 577.
297 529 U.S. 89, 110-117 (2000).
298

Id. at 97.
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Richfield Co.,299 the

Locke Court held that "only the federal
Government may regulate the design, construction, alteration, repair,
maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and
manning of tankers., 3 0

On the other hand, federal law preserves state authority to
regulate with respect to "the peculiarities of local waters, if there is no
conflict with Federal regulatory determinations. 30 1 For example, as
discussed above, since the early history of the nation, Congress has left
conditions like requiring pilots and certifying them to the cognizance of
state authorities. 302

Likewise, nothing in federal law preempted or

barred a state or local requirement requiring that large tanker vessels be
accompanied by tugboats while navigating within restricted waters.3" 3
This is because the question of bringing a vessel safely into port is so
intimately connected with the peculiarities of the local waters and
navigational conditions as to make it susceptible to state regulation.
On the other hand, questions of design, construction, equipping,
and manning standards fall directly within the purview of the federal
government, particularly when the implementation of international
agreements is involved. In the Locke case, over a dozen foreign
299
435 U.S. 151 (1978). "[Tihe Supremacy Clause dictates that the
federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail
over the contrary state judgment." Id. at 165.
300 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 91 (2000). A Federal Court
in
Massachusetts most recently re-affirmed this principle in United States v.
Massachusetts, 440 F.Supp.2d 24, 38 (D. Mass. 2006), involving regulations
governing oil tanker vessels in the approaches to Buzzard's Bay (Boston).

301

Locke, 529 U.S. at 91. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435

U.S. 151, 171-72, 178 (1978).
302
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, pilots in the bays,
inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in
conformity with the laws of the States." 46 U.S.C. § 8501(a)(2000). Although
the Constitution clearly gives Congress the power to legislate on all aspects of
commerce with foreign nations, including pilotage, Congress permits the
individual States to regulate most pilotage matters. Anderson v. Pacific Coast
Steamship Co., 225 U.S. 187, 204-05 (1912). But see 46 U.S.C. §§ 9301-9308
(2000) (a Federal regulatory scheme governs pilotage on the Great Lakes).
303
"The relevant inquiry . .. with respect to the State's power to
impose a tug-escort rule is thus whether the Secretary has either promulgated
his own tug requirement for Puget Sound tanker navigation or has decided that

no such requirement should be imposed at all. It does not appear to us that he
has yet taken either course." Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. at 171-72.
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governments and several shipping industry representatives filed amicus
briefs to convince the Court that, if Washington state regulations were
given full effect, the adverse consequences on international commerce
by sea would be substantial. 3°
One recent development in the issue of state regulation is an
effort by California to impose stringent air quality standards as a
condition of entry for all vessels seeking to call on its ports. Two ports
in particular, Oakland and Los Angeles/Long Beach, are among the
busiest and most important in the world. Because both ports are in
highly populated areas where air pollution is already a serious problem
and because they were dissatisfied with Federal efforts to combat it,
California authorities decided to enact regulations to enhance air
quality. In December, 2005, the Air Resources Board of California's
Environmental Protection Agency approved statewide regulations
designed to reduce emissions from cargo handling equipment and
auxiliary diesel engines on ocean-going vessels. To comply, vessels
must use cleaner fuel and auxiliary equipment that pollutes less.
Insofar as California's requirements are more strict or otherwise
inconsistent with Federal or international standards, the California rules
could have an adverse impact on international trade. Whether these
state-wide rules will survive a preemption challenge under the analysis
contained in Ray and Locke is problematic. To the extent that they
deal with cargo handling equipment powered by diesel engines that are
used on the pier, the state regulations are likely to prevail. On the other
hand, to the extent that they set standards for equipment on board
foreign merchant vessels, any conflicting federal law is likely to take
precedence.
Programs need not be mandatory to be effective, however, and
some ports are introducing incentive initiatives. For example, the Port
of Long Beach, working in cooperation with federal and state EPA's,
has implemented voluntary programs to educate and reward oceangoing merchant vessels that comply with speed restrictions and other
efforts to reduce emissions while entering or leaving port or while
engaged in cargo-handling activities. 305 Such voluntary incentive
programs will likely pass constitutional muster. Moreover, insofar as
304 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Govn't of Can. in Support of
Petitioners, United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), (Nos. 98-1701, 981706); Brief of the Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n in Support of Petitioners,
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), (Nos. 98-1701, 98-1706).
Air Quality, http://polb.com/environment/airquality/default.asp
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
305
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they are administered in a non-discriminatory manner and available to
all, they are unlikely to conflict with customary international law or the
relevant provisions of trade agreements and FCN treaties.
C.
Jurisdiction to Sanction Violation of Environmental
Protection Laws in the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ). Increasingly, port states are using their jurisdiction over
vessels calling on their ports to exercise jurisdiction, including criminal
and civil sanctions, to protect the marine environment in their territorial
sea and EEZ. This trend extends, in some cases, to vessels exercising
their right of innocent passage through the territorial sea or transit
passage through an international strait. The UNCLOS provides for the
right of coastal states to enact laws and regulations to protect the
environment of their coastal waters from pollution. 3° Moreover, other
international conventions negotiated and administered under the
auspices of the International Maritime Organization, such as MARPOL
73/78, provide the coastal state with additional legal authority and
responsibility to act.
For example, the UNCLOS and customary international law
impose on the flag state the obligation to comply with legal obligations
on the high seas, including "the prevention, reduction, and control of
marine pollution ....
Moreover, for serious pollution incidents,
and "[w]here there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating
in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea" has committed a
violation causing or threatening "major damage to the coastline or
related interests of the coastal State," the coastal state may "institute
proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its
laws. 3 °8 Any such coastal laws, however, must be implementing, or at
least consistent with, "applicable international rules and standards. 30 9
The coastal state also has the right to identify a "clearly defined
area of its respective exclusive economic zones" where the adoption of
306 See UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 21, 42, 54, 94, 211, 220.
Pursuant to Article 211(3) of UNCLOS, port states may establish particular
requirements for the prevention and control of pollution as a condition for the
entry of foreign vessels into their ports. See generally ERIK J. MOLENAAR,
COASTAL

STATE JURISDICTION

OVER VESSEL-SOURCE

POLLUTION

103-104

(David Freestone & Danieal Bodansky eds., Kluwer Law International 1998);
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 353-55.
307 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 94(4)(c).
308

Id. art. 220(6).

'09Id, arts. 219, 220(3).
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special protective measures is necessary for "oceanographical and
ecological" reasons; in such areas, after consultations with the IMO, the
coastal state may adopt laws and regulations specially designed to
protect those fragile areas. 31 0 The IMO has established several
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA), of which there are eleven or
so in existence today, including the Florida Keys in the United
States. 3 '
Standing alone, the PSSA concept has no enforcement teeth. The
IMO may approve what it calls "associated protective measures"
(APM's), such as areas to be avoided and other routing measures,"
which the flag state, coastal state, and port state are to enforce.
Because of the coercive effect that these measures may have on
international shipping, an APM must have a valid legal basis.312 The
1982 Convention specifies that, "[w]hen a vessel is voluntarily within a
port or an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may ... institute
proceedings in respect of any violation of its laws and regulations...
when the violation has occurred within the territorial sea or the
exclusive economic zone of that State. 31 3
One recent example of coastal States seeking to properly apply
these principles is the requirement that commercial vessels transiting
the Torres Strait make use of an Australian pilot.3 14 The Torres Strait is
located between Papua New Guinea and the north end of Cape York
Peninsula, Australia.3 1 5 The area of the Torres Strait is at the northern
end of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.316 Although there has been

310
311

Id. art. 211 (6)(a) ("Pollution from vessels").
Particularly sensitive sea areas http://www.imo.org/Environment

/mainframe.asp?topicid=1357#list("Particularly sensitive sea areas")
312 Roberts et al., The Western European PSSA: a "politically
sensitive sea area," 29 MARINE POL'Y 431, 432 (2005).
313 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 220(1) ("Enforcement by coastal
States").
314 See generally Julian Roberts, Compulsory Pilotage in International
Straits: The Torres Strait PSSA Proposal,37 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 93, 94-

104 (2006); Stuart B. Kaye, JurisdictionalPatchwork: Law of the Sea and
Native Title Issues in the Torres Strait, 2 MELB. J.INT'L L. 381, 400-02 (2001).
315 Although some 80 nautical miles wide, the Torres Strait is largely
composed of reefs, shoals, and uninhabited islands. The navigational channel
passes through Australian territorial waters. STUART B. KAYE, THE TORRES
STRAIT 84 (1997).
316 Ottesen, et al., Shipping Threats and Protection of the Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park- The Role of the ParticularlySensitive Sea Area
Concept, 9 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 507, 507-514 (1994). The IMO
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only one major oil spill in the region, when the Oceanic Grandeur ran
aground in the Torres Strait in 1970 spilling a few thousand tons of
crude oil, the volume of oil and other hazardous shipments is increasing
every year, risking ecological disaster.3 17 In 1987 the IMO had adopted
a resolution establishing a PSSA for the Torres Strait and
recommending that States "recognize the need for effective protection
of the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait region and inform ships
flying their flag that they should act in accordance with Australia's
system of pilotage... 3 1 s
At the 49th session of the Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC) of the IMO in April 2003, Australia and New
Guinea submitted a proposal to include the Torres Strait as an extension
of the Great Barrier Reef PSSA.3 19 While there was general consensus
that the Torres Strait was an ecologically sensitive area and that
modification of the sea lane system in the area was appropriate, the
mandatory pilotage proposal that Australia and Papua New Guinea put
forward "proved to be controversial" and failed to garner adequate
support among the member States. 320 This was because of concerns of
other key maritime nations, including Singapore, Japan, Iran, Russia,
and the United States, that such a scheme would unduly constrain the
right of transit passage through an international strait. Australia and
Papua New Guinea tried again in 2005. The Resolution adopted in July
designated the Great Barrier Reef as the world's first "particularly sensitive sea
area" in 1990. Id. at 507.
317
Id. at 511 (the grounding resulted in spilling between 1400 and
4100 tons of crude oil). A strange disease decimated the area's pearl industry
in the 18 months following the spill, causing some to speculate that there was a
causal link between the oil spill and the industry's collapse. Kaye, supra note
315, at 122.
318 IMO, Use of Pilotage Services in the Torres Strait and Great
Barrier Reef Area, Res. A619(15) (Nov. 19, 1987). Robert Beckman, IMO
Didn't Approve Australia's Move, STRAIT TIMEs FORuM, Dec. 23, 2006,
available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/news/archive/2006/STForumDec 23
2006. pdf.
319

IMO, Extension of existing Great Barrier Reef PSSA to include the

Torres Strait Region, submitted by Australia and Papua New Guinea MEPC
49/8.
320
Roberts, supra note 314, at 94, 103-04. See Robert Beckman
visiting Senior Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Australia's
Pilotage System in the Torres Strait: A threat to transit passage?, IDSS

Commentaries 125/2006, Dec. 7, 2006 available at www.ntu.edu.
sg/rsis/publications/Perspective/IDSS I252006.pdf.
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22 only recommended that member States "recognize the need for
effective protection of the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait region
and inform ships flying their flag that they should act in accordance
,,321
with Australia's system of pilotage ....
Australia subsequently adopted a law implementing the
requirement that pilotage through the Torres Strait is a "condition of
entry into an Australian port. 322 The marine notice continued:
"[Flailure to carry a pilot as prescribed may result in a prosecution
under Australian law." 323 To transit the Torres Strait following the
traffic routing scheme that the IMO approved, a vessel passes through
Australia's territorial sea. Under UNCLOS, coastal States may not
hamper, impair, deny, or suspend transit passage in international straits,
even for violations of the laws and regulations of the States through
whose territorial waters they pass. 324

The Australian Government

recognizes that the transit passage regime applies in the Torres Strait
but insists that their rules comport with international law. Indeed, the
Marine Notice emphasized that "[t]he carriage of an Australian pilot
will have the effect of enhancing transit passage, with the ability to
maximise tidal window opportunities for transit and ensuring adequate
margins for safety and environmental protection. 3 25 Even so, the

321

IMO, Designation of the Torres Strait as as Extension of the Great

Barrier Reef ParticularySensitive Sea Area, Res. MEPC. 133 (53) (July 22,
2005). See generally Roberts, supra note 314, at 104.
322
Clive Davison, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Mar. Safety
Auth., Marine Notice 16/2006: Further Information on Revised Pilotage
Requirements for Torres Strait. While Australia and Papua New Guinea made a
joint application at the MEPC, the Torres Strait falls predominantly within the
Australian territorial sea and, therefore, Australia has the primary responsibility
to enforce the navigational regime. See Roberts, supra note 314, at 9, 107 n.9.
323
Davison, supra note 322. "Relevant authorities such as the vessel's
flag state administration and the IMO will also be advised of the failure to
embark a pilot." Id.
324
UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 42(2) ("Such laws and regulations
shall not . . . have the practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the
right of transit passage as defined in this section.") and 44 ("States bordering
straits shall not hamper transit passage ...."). As one Australian scholar
observed: "As the coastal State through whose territorial sea and internal
waters transiting ships must pass when using the Torres Strait, Australia has
limited legislative competence at international law to deal with non-Australian
flagged vessels using the strait." Kaye, supra note 314, at 402 (footnote
omitted).
325
Davison, supra note 322 (emphasis added). Moreover, the notice
asserted: "Australian authorities will not suspend, deny, hamper or impair
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notice makes clear that "the owner, master and/or operator of the ship
may be prosecuted on the next entry into an Australian port, for [failing
to use a pilot on] both ships on voyages to Australian ports
and ships
' 326
transiting the Torres Strait en route to other destinations."
Australia's mandatory scheme, which requires that a vessel slow
or stop and pick up a pilot at one end of the strait, pay the pilot several
thousand dollars for the work of piloting the vessel through the strait,
and then slow or stop and drop off the pilot after clearing the restricted
water, will have the practical effect of hampering continuous and
expeditious transit passage, at least to some degree. Indeed, there is
always a possibility that a pilot and/or pilot boat will not be
immediately available, which means that vessels must delay their
transit while waiting at or near the pilot transfer point. Some States, the
United States and Singapore in particular, expressed concern about the
adverse impact the Torres Strait regime will have on transit passage.327
The U.S. Embassy in Canberra recently delivered yet another
diplomatic note to appropriate Australian government officials
protesting the mandatory pilotage scheme. Noting that "the IMO has
not approved a compulsory pilotage scheme for the Torres Strait ... "
the diplomatic note contended that "there is no basis in international
law" to impose such a mandatory scheme on "foreign flag ships
exercising the right of transit passage. 0,28
Another major legal concern is the apparently unlimited temporal
reach of a "bench warrant" filed against the master of a vessel that
proceeds through the Torres Strait without a pilot while en route to
another port. Australia apparently intends to prosecute the master on
the next occasion in which that vessel voluntarily enters an Australian
transit passage and will not stop, arrest or board ships that do not take on a pilot
while transiting the Strait." Id.
326 Id. The only exceptions are for "sovereign immune vessels" and
where a pilot could not be carried because of "stress of weather, saving life at

sea or other unavoidable cause." Id.

Other States that agreed with the United States that such a pilotage
scheme was not consistent with transit passage were Japan, Bahamas,
Singapore, Iran, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and
the Republic of Korea. "[Tihe Resolution is recommendatory and provides no
international legal basis for mandatory pilotage for ships in transit in this or any
other strait used for international navigation." http://www.uscg.mi
l/hq/cg5/imo/mepc/docs/mepc53-report.pdf.
328
SECSTATE WASH DC message 091524Z Feb 07 ("Torres Strait
Compulsory Pilotage: Third Demarche"), 5.
327
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In its most recent demarche, though the United States

acknowledged that "Australia could impose such a requirement on
foreign flag ships bound directly for Australian ports as a condition of
entry into its ports," it rejected the broad exercise of coastal-state
jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels engaged in transit passage." s
Australia's efforts to unilaterally impose a compulsory pilotage regime
on vessels transiting an international strait sets an adverse precedent
that other strait States may rely on to require a variety of other
restrictions on transit passage, archipelagic sealanes passage, and
innocent passage. This paper will undertake a more detailed analysis of
whether such a condition on port entry is reasonable in Section XI.C.331
D. Balancing the Right of Port Entry in Emergency Cases of
Force Majeure or Distress with the Protection of the Vital Interest
of the Port. There is one set of circumstances where customary
international law generally grants a vessel a right of entry to port where the ship is in distress due to force majeure.332 Historically, a
vessel in distress due to bad weather conditions, dangerous sea state,
involvement in a collision, fire, or other emergency condition
threatening the loss of the vessel and the lives of those on board, had a
right to seek refuge in a foreign port, bay, or other protected internal
waters of a foreign coastal state.3 3 3 The UNCLOS recognizes the
"[T]here appears to be no other international legal mechanism that
would enable Australia to regulate pilotage in the Torres Strait for vessels not
entering an Australian port." Roberts, supra note 314, at 105.
330 SECSTATE WASHDC message 091524Z Feb 07 ("Torres Strait
Compulsory Pilotage: Third Demarche"), 5. The demarche conclude that
"the United States cannot accept application of this scheme of compulsory
pilotage to ships flying its flag exercising their right of transit passage through
the Torres Strait and not directly bound for an Australian port, or the assertion
of the right to prosecute owners or masters not taking a pilot upon any
subsequent entry into an Australian port, and reserves its rights and those of its
nationals, owners, masters and other persons on board ships flying its flag." Id.
331
See infra section XI.C. ("Applying These Factors for Determining
Reasonableness in a Particular Case: Mandatory Pilotage Requirements in the
Torres Strait").
332 Literally, the French phraseforce majeure translates as a "superior
force." It implies that the consequences were unanticipated and irresistible,
such as an "Act of God." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6673-74 (7th ed. 1999).
The principle is well established in the law of the sea. "If a ship needs to enter
a port or internal waters to shelter in order to preserve human life, international
law gives it a right of entry." CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 13, at 63. See
also YANG, supra note 100, at 64-67.
333 According to one recent authority, "all writers agree" that vessels
have a right to enter foreign ports in bona fide cases of force majeure and
329
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principles offorce majeure and distress as permitting a ship to stop and
anchor when engaged in innocent or transit passage.334 Moreover, both
coastal States and individual mariners have an obligation to take
affirmative action to render assistance to vessels and persons "in danger
of being lost at sea. 335
The international community respects this principle in a wide
variety of additional contexts. For example, one Conservation Measure
adopted under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR) 336 provides that Contracting Parties shall
deny port access to their ports to vessels listed as engaged in or
supporting illegal, unregulated, or unreported (IUU) fishing in violation
of the Convention, "unless for the purpose of enforcement action or for
reasons of force majeure or for rendering assistance to vessels, or
persons on those vessels, in danger or distress.,
339

337

U.S. statutes 338 and

regulations also recognize the need to make special allowances for
the access of vessels into port in cases offorce majeure.

distress. La Fayette, supra note 2, at 1I. A general right of access even
extends to warships, where one is "obliged to take refuge in a foreign port by
reason of stress of weather or other circumstances of force majeure."
CoLoMBos, supra note 11, § 274, at 262-63.
334 See UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 18 and 39.
...Id., art. 98 ("Duty to render assistance"). See also SOLAS
Convention, supra note 38, Annex, ch. 5, regs. 10 & 15a; International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Annex, ch. 2,
2.1.1, 2.1.4,
2.1.10, Apr. 27, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,093 1405 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter SAR
Convention]. See also 14 U.S.C. § 88 ("Saving life and property" at sea is a
statutory mission of the U.S. Coast Guard).
336
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, Canberra, May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841-859 (1980), available at
www.ccamlr.org. See generally Erik Jaap Molenaar, CCAMLR and Southern
Ocean Fisheries, 16 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 465, 466-71 (2001).

Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force, 2006-2007 Season,
Conservation Measures 10-06, 18(iv); 10-07, 22(iii) (2006).
338 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1518(c)(2); 33 U.S.C. 1905(e)(1). See also
22 U.S.C. § 454(b) (prohibiting entry into U.S. ports for 3 months for any
foreign-registered vessel illegally flying the flag of the United States or
otherwise holding itself out to be an American vessel, "except in case offorce
337

majeure").

See 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.08(a), 158.130(e), and 160.203(b)(3). The
following language is typical: "Except for a foreign vessel entering U.S. waters
under force majeure, no vessel shall enter any port or terminal of the U.S.
without a safety management system .. " 33 C.F.R. § 96.390(a).
139
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As a general rule, vessels in distress have a right of entry into the
internal waters of a coastal state to seek shelter without first obtaining
permission from the coastal state, especially when there is a real risk
that the vessel might be lost, thus putting the lives of those on board at
genuine risk.34° Moreover, the sovereign authority of the coastal state
does not generally apply to vessels forced to seek refuge in a port by
force majeure or other necessity, except as may be necessary to ensure
the safe and efficient operation of the port. 341 Under long-standing
principles of customary international law, therefore, when a vessel is in
extremis and must take shelter in a safe harbor, the coastal state may
not exclude the vessel from its internal waters and may "not take
advantage of the ship's necessity" in any way.342 For example, if a
foreign-flag vessel en route from Cuba to Canada with a cargo of handrolled cigars and cane sugar was forced to enter the Chesapeake Bay to
seek shelter from a violent, life-threatening hurricane, the United States
could not impose sanctions against the vessel for engaging in343trade with
Cuba in violation of the U.S. law embargoing all such trade.
On the other hand, coastal States have a right to protect
themselves and their citizens under the principle of self-preservation.
This basic principle gives such States the right, indeed the fundamental
responsibility, to keep dangerous instrumentalities and conditions
away. 344

As Professors McDougal and Burke expressed it: "[I]f the

entry of the vessel in distress would threaten the health and safety...
of the port and its populace, exclusion may still be permissible. 345 The
Netherlands Judicial Division of the Council of State recently
considered the conditions under which a badly damaged Chinese vessel
340

COLOMBOS,

supra note II, § 353, at 329-30. See

MALANCZUK,

supra note 9, at 175 (citing as examples ships seeking refuge from a storm or
which are severely damaged).
341 See Kate A. Hoff (United States) v. Mexico, 4 R. Intl'l Arb.
Awards 444 (1929).
342

PHILLIP C.

JESSUP,

THE LAWS OF TERRITORIAL

WATERS AND

MARITIME JURISDICTION 194 (1927). See A.M. de Zayas, Ships in Distress, in

11 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 287-89 (1989).
See also The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 122 (1812) ("[This vessel]
had been sent on a distant mission with a military cargo .... There was no
implied waiver of the peculiar immunities of a public vessel.") (dicta).
143 See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) ("Cuba; embargo on all trade").
344 McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 110. See Christopher F.
Murray, Any Port in a Storm? The Right of Entry for Reasons of Force
Majeure or Distress in the Wake of the Erika and the Castor,63 OHIO ST. L. J.
1465, 1490-91 & n.159 (2002).
345 McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at I10.
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had a right to enter Dutch waters for the purpose of effecting repairs in
a shipyard:
[U]nder international law [a State] may not go so far
as to prevent a ship which is in distress and requires
repairs from entering territorial and coastal waters
and seeking safety in a port or elsewhere along the
coast. In such case, the seriousness of the situation in
which the ship finds itself should be weighed against
the threat which the ship poses to the coastal State. 346
Thus, the right to seek refuge does not extend to situations in
which greater damage or loss of life may result were the vessel to enter.
The coastal state must balance the emergency on the vessel with the
threat to its own people and nation. For example, if a Venezuelanflagged, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker was on fire off the coast of
Texas and requested permission to enter the protected waters of
Galveston Bay to put out the fire and save the lives of the crew, it
would be legally proper for U.S. authorities to deny entry to such a
dangerous instrumentality. In such a situation, an attempted entry into
port might well result in a destructive and deadly catastrophe far out of
proportion to the disaster had the ship remained at sea. Even so, under
the obligation to go to the assistance of mariners in distress, the United
States would be expected to use Coast Guard or other maritime lifesaving assets to rescue the crew and render fire-fighting assistance to
the vessel. 347 All concerned would also be under an obligation to
minimize the potential environmental consequences of the disaster.
Recent state practice has revolved around avoiding polluting the
port and sensitive coastal areas that vessels in distress might represent.
The cases of the Erika and Castor were separate incidents involving
two tankers seeking refuge in European and North African ports from
the hazards of the sea.348 According to reports, the French government
refused to permit the Erika to seek shelter when it was in danger of
346
Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co. v. Minister of Transport, Public
Works, and Water Management, 27 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 354, 357 (1996).
347 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 98 ("Duty to render assistance").
"Every coastal State shall [establish] an adequate and effective search and
rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea .
I..."
Id., art. 98(2). See
also 14 U.S.C. § 88 ("Saving life and property" at sea is a statutory mission of
the U.S. Coast Guard.).
348
See Murray, supra note 344, at 1469-72.
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breaking up due to heavy weather in the North Atlantic in late 1999.
Although British Navy helicopters were able to rescue the 26-man
crew, the vessel was lost, causing what one newspaper article called the
"worst oil disaster in European history" and the death of more than
200,000 sea birds.349
The Castor's saga was more protracted. Encountering severe
weather in late December 2000, it began to break apart in the
Mediterranean Sea, threatening to spill the 29,500 tons of refined
gasoline it carried on board. 350 The governments of nine different
coastal States refused its master's passionate requests for refuge over a
40-day period, through several severe winter storms, 35 1 until the vessel
was able to offload its cargo to smaller vessels while at sea just south of
the island of Malta.352
These two incidents, along with the November 2002 loss of the
tanker Prestige in heavy weather off the northwest coast of Spain, and
the resulting discharge of 20 million gallons of heavy fuel oil, helped
motivate the IMO General Assembly in 2003 to adopt a non-binding
resolution, "Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of
Assistance. 353 In cases in which persons on board the ship find
themselves in distress, the rules applicable to rescue operations under
the SAR Convention and other protocols take "priority." 354 Among
other things, this Resolution "invites Governments to take these
Guidelines into account when ... responding to requests for places of
refuge for ships in need of assistance. 3 55 These include criteria and
See Clare Gamer, Diesel Oil Tanker Snaps in Two Off French
Coast, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 13, 1999, at 9; Tim Finan & Stephen
Bevan, Oil Death Toll May Rise to 300,000 Birds, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON),
Jan. 9, 2000, at 28. See also The Erika Oil Spill: Environmental
Contamination and Effects in the Bay of Biscay, 17 AQUATIC LIVING
RESOURCES (Special Issue) 235, 235-394 (2004).
350 Murray, supra note 344, at 1471-72; see Donald Urquhart, Stricken
Vessel OffEurope Denied Refuge, Bus. TIMEs (Singapore), Jan. 12, 2001, at 1.
351 Donald Urquhart, Outcast Castor's 40-Day Ordeal Comes to an
End, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 20, 2001, at 1.
352 Brian Reyes, Salvage: Salvage Chief Warns that "Leper" Ship
Will Sink, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Jan. 29, 2001, at 3.
353 Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines on Places of Refuge for
Ships in Need of Assistance, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 949 (23) (Dec. 5, 2003),
349

available at http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic id=746.

See also Veronica

Frank, Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International
Law, 20 INT'L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 1, 36-37 (2005).

314
315

Annex 1.14.
Id., Res. A. 949, 2.
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factors for evaluating and balancing356the risks of refusing or providing
refuge under various circumstances.
A more complex incident in January 2007 involved the M/V
Tong Cheng, a 485-foot Chinese-flag commercial cargo vessel en route
from South Korea to the Panama Canal. The vessel's cargo reportedly
included plywood, steel, and a limited amount of military equipment
and munitions bound for Cuba.357 During a period of heavy weather in
the North Pacific, the MN Tong Cheng suffered a large crack in its hull
below the waterline causing dangerous flooding and placing the vessel
and the lives of those on board at some risk. On January 17, 2007, the
ship's master requested permission for an unscheduled entry into a
Hawaiian port to undertake essential repairs. 358 After Navy divers
made emergency repairs to the cracked hull, the Coast Guard removed
much of the flooding water, and authorities completed a careful review
of the vessel's structural integrity while still at sea, the Captain of the
Port at Kalaeloa Barber's Point decided to authorize port access to
effect repairs.359 Moreover, the United States agreed not to subject the
vessel, cargo, or persons on board to any inspections, duties, or fees
arising from entry into port except as may be necessary to ensure the
safety, security, and health of the port. Prior to departing Hawaii, the
Coast Guard conducted a safety inspection to ensure that the vessel was
fully seaworthy. 36

356

See id., Annex and App. 2. See also Comit6 Maritime Int'l, Work

in Progress - Places of Refuge, available at http://comitemaritime.org
/worip/pdf/PlacesRefugeWP.pdf. Included among the factors relevant in
deciding whether to grant port access to a vessel in distress is "[tihe advent of

the helicopter, which makes it possible to rescue the crew of a vessel [in
distress]Tquickly and relatively safely."
3
Audrey McAvoy, Coast Guard Pumps Water from Chinese Ship,
NAVY TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.navytimes.com

/news/2007/0 1/apcgdistress070l26/.

358 U.S. Coast Guard Public Affairs Hawaii, M/V Tong Chen 19 Jan
2007, availableat http://www.uscghawaii.com/go/doc/800/142557/.

359 Security Zone: Waters Surrounding M/V Tong Cheng, 72 Fed.
Reg. 4639 (Feb. 1, 2007) (temporary final rule); U.S. Coast Guard, Damaged
Chinese Cargo Vessel Makes Unanticipated Stop in Honolulu, Coast Guard
News, Jan. 22, 2007, available at http://coastguardnews.com/2007/01/22/.
360 David Waite, Damaged Ship Carrying Ammo, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Jan. 25, 2007, at IA available at http://www.honoluluadvertiser.
com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070125/NEWSO1/701250331/1001/.
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In addition, with the agreement of the Shanghai Ocean Shipping
Company, the vessel's owner, the United States required that the vessel
not continue on to Cuba, but rather return to China for final repairs.
Local officials in Hawaii reportedly discussed the situation with the
U.S. State Department, because of the U.S. embargo on trade with
Cuba. 361 The embargo prevents U.S. companies from trading directly
with Cuba, and prevents ships under any flag from shipping cargo
directly from a U.S. port to Cuba. The argument that the doctrine of
force majeure does not require the United States to facilitate the
transportation of cargo in violation of its national security interests has
the potential to adversely impact foreign relations with China. In
addition, consideration of such factors could jeopardize the ability of
U.S. vessels to take advantage of their right to enter a foreign port in
the event of an emergency, at least without having to agree to
objectionable conditions.362
Thus, the current state of the law on the right to enter port under
circumstances of force majeure and distress is somewhat unclear.
There must be a balance of the equities: assessing the damage to the
vessel and the risk to its passengers and crew against the risks to the
coastal state, including environmental and security concerns, and the
foreseeable consequences of granting port access. Given the national
security and environmental protection sensitivities in the world today, it
seems unlikely that any vessel in distress today can demand access to
any port at any time. Instead, coastal state authorities may well
conclude, based on all the relevant factors, that permitting a vessel
361 David Waite & Mike Gordon, Chinese Ship Repair Protested,
26, 2007, at 26B available at http://www.
honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070126/NEWS01/70120
361/1001/.
362 Although the situations differ markedly for a number of reasons,
recall how China protested the emergency landing of a Navy EP-3E Aries 11
electronic "spy plane" at a military airfield on Hainan Island, China, following
a mid-air collision with a Chinese F-8 interceptor jet fighter over the South
China Sea on Apr. 1, 2001. The United States recovered the crew, and the
dismantled aircraft, only after "apologizing" for the death of the Chinese pilot
and its "unauthorized" landing at the airfield, even though objective accounts
agree that the Chinese pilot was at fault and, in the event of an in-flight
emergency threatening the lives of those on board, any aircraft, whether
military or civilian, has a legal right to declare an emergency and land at the
nearest available airfield. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 626, 630-32
(2001) ("Aerial incident off the coast of China"). See also Erik Eckholm,
Collision with China: The Reaction - Angry Beying Denounces Washington's
Reports That Its Pilot Caused the Collision, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2001, at A 10.
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan.
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entry into its port or internal waters represents an unacceptable threat to
vital coastal state interests, and may take all necessary action to bar
access. However, the doctrine offorce majeure continues to represent
a viable basis for requesting such access and, in most cases, fully
expecting to find safe refuge. Moreover, if state port authorities deny
or condition access, they should be able to articulate a defensible basis
for doing so. Finally, if the port state denies access, the authorities of
any nearby coastal States, and the masters of any vessels in a position
to assist, must provide appropriate aid to preserve the lives of any
mariners or other persons in distress and to help protect the marine
environment.363
VIII. CONDITIONS ON ENTRY DESIGNED TO PROMOTE
ECONOMIC INTERESTS
All coastal states are interested in taking effective measures to
promote the economic interests of their citizens and businesses. The
classic example of those economic interests that seek exclusive access
to resources in coastal waters are domestic fishermen and fisheries.
Such demands can conflict with inclusive uses by fishermen from
foreign States and have often lead to "cod wars" or other actual or
threatened conflicts over living resources. 3 4 With the end of World
War II, domestic demands in the United States to control living and
non-living resources offshore resulted in the two 1945 Truman
Proclamations.3 65 Today, coastal States possess the exclusive right to
explore and exploit living and non-living resources within a 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and to the outer limits of the

363
See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 98 ("Duty to render assistance");
46 U.S.C. § 2304(a). See generally Arthur A. Severance, The Duty to Render
Assistance in the Satellite Age, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 377, 378-93 (2005-2006)
(discussing the duty of masters, vessels, and coastal States to render assistance
at sea).
364 See Jennifer L. Talhelm, Curbing InternationalOverfishing and the

Need for Widespread Ratification of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 381, 406-07, 417 (1999-2000).
365
Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to

the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf,
Sept. 28, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945), and Proclamation No. 2668,
Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in CertainAreas
of the High Seas, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12, 304 (Oct. 2, 1945).
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continental shelf. 366 This part of the paper will examine how conditions
on port access reinforce exclusive control over these resources. It will
also discuss under what circumstances coastal States may impose
conditions on port access to protect the state's economic interests.
A. Denial of or Restriction on Entry of Vessels Engaged in
Fishing and Other Prohibited Activities within the EEZ and on the
Continental Shelf. International law grants to the coastal state
complete sovereignty over the exploration and exploitation of
economic resources within its EEZ and on its continental shelf. The
coastal state also has jurisdiction with regard to "the protection and
preservation of the marine environment .... .367 Other states enjoy
various inclusive rights, including freedom of navigation and
overflight, the laying of cables and pipelines, "and other internationally
16'
These
lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms ....
inclusive rights do not include fishing, marine scientific research,
drilling, or otherwise exploring or exploiting the living and non-living
resources of the EEZ and continental shelf. To engage in such
activities requires the consent of the coastal state. 369 To enforce its
rights in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, "the coastal state may ...
take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance" with the laws
and regulations that it has adopted in conformity with the
Convention. 370 The U.S. Coast Guard constantly patrols the EEZ off
the coast of the United States, and regularly boards, inspects, and
arrests foreign fishing vessels found to be in violation of U.S. laws. 37 '
366 UNCLOS, supra note 4, pts. V (EEZ) and VI (continental shelf).
For further discussion, see CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 13, chs. 8
(continental shelf) and 9 (EEZ).
367

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 56(l)(b)(iii).

368

Id., art. 58 ("Rights and duties of other States in the [EEZ]"). See

also id., art. 78(2)("The exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference
with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States .... ").
369 For example, no one may explore or exploit the natural resources of
the continental shelf "without the express consent of the coastal State."
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(2). But see id., arts. 246 (The coastal State
shall, "in normal circumstances," grant consent for marine scientific research)
and 252 ("Implied consent").
370 Id., art. 73(1),
371 See, e.g., U.S. Coast Guard, Press Release. U.S. Coast Guard
Seizes Foreign Fishing Vessel Illegally Fishing in US. Waters, Sept. 14, 2006,
available
at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/news/news PID_091406.htm.
Jurisdiction is found in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882. Potential sanctions include civil
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Extending as they do to the use of appropriate force to effect an arrest
and detention pursuant to judicial proceedings, these enforcement
measures clearly include the less drastic ones of conditioning access to
port on the vessel operating in compliance with the laws governing the
EEZ and continental shelf.
B. Denial of or Restriction on Entry of Vessels Engaged in
Illegal Economic Activities on the High Seas. International law also
grants to port states the right to deny or restrict access to vessels based
on the illegal activities in which they may have engaged on the high
seas, such as fishing and whaling in violation of an international treaty
to which they, the vessel's flag state, may be party. For example, the
international community has largely agreed that driftnet fishing is one
of the most destructive predatory fishing practices. Driftnets can reach
as long as 25 miles in length. At the height of their use in the 1970's
and early 1980's, thousands of fishing vessels paid out many thousands
of miles of nearly invisible nylon driftnets on the high seas in virtually
every part of the world. Often the nets would break or drift away.
Fish, sea birds, dolphins, sharks, sea turtles, and other marine animals
would become entangled in these driftnets, struggle, and die before the
fishing vessel would return to harvest the particular species it was
targeting, especially tuna (albacore), squid, swordfish, and high-seas
salmon. The effect was environmental devastation.] As one group of
marine experts has observed:
Driftnet fishing ... is sometimes called 'wall of death

fishing' because it kills most living things in its path.
Whatever they catch, driftnets kill or maim. Marine
creatures in search of food and lured by fish already
caught in the net, swim or dive into the webbing
where they become entangled. If they do not drown
or manage to escape they may suffer for several

penalties, up to $100,000 for each violation, in rem forfeiture, loss of fishing
permit, and imprisonment of the master. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1858, 1859 ("Criminal
offenses"), 1860 ("Civil forfeitures").
372

See generally JAMEs CARR &

EcosysTEMs:

MATTHEW GIANNI, HIGH SEAS
LARGE SCALE DRIFTNETS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1991);

Report of the Expert Consultation on Large-scale Driftnet Fishing, U.N. FAO
Fisheries Report No. 434, UN Doc. FIPL/R434 (1990).
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months before dying from injury, starvation or
both.373
The international community reacted to outlaw such
environmentally destructive practices. The first such response was the
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the
South Pacific (Wellington Convention of 1989). 374 The United States

ratified the Wellington Convention on February 28, 1992. Among
other enforcement measures, the Convention required party states to
"restrict port access and port servicing facilities for driftnet fishing
vessels" to the extent permitted by international law. 375 Among other
things, this Convention prohibits driftnets longer than 2.5 kilometers
(1.5 miles) in length. In December 1989, the United Nations General
Assembly agreed upon a Resolution that proposed
a global moratorium
3 76
on large-scale driftnet fishing on the high seas.
The U.S. Congress implemented the Convention in the High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992. 377 That Act requires U.S.
authorities to deny port access to vessels from any nation that the
Secretary of Commerce has determined engages in drift-net fishing on
the high seas, except where such activity complies with applicable
international agreements, or other illegal, unregulated, or unreported

373

LAKsHmAN

D.

GuRUSWAMY

ET

AL.,

INTERNATIONAL

(1994). See Douglas M.
Johnston. The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean:
Legal
Considerationsand Diplomatic Options,21 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 32 (1990).
ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW AND WORLD ORDER 747

Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in
the South Pacific Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1449 (1990), available at
http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/wellington.htm.
371 Id., art. 3(2)(d). See Grant J. Hewison, The Convention for the
374

Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, 25 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 449, 507-11 (1993).
376

G.A. Res. 44/225, at 147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/225 (Dec. 22,

1989).

177
Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106 Stat. 4901, § 101 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 1826a), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-479, § 610, 120 Stat. 3575,
Jan. 12, 2007.
The European Union did not ban driftnet fishing until 2001. BBC

News, EU Bans Fishing 'Wall of Death,' June 8, 1998, available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/108747.stm. Even so, some European fishermen,
particularly from Italy, continue to practice driftnet fishing in the
Mediterranean Sea. Greenpeace, Press Release: Greenpeace Rounds Up 'Wall
of Death' Fishing Nets, June 26, 2006, available at http://www.scoop.co.nz
/stories/WO0606/S00533.htm.
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fishing.378 In the subsection entitled "Denial of port privileges," the
applicable statute provides:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall, in accordance
with recognized principles of international law-(A) withhold or revoke the clearance . . . for any

large-scale driftnet fishing vessel that is documented
under the laws of the United States or of a nation
included on a list [of violator nations]; and
(B) deny entry of that vessel to any place in the
United States and to the navigable waters of the
United States. 379
Thus, the denial of access to all U.S. ports extends to a particular
category of fishing vessels registered with any nation that the Secretary
has determined does not comply with the Convention. No evidence is
necessary that the particular vessel in question has violated
international law. 380 Federal law provides that the denial of port
privilege to fishing vessels registered in the listed state continues "until
such time as the Secretary of Commerce certifies to the President and
the Congress that such nation has terminated large-scale driftnet fishing
by its nationals and vessels beyond the exclusive economic zone of any
nation.",38 1 That Act also requires the United States to notify the nation

against whose fishing vessels it has taken action, and imposes
additional sanctions on any nation that fails to take appropriate followup action.38 2

378

16 U.S.C. § 1826a. This section was amended in January 2007 to

add "illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing" as another basis for denying
port access. Pub. L. No. 109-479, § 610, 120 Stat. 3575, Jan. 12, 2007.
319 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(a)(2).
380
Id. See Jane Kathryn Jenkins, International Regulation of Driftnet
Fishing: The Role of Environmental Activism and Leverage Diplomacy, 4 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. J. 197, 216-17 (1993).
381

16 U.S.C. § 1826b ("Duration of denial of port privileges and

sanctions"). See Humane Soc. Of US v. Clinton, 44 F.Supp.2d 260, 277-278

(D.D.C. 1999)(continued violations by Italian fishermen required that the
Secretary of Commerce place Italy on the list of violator nations).
382 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)( "Sanctions")(Sanctions include banning the
importation of fish products and fishing equipment from the nation whose
nationals or registered vessels are in violation of the statute).
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Denial of port access or conditioning access to enforce
compliance with international treaties related to illegal fishing activities
on the high seas is an appropriate unilateral sanction. The same
principle applies to nations whose vessels engage in fishing in violation
of other international agreements, such as the one designed to protect
highly migratory species, including tuna, straddling stocks, dolphins,
and sea turtles.38 3 Article 23 of the Convention Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks provides:
1. A port state has the right and the duty to take
measures, in accordance with international law, to
promote the effectiveness of

. .

. conservation and

management measures. When taking such measures
a port state shall not discriminate in form or in fact
against the vessels of any state.
2. A port state may, inter alia, inspect documents,
fishing gear and catch on board fishing vessels, when
such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or at its
offshore terminals.
3. States may adopt regulations empowering the
relevant national authorities to prohibit landings and
transshipments where it has been established that the
catch has been taken in a manner which undermines
the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global
conservation and management measures on the high
seas.

383

In addition to the statutory provisions that permit the United States

to bar fishing vessels from States that engage in long-net fishing in violation of
international conventions, the U.S. Congress permitted the Secretary of
Commerce to bar vessels engaged in fishing in the Central Bering Sea in
violation of agreement. Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-582, § 303, 16 U.S.C. § 1823. For an interesting analysis of
the possibility that the dispute resolution provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention may have on unilateral approaches to promote U.S. interests in
these areas, see Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United
States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and
Other InternationalMarine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 72-6 (1994).
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4. Nothing in this article affects the exercise by
States of their sovereignty over ports in their territory
in accordance with international law. 3
Thus, the coastal state has the authority and responsibility to take
appropriate measures, including vessel inspection and denial of port
access, to carry out the conservation and management purposes of this
Convention.
Of particular popular interest in the United States have been the
various international initiatives to protect whales and other marine
mammals. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW) was adopted "to establish a system of international regulation
for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and
development of whale stocks. 38 5 While the law implementing the
ICRW in the United States provides for criminal and civil sanctions,
including vessel forfeiture, it does not specifically deny port access to
the vessels from foreign States found to be in violation of the
Convention.
Instead, under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments, once the Secretary of Commerce has "certified" a
foreign state as permitting its nationals to engage in whaling operations
that undermine the effectiveness of the ICRW, the Secretary of State
must impose sanctions. 86
Possible punishments include fines,
3 87
imprisonment, forfeitures of catch, and restrictions on port access.
Moreover, the Congress has provided for additional sanctions against
foreign States that violate international agreements to protect fish
stocks and endangered species, including sanctions against imports
384

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, Sept. 8, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/fish-stocks-agreem
entICONF164 37.htm.
385 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble,
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 361; The Whaling Convention Act
of 1949, 16 U.S.C. §§ 916-916k, (implements the ICRW in the United States).
See also 50 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-230.8.
386 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) ("Certification to President") See Gene S.

Martin, Jr., & James. W. Brennan, Enforcing the InternationalConventionfor
the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-MagnusonAmendments,

17 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 293, 294-97 (1989).
387

16 U.S.C. § 916f ("Violations; fines and penalties").

C.F.R. § 12.30 (2009).

See also 19
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from those States certified to be in violation. 388 The United States has
taken action to impose trade sanctions against such whaling States as
Japan, Peru, Iceland, and Norway under the applicable statutory
provisions. 389 The economic impact of such sanctions appears to have
had greater persuasive force than the moral, diplomatic, or political
arguments against whaling activities undertaken in violation of
international norms.39
C.
Conditions on Entry to Protect the U.S. Maritime
Industry. International law also permits coastal States to impose
certain conditions on port entry to protect the domestic maritime
industry.
Cabotage laws, or coastwise trade laws, have become
commonplace among maritime States. Such laws generally require that
vessels documented in a particular state support virtually all of the trade
between ports of that state. 39 1 "The right of a nation to exclude foreign
vessels from its domestic maritime trade is accepted without question
in the international community; and most coastal nations, including the
United States, have adopted cabotage laws to enforce that right. 392
The primary purpose is to promote the continued viability of the
domestic merchant marine industry.393

388

22 U.S.C. § 1978 ("Restriction on importation of fishery or wildlife

products from countries which violate international fishery or endangered or
threatened species programs").
389 Maria Clara Maffei, The International Convention for
the
Regulation of Whaling, 12 INT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 287,298-99 (1999).
390 See Ronald B. Mitchell, Discourse and Sovereignty: Interests,
Science, and Morality in the Regulation of Whaling, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
275, 282-85 (1998).

391 "Cabotage," also known as coast-wise trade, denotes the
reservation of a nation's coastwise trade exclusively for that nation's own
vessels. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (6 th ed. 1990). "Coastwise trade
includes the transportation of passengers or merchandise between points
embraced within the coastwise laws of the United States." 46 C.F.R. § 67.3
(2009).
392 Robert L. McGeorge, United States' Coastwise Trading
Restrictions, I1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 62,62-63 (1990-91)(footnote omitted).
393 "The requirement that U.S.-flag vessels be U.S.-built, U.S.-crewed
and U.S. citizen-owned ensures the continuation of a domestic merchant marine
and shipbuilding industry -- important goals of the United States and
MARAD." Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Administrator of U.S. Maritime Administration,
Department of Transp., Statement before the House Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Mar. Trans. (Sept. 24, 1998), available at http://www.marad.dot.
gov/headlines/testimony/testim 1.htm.
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In the United States, the law governing cabotage, or the
coastwise trade, has long been the Jones Act. 39 4 That Act, and its
predecessors and successors, generally require that such vessels are
"built in the United States" and are "wholly owned" by American
citizens.395 Proof of eligibility to engage in such coastwise trade
requires a Certificate of Documentation, proving compliance with all
applicable laws and conditions.396 Other countries share these policy
goals and have enacted similar laws.397 For example, China has well
established cabotage laws, established for security as well as to
encourage the growth of the domestic shipping industry.398 Worldwide,
there are approximately fifty nations that have enacted cabotage laws to
protect the domestic maritime industry. However, the recent trend,
particularly in the European community, is to liberalize the
requirements of cabotage laws to encourage
greater trade efficiencies
39 9
and reduce maritime transportation costs.
D. Conditions on Entry to Protect Other Economic Interests.
Within reasonable limits, coastal States may also impose conditions on
port entry to protect other economic interests. Some such laws are only
tangentially related to the vessel's operations, such as imposition of
requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National
Labor Relations Act to certain foreign-flag vessels. Although the
As used here, the "Jones Act" refers to the provisions of section 27
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 999 (codified at 46 App. U.S.C. §
883), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-304, Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1710-1712
(codified at 46 U.S.C. chs. 121 and 551).
'9' 46 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 55102 (2009); 46 C.F.R. § 67.30
("Requirement for citizen owner").
396
The Director, National Vessel Documentation Center, issues a
Certificate of Documentation, or CG-1270, with appropriate endorsement, once
all requirements have been met. 46 C.F.R. § 67.15.
397
"Cabotage . . . is common among the maritime nations of the
world." Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Administrator of U.S. Maritime Administration,
Department of Transp., Statement before the House Subcommittee on Coast
Guard
and
Mar.
Trans.
(Sept.
28,
1998),
available at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/headlines/testimony/testim I.htm.
398 Mark A. Hamilton, Negotiating Port Access:
The Sino-US.
Opportunity for Leadership in the Maritime Transport Services Industry, 3
AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 153, 158 (2002). See also JEANETTE GREENFIELD,
394

CHINA'S PRACTICES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 81-83 (1992).

See Malgorzata Nesterowicz, Freedom to Provide Maritime
Transport Services in European Community Law, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 629,
399

640-45 (2003).
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Supreme Court recognizes the "well-established rule of international
law" that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the "internal
affairs of a ship,"

400

the U.S. Congress has seen fit on several

occasions to impose certain expectations on foreign-flag vessels
engaged in trade with the United States. As a general rule, the United
States will not interfere with the internal affairs of a foreign vessel as a
condition of port entry unless the absence of port state regulation would
place a direct burden on the United States or where the United States
has a special duty to safeguard the welfare of the class of persons
protected by the statute. 40 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that
U.S. obligations under international law would not permit it to impose
on the owners of foreign-flag vessels the requirements of federal law
merely to make U.S. merchant shipping more competitive or to create
additional rights for foreign seamen.40 2 The United States, as a member
of the seafaring community of nations, has accepted the "internal
affairs" rule as a binding obligation of international law. 403 Given the
likelihood of diplomatic protests from affected flag States, this doctrine
assumes that Congress will take special care in the exercise of its
powers to enact laws that seek to regulate the internal conduct of
visiting ships. 4° On the other hand, courts may reasonably assume that
Congress intends for "its statutes to apply to entities in United States
territory that serve, employ, or otherwise affect American citizens, or
that affect the peace and tranquility of the United States, even if those
entities happen to be foreign-flag ships. 40 5

400

McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21.

See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, §

402, cmt. h, § 502 cmt. d., § 512 rep. n. 5.
401
Jason M. Schupp, The Clay Bill: Testing the Limits of Port State
Sovereignty, 18 MD.J.INT'L L. & TRADE 199, 226 (1994).
402 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571, 593 (1953).
403
McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19-21. While the Congress may have the
constitutional power to apply the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act to give a union the right to hold elections on a Honduran-flag vessel while
in U.S. ports, this would violate "the well-established rule of international law
that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship."
Id. at 21.
404 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47
(1957) (In Benz, the Court held that it was inappropriate for it "to run
interference in such a delicate field of international relations [as labormanagement relations]" without "the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an
important policy decision where the possibilities of international discord are so
evident and retaliative action so certain." Id.at 147.)
405 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 132 (2005).
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Since World War II, multilateral efforts have sought to reduce
barriers to international trade, while ensuring a level playing field.
These efforts first resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).
During the 1990's, negotiations led to the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which took
over most of the functions of GATT. Although the WTO/GATT
process is silent on the specific issue of vessel access to ports, the
denial of a right of access could well be seen as a trade barrier
inconsistent with a nation's responsibility under its provisions.
Moreover, if a port state were to treat vessels flying various foreign
flags differently, the WTO/GATT rules may apply to prevent
discrimination or favorable treatment being given to vessels from
member States. 4 6 However, in practice, there is little real danger of a
successful challenge when the port state is seeking to promote
legitimate concerns, such as environmental protection, vessel safety,
and homeland security. As Professor Ted Dorman put it:
While the international trade agreements administered by the
W.T.O. may affect the ability of a port state to deny access to
foreign vessels or to impose burdensome conditions on foreign
vessels entering port, the effect is limited to those situations
where the port state is using port access as a means to deny
entry of the goods being carried by the vessel .... 407
E. Enforcing Other Domestic Laws Designed to Protect U.S.
Citizens. As this paper has repeatedly emphasized, the Supreme Court
considers it appropriate to apply domestic laws to foreign vessels in
U.S. ports only where Congress has made clear that it intended such
laws to apply. Moreover, Congress is likely to do so only when the
absence of U.S. regulation would place a direct burden on American
resources or nationals. A recent example of this balancing process
involved a statute Congress enacted to apply to "places of public
accommodations" and "public conveyances" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).4 °8 In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,
the Supreme Court determined that the ADA imposed requirements on

406 McDorman, supra note 270, at 219-22 ("Access to Ports - Effect of
International Trade Laws").
407
Id. at 222.
408
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, §§ 301(7), (10), 302(a),
304(a)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), (10), 12182(a), 12184(a)).
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foreign-flag cruise liners operating out of U.S. ports. 40 9 After
discussing the "internal affairs" rule as developed in a series of earlier
cases, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended the ADA
to apply to foreign-flag cruise vessels to the extent practicable even
though the statutory language and history did not contain a "clear
statement" mandating coverage for such vessels, because the purpose
and intent of the ADA was to protect disabled Americans on all means
of public conveyance.4 10
In considering whether the ADA required removal of physical
barriers, when such a requirement would implicate vessel design and
construction standards and which "would bring a vessel into
noncompliance with the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea . . . or any other international legal obligation," the Court

observed that such a requirement could not qualify as one that was
"readily achievable" within the language of the ADA. 4u However, to
the extent that other practices of the foreign-flag cruise line violated the
ADA, did not merely affect the internal affairs of the ship, and could be
remedied by measures that were "readily achievable," the Court held
that the foreign cruise line had 41
to2 comply with the Act's provisions
when operating out of U.S. ports.

If Congress chose to do so, it could impose a wide range of laws
applicable to foreign-flag vessels in U.S. ports beyond those it has
already enacted. All it needs do to pass muster with the Supreme Court
is: (1) make a "clear statement" of its intention to do so on the face of
the statute; and (2) comply with the requirements of the U.S.
Constitution.4 13 If these two requirements are met, the Supreme Court
has held that there is no additional need to comply with international
law.414 Despite its broad authority, Congress is unlikely to act
unreasonably because of the dictates of international comity and
Spector, 545 U.S. at 129 (in overruling the contrary conclusion of
the lower court, the Supreme Court held that "there can be no serious doubt"
that the ADA applies to the foreign cruise ships). For a concise discussion of
the significance of this rather complex plurality decision, see David W.
Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and
Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 30
TUL. MAR. L.J. 195, 209-13 (2006).
410 Spector, 545 U.S. at 129-135.
411
Id. at 135-36.
412
Id. at 136.
413
Id. at 140.
414 See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 174-77, 188
409

(1993); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
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economic realities.
As a policy matter, excessive exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels would undoubtedly have adverse
consequences, including diplomatic protests, other retaliative actions,
possible court-ordered damage judgments resulting from the breach of
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and, perhaps most
importantly, a chilling economic effect on the burgeoning global ocean
trade with the United States.
The United States has also enacted laws to protect U.S. citizens
against other threats. For example, the Department of Agriculture has
long maintained a comprehensive program for inspecting potentially
contaminated or otherwise harmful agricultural products brought into
the United States from overseas.4'
These and other laws are
appropriate exercises of jurisdiction to control port access to protect
economic and other interests of the American public.
IX. CONDITIONS ON PORT ENTRY AND EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION TO PROMOTE OTHER INTERESTS NOT
DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PORT VISIT IN QUESTION
In some instances, States include in their international
agreements and/or domestic legislation or regulations restrictions or
conditions on port entry (or even passage through territorial waters)
that are not directly or even tangentially related to the visit itself. These
run the gamut from a desire to show displeasure with the domestic or
international policies of the flag state to a need to punish a state which
allows its fishermen to engage in practices in violation of international
fishing agreements. There are too many variations of the possible
applications of this principle to cover all of the possibilities here.
Instead, this paper will simply deal with two recent examples,
Protection of the North Atlantic Right Whale and Protection of
Underwater Cultural Heritage.
A. Protection of the North Atlantic Right Whale. The North
Atlantic right whale is one of the most endangered species of marine
mammals. Although the Endangered Species Act protects all types of

411 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 8303a (2004) ("Restriction on importation of
entry... necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the
United States of any pest or disease of livestock .... "); See Pacific Merchant
Shipping Assn. v. Voss, 12 Cal. 4th 503, 907 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1995).
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right whales, 416 the North Atlantic right whale is perhaps the species at
greatest risk.417 The best available estimates put the current population
of the North Atlantic right whale at approximately 300-400
individuals. 418 Low reproductive rates and high mortality make
recovery a slow and uncertain process, with the real possibility that the
species could become extinct.419
One of the major reasons for high whale mortality is the
occurrence of "ship strikes" along the East Coast of the United States
where the whales are particularly vulnerable as they feed, mate, and
loiter on or near the surface of the ocean. 420 After consultations with
officials at the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the mid1990's, both the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard instituted measures to
protect against strikes caused by their ships. These measures included

16 U.S.C. §§ 1362-62, 1531-44 (2004). See also 50 C.F.R.

416

224.101(b).
417

"[T]he North Atlantic right whale [is] one of the most endangered

whales .... ." EndangeredNorth Atlantic Right Whale Study Says Population
in Crisis, SCIENCE DAILY, Jul. 27, 2005, availableat http://www.sciencedaily.

com/ releases/2005/07/050726075715.htm (based on a study by the Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution). See also Michael Moore, Whither the North
Atlantic

Right

Whale?,

43

OCEANUS

No.

2,

1 (2004),

available at

http://oceanusmag.whoi,edu/v43n2/moore.html ("[U]nless this dire population
trend is reversed, the species is headed quickly toward extinction."); John
Garofolo, Protecting America's Fisheries, Jan. 1999, available at
http://www.uscg.mil/history/h_fisheries.html. ("The right whale is the world's
most endangered species of whale.")
418
Id. (estimated population of 350 individuals). See also NOAA,
Fact Sheet: Proposal to Address Ship Strikes of the North Atlantic Right
Whale, June 23, 2006, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov /pr/pdfs
/shipstrike/proposed rule fact sheet.pdf.
See also Alexander Gillespie,
Wasting the Oceans: Searching for Principles to Control Bycatch in
InternationalLaw, 17 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 161, 168 (2002) (the
latest figures put the population of the North Atlantic right whale at around
300, "due to a combination of ship strikes and entanglements.") (footnote
omitted); Right whale, Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Right whale (estimating 400); Right whale, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
ONLINE (2007), available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9063681/
right-whale ("numbering only in the hundreds.").
419
A recent computer model "predicts that. under current conditions,
the population will be extinct in less than 200 years." NOAA Fisheries, Office
of Protected Resources, Right Whale(Eubalaena glacialis), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/mammals/cetaceans/rightwhale/.
420

Id.
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operating at slower speeds and posting specially-trained lookouts.42'
The Coast Guard has acted significantly to protect against strikes
caused by vessels in general, including passing initiatives to educate the
public, participating in studies, assisting in whale monitoring efforts,
and issuing precise and up-to-date notices to mariners. Upon the
request of the United States and consistent with the provisions of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other applicable
international agreements, 42 2 in December 1998 the IMO established a
mandatory ship reporting system for vessels passing through two of the
whale's critical habitats and imposed restrictions on fishing gear used
by vessels within these areas.423
Exercising statutory authority
specifically enacted for that purpose,424 the Coast Guard has issued
regulations to implement this mandatory reporting system.425
To further lower the risk of such deadly ship strikes, the National
Oceanographic and Atmosphere Administration (NOAA) proposed in
2006 that the United States impose and enforce seasonal speed-limits
on vessels 65-foot in length or greater, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, as well as those entering or departing a port of place
under the jurisdiction of the United States. 426 The geographical areas

affected would include specified Atlantic coast whale breeding and
feeding areas, including arcs extending out to 30 nautical miles from
major U.S. East Coast ports and 15-day "dynamic management areas"
that may be designated at any point within the U.S. EEZ in the Atlantic
421

Bob Nelson, Navy News Service, Press Release: Navy continues

to protect marine life off East Coast, available at http:llfindarticles.
com/p/articles/mi_pnav/is_200101/ai_906909234/print.
422
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 194(5); International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, ch. V, reg. 8-1.
423
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Report of the Maritime Safety
Committee on its Seventieth Session, 70th Sess., Agenda Item 23, par. 11.41,
IMO Doc. MSC 70/23 (1998).
See generally Jeffrey P. Luster, The
InternationalMaritime Organization'sNew Mandatory Ship Reporting System
for the Northern Right Whale's CriticalHabitat: A Legitimate Approach to
Strengthening the Endangered Species Act?, 46 NAVAL L. REV. 153, 153-54
(1999).
424 33 U.S.C. § 1230(d) ("International Agreements -- Ship reporting
systems").
425 33 C.F.R. §§ 169.100-169.140 ("Establishment of Two Mandatory
Ship Reporting Systems for the Protection of Northern Right Whales").
426 NOAA Fisheries, Office of Protected Resources, Strategy to
Reduce Ship Strikes to North Atlantic Right Whales, available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/shipstrike/.
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Ocean. 4 " The compliance and enforcement concept currently under
consideration by NOAA and the Coast Guard potentially includes using
AIS data on the position, heading, and speed of vessels in the area to
notify those vessels located
in the areas of concern that they are
428
exceeding the speed limit.

If a particular vessel fails to slow down, NOAA or the Coast
Guard may issue the master a citation which will be enforced once the
vessel enters port. Should the violation occur while a foreign-flag
vessel is outbound from the U.S. port, enforcement action against the
vessel, its owner-operator, and/or the master would not take place until
a subsequent port call, perhaps even several years later, raising due
process concerns. 429 Some proponents have even proposed enforcing
the speed restrictions on vessels that are engaging in innocent passage
through the territorial sea or exercising their freedom of navigation 4in0
international waters when and if the vessel next visits a U.S. port.
427

NOAA, Office of Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Proposed Rule to

Implement Speed Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Ship Collisions with
North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. 36299, 36299-36310 (June 26,
2006)(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 224.105). See generally NOAA, Ship
Strike Reduction, Aug. 16, 2006, available at http://www.nero.noaa.gov/
shipstrike/.
428 See Brian Tetreault, Automated Identification System: The Use of
AIS in Support of Maritime Domain Awareness, PROCEEDINGS 27, 30 (Fall
2006) ("[T]he Coast Guard is working with [NOAA] to use the automatic
identification system in support of protection of endangered living marine
resources.")
429 See NOAA, Office of Law Enforcement, Press Release: NOAA
Penalizes Vessel Operatorsfor Violating Various Federal Marine Mammal
Protection Laws, Jul. 14, 2005, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/
news/newsNED 071405.htm (announcing fines of up to $3500 to operators
whose vessels failed to comply with laws and regulations to protect right
whales).
430 See, e.g., Int'l Fund for Animal Welfare, Recommended Measures
to Reduce Ship Strikes of North Atlantic Right Whales, Aug. 23, 2001,
available at http://www.ifaw.orglifaw/dfiles/file_159.pdf North Atlantic right
whale found dead on an East Coast beach, May 20, 2005, available at
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2005/2005-05-20-02.asp. "It is critical
for the right whale population that NMFS enact these measures immediately
until meaningful and permanent regulations are put in place," the coalition said.
... With a combined membership of more than I I million people, the coalition
to protect the North Atlantic right whale species includes - Defenders of
Wildlife, The Humane Society of the United States, International Fund for
Animal Welfare, International Wildlife Coalition, National Environmental
Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Oceana, The Ocean Conservancy,
and the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society." Id.
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Domestic opponents argue that such restrictions adversely affect
international shipping. Any such extension ofjurisdiction over foreignflag vessels would go against the position that the United States has
taken on similar issues that other States have proposed and could have
significant international repercussions.
B. Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage. A second
example of how far restrictions on port access can depart from those
directly related to the vessel's visit is the adoption of laws designed to
protect underwater cultural heritage. At least in the opinion of a
zealous group of international advocates, the world community is
increasingly interested in protecting such interests. The 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea established a "duty to protect objects
of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea.",43' In order to
restrict the trafficking of cultural artifacts, Article 303 expands the
jurisdiction of the coastal state to presume that removal from the seabed
in the contiguous zone "without its approval would result in an
infringement within its territory or territorial sea .... ,A32
One of the most important underwater cultural heritage sites is
the portion of the North Atlantic where the RMS Titanic sank, causing
the loss of approximately 1500 lives, after striking an iceberg in April,
1912. Seventy-three years later, technological breakthroughs enabled a
joint U.S.-French expedition to locate the shipwreck in 12,500 feet of
water. Later expeditions began to recover treasure and other artifacts
from the wreck site. To protect against destruction of this historic site
and uncontrolled pilferage of the cultural heritage, in 1986 Congress
directed that the Administrator of the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, in discussion with the Secretary of State,
"to enter into consultations with the United Kingdom, France, Canada,
and other interested nations to develop international guidelines for
research on, exploration of, and if appropriate, salvage of the R.M.S.
Titanic . . . ,.33Congress instructed NOAA to negotiate with

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 303(1) ("Archaeological and historical
objects found at sea").
432
Id., art. 303(2).
433 R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99513, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 2083, (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 450rr-1 - 450rr6).
431
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concerned States to have the site declared to be an international
maritime memorial.
In 2001, NOAA issued Guidelines for Research, Exploration and
Salvage of RMS Titanic. 35
Subsequent diplomatic negotiations
resulted in the 2004 Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel
RMS Titanic.436 The United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the United
States have all signed the Agreement. Among other expectations, such
as following the best practices for developing an underwater
archaeological site, this 2004 Agreement requires all parties to "take
appropriate actions to prohibit activities in its territory including its
maritime ports... that are inconsistent with this Agreement. 437
The Agreement is subject to acceptance following the enactment
of implementing legislation. After working within the interagency
process to develop an appropriate legislative package, the State
Department submitted a draft to Congress in June 2006. 438 Once
enacted and signed into law, the United States will deposit its
439
acceptance and the Agreement will become effective for the U.S.
The draft legislation includes various administrative and criminal
sanctions against any person determined to have violated the legislation
implementing the Agreement, including fines of $250,000 per day of
violation, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.4
Current sanctions do not include barring access to U.S. ports of foreignvessels determined to be in violation of the Agreement. Although
denial of port access could certainly constitute an appropriate sanction,
16 U.S.C. § 45Orr-4 (international agreement to designate site "as
an international maritime memorial").
435 National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration,
Guidelines for Research, Exploration and Salvage of RMS Titanic, 66 Fed.
Reg. 18905, 18908-09 (Apr. 12, 2001).
436 Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS Titanic, June
18, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/ g/oes/rls/or/2004/33709.htm.
437 Id., art. 4(5).
438 Letters from Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary, Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, to Vice President Richard B. Cheney, President of
the Senate, and the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House (June 9,
2006).
439 State Department, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note:
Administration Transmits Proposed Legislation to Implement Agreement to
Protect RMS Titanic Wreck Site, June 9, 2006, available at http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/67769.htm.
440 State Department Draft Legislation, R.M.S. Titanic Maritime
MemorialAct of 2006 § 10 (as submitted to Congress on June 9, 2006).
414

2009]

LEGAL AND POLICY FACTORS GOVERNING THE
IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS ON ACCESS TO
AND JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN-FLAG
VESSELS IN U.S. PORTS

315

those responsible for enforcing the treaty obligations apparently view
obtaining jurisdiction over and prosecuting the violator as more likely
to deter criminal conduct than simply denying port access to the vessel.
X. DOMESTIC AUTHORITY AND PRACTICAL PROCEDURES
FOR DENYING PORT ENTRY
Even if a port state has the international legal right to deny access
to its ports to a particular vessel, the cognizant officials usually must
have explicit domestic authority to do so. While a country's Head of
State or legislative body could formally advise another state that
vessels flying its flag are not welcome within its ports (such as Japan
and Australia have recently done with respect to vessels flying the
North Korean flag and the international community is doing to enforce
U.N. sanctions against Iran), most decisions made by lower-level
functionaries seek to apply domestic law designed to promote the
interests of the state. Since there is a general presumption of access for
foreign-flag commercial vessels, an official who determines that a
vessel may not have access under certain circumstances must generally
have the domestic legal authority to do so. Otherwise that official and
his agency may experience legal and political complications for
engaging in an ultra vires act or failing to follow mandated procedures.
This might even result in a lawsuit and/or political or diplomatic
pressures if the responsible official has taken unauthorized or illegal
action to the detriment of the foreign-flag shipping company and the
domestic interests interested in using that vessel to engage in
international trade. In other words, even if a state has the international
legal right to do prevent access, the exercise of that right must be
carried out in accordance with domestic legal authority and following
established procedures.
In the handful of reported decisions that have focused on the
denial of port access in the United States, the aggrieved party has
generally taken the position that the officials who have made the
decision to do so have acted contrary to domestic law and policy. In
Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, for example, a Canadian
corporation brought an action for damages for the Coast Guard's
refusal to permit a vessel employing a Polish master and several Polish
officers entry to harbor in Norfolk, Virginia. 441 While the general
Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1083-84
(D.C.Cir. 1980).
441
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rationale for that denial, that the presence of Communist-bloc officers
might pose a risk to national security in that particularly sensitive port,
was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of international law, the
plaintiffs argued that the Coast Guard officials had acted capriciously
and contrary to existing regulations and procedures in reaching and
carrying out the decision to deny access. The Appellate Court held that
"if the Coast Guard officers acted arbitrarily and in violation of
regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant vessel], the United States
is not immune from a damage action .... "2 The Court returned the
case to the district court for a factual hearing on that issue.
In the Humane Society of the United States v. Clinton,
plaintiffs successfully sued President Clinton and the Secretary of
Commerce because the Federal Government failured to take timely
action to sanction Italian drift-net fishing vessels when these
government officials had, or should have had, reasonable cause to
believe that such vessels persisted in employing excessively long
driftnets in violation of an international treaty and the implementing
statute. 4" The U.S. Court of International Trade concluded that "nine
confirmed sightings [of illegal driftnet fishing by Italian vessels]
combined with the numerous allegations make the Secretary's refusal to
identify Italy a second time arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance
with the Driftnet Act. ' "5
In recent decades some international institutions have also
directed their attention to combat illegal, unregulated, and unreported
(IUU) fishing and the threat such fishing poses to in the global
commons. Of particularly concern are highly migratory species, such
as albacore tuna, and various types of fish that spend significant
amounts of their adult lives in the high seas or seas outside of the EEZ
or in more than one EEZ (straddling stocks), such as the Patagonian
toothfish in the waters of the Southern Ocean." 6 To provide some
measure of protection and management of threatened fish stocks, the
442

Id. at 1091.

443

Humane Society of the United States v. Clinton, 44 F.Supp.2d 260

(Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).
4" High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-582, 106 Stat. 4900, § 101 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1826a).
445 Humane Society, 44 F.Supp.2d at 277. To rule against the
Government, "the Court must find that [the Secretary of Commerce] acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and not in accordance with law." Id. at 278.
446 See Patagonian toothfish, Wikipedia, available at http://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Patagonian-toothfish.
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Law of the Sea Convention encourages concerned States to work
together or within international and regional organizations "to agree
upon the measures necessary for the conservation of those stocks...
,
Toward this end, the United Nations Conference on Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks met in the early 1990's
to develop a comprehensive strategy for handling such management
issues. 4 48 Moreover, for decades concerned States have formed
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO's) in various
parts of the world. Among several such RFMO's, the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), established in 1979, pursues
stocks in the once
aggressive policies to manage and conserve fishery
449
highly productive waters of the northwest Atlantic.
Conservation measures that NAFO have adopted include fishing
bans on certain threatened fish stocks and requirements to mark fishing
gear, to submit to vessel monitoring and inspection, and to maintain
catch and transshipment records. After appropriate investigation, the
NAFO General Council may place vessels found to have violated
conservation measures on an IUU List. 450 "Contracting parties shall
take all necessary measures to the extent possible in accordance with
their applicable legislation with regard to vessels on the IUU List,
including . . . prohibiting the entry into their ports of such vessels,
Most enforcement provisions,
except in case offorce majeure ....
including denial of port entry, extend to fishing vessels of both
contracting parties and non-contracting parties alike. By its terms,
447

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 63(2); id., art. 64 ("Highly migratory

species"), and art. 197 ("Cooperation on a global or regional basis ... for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment").
448

United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly

Migratory Fish Stocks, Sep. 8, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/37, reprintedin
34 I.L.M. 1542-1580 (1995).
449 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries, available at http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/about.html. A
similar international agreement involving an RFMO is the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M.
840 (CCAMLR). Chapter 44A of Title 16, United States Code, 16 U.S.C. §§
2431-2444, implements the CCAMLR in the United States. As a normal rule,
statutes implementing these Conventions apply directly only to vessels or
actions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
450 NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, NAFO FC Doc.
07/1 Ser. No. N5335, art. 49 ("Establishment of the IUU List").
411 Id., art. 58.
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however, those enforcement provisions are not self-executing. Just
because a vessel may appear on the IUU list, the port state must still
have taken legislative and administrative action to ensure that
appropriate laws and regulations result in the sanctions specified.
In the United States, Congress implemented the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Convention through Title I1 of the Fisheries Act of
1995. 452 As a general rule, the primary enforcement mechanisms under
that Act, and the many international conventions and domestic statutes
established to protect and manage fish stocks, are administrative
sanctions, such as civil fines and the seizure of illegally obtained fish.
However, except for the rather involved process for listing nations
whose fishing vessels are found to engage in illegal fishing activities
using long driftnets,453 sanctions in current U.S. law and regulation do
not extend to barring vessels listed as having engaged in IUU fishing in
violation of international conventions.
Indeed, nothing in the
implementing statute or regulations specifically refers to the denial of
port entry for vessels on any of the several IUU lists that RFMO may
promulgate. To justify enforcing a port-entry ban against a foreign-flag
fishing vessel, the cognizant Coast Guard officer must look to authority
found elsewhere.
Existing Federal statutes and regulations give the Coast Guard
rather broad power to deny port entry and control operations within
U.S. waters of foreign-flag vessels found to be in violation of laws,
regulations, or treaties to which the United States is a party. The Ports
and Waterways

Safety Act of 1978 (PWSA), as amended,

'5'

specifically authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security (delegated
to the cognizant Coast Guard District Commander and Captain of the
Port) to deny port entry to any U.S. port or navigable waters if "he has
reasonable cause to believe such vessel does not comply with any
regulation issued under this act or any other applicable law or
treaty. 455
Implementing regulations provide that "[ejach District
Commander or Captain of the Port . . . may deny entry into the
navigable waters of the United States . . . to any vessel not in

compliance with the provisions of the [Act] or the regulations issued
452

Fisheries Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-43, Tit. II (codified at 16

U.S.C. §§ 5601-5612).
453 See 16 U.S.C. § 1826(a)(2).
454 Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1978 (PWSA), Pub. L. No. 92340 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236).
45 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b)(1).

2009]

LEGAL AND POLICY FACTORS GOVERNING THE
IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS ON ACCESS TO
AND JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN-FLAG
VESSELS IN U.S. PORTS

319

thereunder., 456 Later in that regulation, the District Commander or
COTP is given authority to order a vessel to operate in a particular
manner whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe that the vessel is
not in compliance with any regulation, law or treaty ....
',4" While the
PWSA and the regulations issued under it normally apply to
international vessel safety, manning, equipment, and construction
standards, nothing limits them to such laws or treaties. If the cognizant
international commission or implementing body determined that a
particular vessel had violated conservation measures designed to
combat IUU fishing, this finding would seem to provide "reasonable
cause" for denying access to port. Because the National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration is the lead Federal Agency
responsible for interpreting and enforcing international and domestic
fishery regulations, the Coast Guard would normally wait until NOAA
has made a determination that the vessel in question was in violation of
U.S. laws. If the violation of law, regulation, or treaty concerned a
vessel equipment standard, or a threat of serious pollution, the Coast
Guard would not require the determination of another Federal Agency
to take action, since it would be the appropriate subject-matter expert.
If the violation related to a homeland security matter, the coast guard
would presumably act based on information received from the
appropriate Agency in DOD or DHS. If it related to an immigration
matter, the subject-matter expert would likely be CBP or ICE. Of
course, before the Coast Guard would take action to deny port access, it
would have to independently determine that it had authority and valid
and appropriate rationale under all the circumstances.
When a port state has good cause to deny port access to a
foreign-flag vessel and decides to do so, it has an obligation to notify
the vessel's master, its flag state, and its owner or owners in a timely
and reasonable manner under the circumstances.
The President,
Secretary of State, appropriate U.S. Ambassador, or other authorized
State Department official could communicate to the appropriate flag
state that a particular vessel may not call upon ports in the United
States because of its violation of international convention or domestic
law. However, under existing U.S. procedures, appropriate Coast
Guard officials normally carry out the process of denying port access to
foreign-flag vessel where U.S. law and regulations require or authorize
it. The cognizant District Commander or Captain of the Port (COTP)
33 C.F.R. § 160.107 ("Denial of entry").
4" 33 C.F.R. § 160.111 ("Special orders apply to vessel operations").
456
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normally issues an order to the vessel denying port access. Such an
order should include a summary of the factual situation, the basis for
denying port access, the legal authority for taking such action, the
circumstances under which the order would be rescinded, the potential
penalties for violating the order, the process for appealing the order,
and the office which the recipient of the order could call for any
questions. Such an order should be communicated not only to the
vessel in question, but also to its owners, agents, and flag state.
Any time that the United States seeks to deny port access to a
foreign-flag vessel, even to a foreign warship, fishing vessel, or
merchant vessel that is in clear violation of a law, regulation, or treaty
obligation, it must find the authority for denying such access and
comply with basic due process requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Particularly involving issues related to
homeland security, the Coast Guard and other cognizant agencies
employ the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
coordination process to effectively align and integrate "responses to
real or potential terrorist incidents across all stakeholders" in the
federal government. 458
If the Congress and cognizant agencies
consider that denial of port entry to certain foreign-flag vessels under
particular circumstances promote key interests of the United States,
there should be laws, regulations, and procedures in place to carry out
such a policy. Otherwise there are likely to be legal, political, and
practical consequences for the denial. The next section discusses some
of these possible adverse consequences in detail.
XI. IMPOSSIBLE LEGAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND PRACTICAL
CONSEQUENCES FOR IMPOSING EXCESSIVE RESTRICTIONS
ON PORT ACCESS OR EXERCISING OVERLY BROAD
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN VESSELS IN PORT
Black letter law provides that "a State that violates an
international obligation is responsible for the wrongful act towards the
injured State . . . ." '9 To avoid adverse consequences, port states

458

Admiral Thad Allen,Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, The Water Is

Different, Address at the U.S. Naval Institute Port Security Conference (Jun. 7,
2006) ("Significant progress has been made in the continuing maturation of the
[MOTR] coordination process ..." ), available at http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/
speeches/docs/USNI_ NY 06 2006.pdf.
459 MALANCZUK, supra note 9, at 3. See also The Corfu Channel Case
(Merits) (UK. v. Alb.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 27-30 (Apr. 9); Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S.v. Can.), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1901, 1905, 35 Am.J. INT'L L. 684, 685 (Mar.
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should be careful not to impose conditions on port access over foreign
merchant vessels not rationally and effectively related to the voyage in
question or otherwise violate norms of international law. Likewise,
port states should only exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels in their
ports consistent with well established, fundamental principles of
international law. Otherwise, the port state may be exposed to various
consequences to any other state, individual, or entity harmed as a result.
Under international law, a port state that has violated a legal obligation
to another state or individual may be required both to stop violating that
obligation and to make restitution for any loss suffered. 4 ° Such
consequences may be the result of legal action or responses from
foreign States or shipping companies, diplomatic intervention,
international sanctions, unilateral remedies, or the practical
consequence of making seaborne trade so onerous or expensive as to
discourage companies from making port calls in the state in question.
This section will briefly consider the range of possible legal,
diplomatic, and practical consequences for violating international law
related to port access.
A. Legal Consequences. If the state imposes a condition on
port access that violates its obligations under a treaty or customary
international law, the flag state, or even the affected individual, may
attempt to seek a legal remedy. As Professors Churchill and Lowe
wrote: "[Port] closures or conditions of access which are patently
unreasonable or discriminatory might be held to amount to an abus de
droit, for which the coastal State might be internationally responsible..
• .,,461
Likewise, if the port state attempts to assert jurisdiction over a
foreign-flag vessel in its ports or waters in violation of international
law, the aggrieved party may seek a legal remedy, either through the
courts of the port state or in some other legal forum.
For example, if a port state imposed a condition on access, such
as an excessive or discriminatory fee for port services, that violated the
terms of an applicable FCN treaty between the port and flag state, relief
11, 1941);

IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS:
STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (PART 1)1,49-52 (1983).
460 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at § 901.
"[I]tis a principle of

international law ... that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation
to make reparation." BROWNLIE, supra note 221, at 17 (quoting the Court's
opinion in the Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 17,
at 29).
461 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13, at 63.
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could be sought in the courts of the port state, through a mediation or
arbitration panel, through compulsory settlement procedures under the
LOS Convention, or other agreed-upon forum. Likewise, if the
domestic courts of the port state brought the vessel's master before it
for a criminal or administrative matter solely related to the internal
economy of the vessel, any defense counsel would first seek to protect
his client's interest by seeking to have the charge dismissed or, if this
were not possible, mount a zealous defense to the charge in court. In
the United States, Federal courts occasionally review criminal or civil
charges against foreign persons or shipping interests on the basis that
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction may be inconsistent with international
law.462
The LOS Convention established safeguards for foreign-flag
vessels that the port state has subjected to abusive or excessive
investigative or enforcement actions. 463 "Coastal States that violate the
Convention's safeguards may be liable for any resulting damages or
losses suffered by the vessel.' ' 464 If both the coastal and flag state sign
on to the LOS Convention, the compulsory dispute settlement
provisions may come into effect. 465 In certain cases, international fora
are also available to consider providing relief to aggrieved States or, in
a few cases, individuals. These range from arbitration panels that
bilateral or multilateral treaties between the effected States call for,
regional international courts, trade courts, or even the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). For states party to IJNCLOS and with respect to
certain issues, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) would be available to resolve issues affecting port access,
detention of vessels, or the exercise of jurisdiction over vessels and
crews by port states.4 66 Decisions of such international courts and
tribunals could not only result in a determination that the particular law
or administrative practice violates international law, but that the
violator state was under an obligation to pay restitution for the damages
462

See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 402-03 (3d

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 969 (2002); United States v. Hyundai
Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 172 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999).
463
UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 223-231.
464 Allen, supra note 272, at 575 (citing UNCLOS, art. 232).
465 Id. (citing UNCLOS, art. 292). Interestingly, the first case that the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea decided arose under article 292.
See MN SAIGA (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 37 I.L.M. 360
(1997).
466 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 287 and Annex VI. See Jillaine
Seymour, InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea: A Great Mistake?, 13
IND.J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-9 (2006); Roberts, supra note 314, at 107.
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it has caused. States determined to have violated international norms
must usually pay the litigation costs associated with any court or
administrative hearings as well.
B. Diplomatic Consequences and International Sanctions.
Even if the aggrieved state or private party is unable or unwilling to
seek legal redress for what it perceives to be excessive conditions on
access or the excessive exercise of jurisdiction in a foreign port, one or
more concerned States might decide to issue diplomatic protests to the
port state that violated international law. For example, if the United
States denied access to a French-flag commercial vessel based on
criteria that France considered unjustified, or which violated a bilateral
treaty between France and the United States, the French government
could issue a formal demarche concerning the incident, to which the
United States would normally have to reply. It is through such claims
and counterclaims that customary international law forms and develops
over time. This is what the United States recently did to protest
Australia's efforts to impose a compulsory pilotage scheme in the
Torres Strait.
The aggrieved state may also take the matter outside of the
bilateral relationship to the United Nations, International Maritime
Organization (IMO), World Trade Organization (WTO), or other
appropriate regional or specialized organization. The purpose of such
an action would be to bring international diplomatic and political
scrutiny to bear on the excessive application of jurisdiction.
Particularly if an international consensus can develop that a particular
action is unreasonable and excessive, the use of such diplomatic and
political tools can have a significant impact on modifying state
behavior. If the violation of international law is sufficiently serious, the
cognizant international organization may even decide to impose
appropriate sanctions against the violator state.
C. Unilateral Remedies and Practical Consequences. Perhaps
the most effective response to the violation of international law by a
port state is through the unilateral remedies that other States might
impose and the practical consequence that shipping companies might
adopt. For example, consistent with the international principle of
reciprocity, the aggrieved state might impose equally burdensome
conditions on port access to vessels from the state it considers to be
acting in violation of international law as a unilateral sanction. Such a
countermeasure would be appropriate if necessary to end the violation.
Moreover, excessive conditions on port access or jurisdiction over

324

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF

[Vol. 5.209

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

foreign vessels in port would discourage international trade with ports
of that state. This effect would be particularly telling if the foreign
state or shipping company were to communicate the reasons it had
decided to no longer call on a particular port. The loss of business
would likely cause the local industry, civil, and business associations to
seek relief through the elimination or modification of the excessive and
unreasonable exercise of port state jurisdiction. If the denial of access
to a port amounted to a trade barrier or an example of discriminatory
treatment inconsistent with GATT or an international agreement under
the World Trade Organization, the aggrieved state might have access to
the WTO dispute settlement process and, ultimately, the imposition of
trade sanctions against the offending state.
XII. EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANALYTICAL
MATRIX
One of the key purposes of this paper is to develop a
methodology to evaluate proposed and actual conditions that the United
States and other port states seek to impose on foreign-flag vessels. This
section will evaluate both the legal and policy factors that affect the
imposition of such conditions and then propose an analytical
methodology for determining whether a particular condition on port
entry is an appropriate way to promote a particular policy goal. The
paper will then apply these analytical factors to a current real-life issue,
Australia's recent requirement that foreign-flag vessels employ an
Australian pilot while transiting the Torres Strait. The final part of this
paper will emphasize the need and importance of harmonizing port
state regulations with international expectations and procedures.
A. Evaluating Legality and Policy for Imposing Port Entry
Conditions. As discussed in detail above, international law permits
port states to impose reasonable conditions on the entry of foreign
vessels into ports. However, the international community presumes
that, as a general rule, commercial vessels will have access to the ports
into which they need to enter to engage in global trade. To be
consistent with international law, any restrictions must be based on
important national goals, must be directly and effectively related to
accomplishing one or more of these goals, and must be objectively
prudent and necessary under all the circumstances. Any effort to
impose conditions on port entry of a foreign-flag vessel involves a
claim of jurisdiction over the vessel for certain purposes. While a
foreign vessel can likely avoid the exercise of jurisdiction by refusing
to engage in trade with the port state or, if notified as it approaches,
refusing to enter the waters of the port state, imposing conditions on
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port entry presupposes some appropriate enforcement mechanism.
That is, if a foreign vessel enters a port in violation of conditions of
entry, or reports that it has complied, when it has not in fact complied
with any such conditions, the port state has the right to enforce its
conditions by taking appropriate administrative, civil, or possibly
criminal sanctions against the owner and/or operators of the foreign
vessel.467 However, a state may not exercise jurisdiction with respect
to a foreign-flag vessel or its activity when the exercise of such
jurisdiction would be arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable. 4 8
B. Determination of "Reasonableness." Although various
States, the international community, and legal commentators will often
differ as to when the imposition of conditions or the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable under various circumstances, it is important to
make an effort to do so. Determination whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over a vessel or its activity as a condition of port entry is
appropriate involves consideration of a number of relevant factors.
Questions that a port state and the international community might
appropriately ask in determining the reasonableness of a law or
regulation conditioning port entry or imposing jurisdiction on foreign
merchant vessels upon arrival in port include the following:
(1)
Are the policy interests that the law or
regulation is designed to address of importance to the
port state?
(2)
Does the harm(s) to be avoided, or the
benefit(s) to be achieved, have a direct connection to
the foreign vessel's presence while operating in the
coastal waters of the port state?
(3)
Does the regulated activity have a close
geographical nexus to the entry of the vessel into the
waters of the port state?
(4)
Does the regulated activity have a close
temporal nexus to the planned entry of the vessel into
the waters of the port state?

467 See 33 U.S.C. § 1232 ("Enforcement provisions," including civil,
criminal, in rem, injunctions, and denial of entry or exit).
468
See RESTATEMENT , supra note 9, § 403(1).
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(5) Will the law or regulation be effective in
accomplishing the policy goal(s) for which it was
implemented?
(6)
Will the law or regulation have the
practical effect of denying or impeding freedom of
navigation in international waters or the exercise of
the rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided in the
LOS Convention?
(7)
Would the exercise of jurisdiction under
the circumstances violate an applicable bilateral or
multi-lateral convention or the relevant provisions of
customary international law?
(8)
Are the criminal or administrative
sanctions to be imposed for violation of the law or
regulation consistent with the applicable principles of
international law?
(9)
How important to the international
community are the political, economic, social, or
environmental goals to be achieved?
(10) To what extent have other States
imposed similar conditions on port entry or exercises
of jurisdiction over foreign vessels in their ports with
at least the tacit approval of other States?
(11)
Has the relevant competent international
organization approved similar laws or regulations
that one or more other States may have proposed or
adopted?
(12) To what extent does another state with a
greater claim to jurisdiction over the vessel have an
interest in regulating the activity to promote the
policy goals?
(13)
What is the likelihood of a conflict
between the port state and another state with an
interest in regulating the activity?
(14) Is there domestic legal authority for
denying access, and have the appropriate authorities
complied with the procedural requirements to notify
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the vessel of the denial and included an opportunity
to be heard on the matter?
(15) Will the consequences of enforcing the
regulation have any adverse consequences, such as
increasing navigational risks for vessels underway,
complicating or delaying the port visit, or otherwise
discouraging or increasing the costs of seaborne
commerce?
(16) Is there a less intrusive, disruptive,
expensive, complicated, or objectionable way to
accomplish the same policy goal(s)?
Each of these relevant questions determines the reasonableness of the
domestic law, regulation, or policy under consideration.
C. Applying These Factors for Determining Reasonableness
in a Particular Case: Mandatory Pilotage Requirements in the
Torres Strait. To illustrate how these sixteen factors could be used
effectively to determine the objective reasonableness of a proposed
condition on port entry, consider the recent initiative of Australia and
Papua New Guinea to require a qualified local pilot to board and pilot
all commercial vessels of a certain size and all tanker vessels passing
through the Torres Strait between northern Australia and southern
Papua New Guinea. Failure to employ such a pilot could result in
substantial financial sanctions to be imposed on the vessel on its next
visit to an Australian port. As discussed above,469 this proposed
mandatory pilotage requirement has generated a good deal of
international discussion. This paper will consider each of the factors
listed above to evaluate reasonableness.
First, the law or regulation was implemented to address a matter
of significant and long-term concern to both Australia and Papua New
Guinea. 470 The Torres Strait, located just beyond the northern end of
the Great Barrier Reef, is an environmentally sensitive area and home
to indigenous peoples who have lived and worked in the pristine waters
there for many generations. A collision in those restricted waters, or a
469
See supra Section VI.C, discussing Australia and Papua New
Guinea's mandatory pilotage proposal for the Torres Strait, and Australia's
implementing regulations.
470
Ottesen et al., supra note 316, at 507-511, 519; Roberts, supra note
314, at 93-94, 99-10 1.
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grounding on any of the thousands of rocks, reefs, and islets would
likely cause an ecological disaster, impacting adversely on those living
and working there. Moreover, depending on the size of the vessels and
where the incident occurs, it could have the effect of blocking the
Torres Strait for international navigation for some time. Preventing
pollution of the marine environment of the area and keeping the Torres
Strait open for international navigation are two vital and nationally
important goals.
Second, the harm has a direct connection to the foreign vessel's
presence while navigating through the coastal waters of the port state.
The physical presence of these large commercial vessels and tankers,
plying the waters of the Torres Strait, is of direct concern. If these
vessels never enter the Torres Strait, the regulation would have no
impact on their free navigation rights. Once they enter the Torres
Strait, the purpose of the legislation is that they proceed through
without incident. Australia and Papua New Guinea have determined
that this can best be done by requiring a certified Australian pilot to be
in charge of navigating the vessel. At the end of the passage through
the strait, the vessels need only pay the pilot for services rendered.
Although the ship's operators may be concerned about the cost, the
harm to be avoided is directly related to the vessel's presence in the
water of the coastal States.
Third, the regulated activity, passage through the Torres Strait, is
geographically related to the Australian ports into which many of the
vessels are likely bound. The Torres Strait is within a few thousand
nautical miles of the major Australian port cities to which many of
these vessels will be bound. Considering the vast size of Australia, this
is relatively close. While some of the commercial vessels transiting the
Torres Strait may be coming from and bound for New Zealand, Chile,
India, South Africa, Singapore, or elsewhere, a significant number, if
not most, will be on their way to Australian destinations. Of course,
there is much international concern with the proposal to impose a
mandatory pilotage requirement on vessels merely engaged in transit
passage and bound for a port far removed from Australia. However, if
the vessel proceeds through the strait and on its way to its foreign
destination without incident, such a vessel would avoid any immediate
sanctions for not using a pilot. 47 1

The provision does not provide for

immediate enforcement authority for vessels underway.
471

Of course, if it has a collision, goes aground, or otherwise fails to

negotiate the Tores Strait safely, Australia and Papua New Guinea would have
other bases for exercising jurisdiction and imposing sanctions. See UNCLOS,
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Fourth, at least for vessels proceeding directly to an Australian
port, the regulated activity has a close temporal nexus to the planned
entry of the vessel into the port state. Any such vessel would be within
a few days of arrival at an Australian destination. For vessels traveling
to other ports and unlikely to return to Australia anytime in the near
future, there would not be a close temporal nexus between the regulated
activity and entry into an Australian port.
Indeed, Australian
authorities could potentially impose punitive sanctions many years
later.
Fifth, the regulation will likely be effective in accomplishing the
policy goals for which it was designed, particularly with respect to
vessels bound directly for Australian ports. Australia has long had a
similar law requiring mandatory pilotage on all vessels passing through
the Great Barrier Reef on the way to and from an Australian port. After
dozens of cases in which the masters of foreign ships had to pay fires
for failing to comply with this requirement, the present level of
compliance is reported to be quite high, nearing 100%.472 Under the
current voluntary pilotage regime in the Torres Strait, in contrast,
Australian authorities have noted that compliance has declined from
70% in 1995 to 55% in 2001.
A study commissioned by the
Australian government concluded that only "some 45% of vessels take
pilots through the Torres Strait ....
The study stated "[t]he effect
of introducing 100% pilotage is predicted to reduce collision accidents
by about 30% and powered grounding accidents by about 32% ...
The risk benefit should be assessed against the additional cost of

supra note 4, arts. 220 and 221. See generally Michael White, Marine
Pollutionfrom Ships: The AustralianLegal Regime, 9 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE
L.J. 1, 3-11 (2000).
472
Ottesen et al., supra note 316, at 514-21 . See also Michael White,
Liabilityfor Damage to the Marine Environmentfrom Ships, 26 DALHOUSIE L.
J. 231, 260-61 (2003).
473 Roberts, supra note 314, at 102 ("This equates to approximately
500 un-piloted transits each year." Id.). See also Stuart B. Kaye, Regulation of
Navigation in the Torres Strait: Law of the Sea Issues, in NAVIGATIONAL
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 119, 124-25 (Donald R.
Rothwell & Sam Bateman, eds., 2000).
474

AUSTRALIAN MARITIME SAFETY AUTHORITY, ASSESSMENT OF SHIP

SAFETY CONTROLS IN THE TORRES STRAIT AND GREAT BARRIER REEF 28,

§

5.3.3. (2001) ("Recommended Pilotage"),, available at http://www.amsa.
gov.au/publications/shipping/ assessment of shipsafetycontrols.pdf.
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compulsory pilotage.' 47 As Australian authorities take appropriate
administrative action against vessels that fail to take on a pilot in the
Torres Strait and subsequently enter an Australian port, compliance
will likely be much higher. On the other hand, vessels that never intend
to enter an Australian port and consider the benefits of using a pilot not
worth the expense are unlikely to comply, even with the prospect of
being cited for violating the regulation and being reported to the
cognizant flag state authorities.
The sixth question concerns the impact the regulations will have
on international navigational rights. These regulations will directly
impact the right of transit passage through the Torres Strait. The
regulations require the use of a pilot in passing through the strait;
however, they do not deny or significantly impair the right to pass
through. The disastrous effect that the grounding of a supertanker in
the restricted waters of the Strait could potentially have, closing it off
for transit by all vessels renders, the requirement to use a pilot a
relatively minor burden. Of course, some substantial financial costs
associated with using the services of a pilot exist, particularly since the
transit time through the entire strait can require nearly 24 hours. This
economic impact will no doubt discourage some marginally-profitable
vessels from using the Torres Strait as a route to ports in Australia.
However, by exempting sovereign immune vessels and vessels engaged
in emergency transits4 6 and applying sanctions only after the vessel
enters an Australian port, an objective appraisal must show that there is
no serious impairment of the right of transit passage. 77 On the other
hand, the Torres Strait proposal could establish a precedent where strait
States elsewhere seek to impose a mandatory pilotage regime on all
vessels seeking to engage in transit passage, or where coastal States
471 Id. at 37, § 6.1.4. Historically, the total number of marine incidents
in the Torres Strait from all causes is very low, approximately .60 per year. Id.
at 26, Fig. 5.2 ("Incident Type across the Study Area").
476 Davison, supra note 322 (excepting pilotage requirement for
"sovereign immune vessels" and where a pilot could not be carried because of
"stress of weather, saving life at sea or other unavoidable cause.").
477 Some maritime States, particularly Singapore, Japan, Russia, the
PRC, the Bahamas, South Korea, and the United States, argued that the
Australian mandatory pilotage scheme would have the practical effect of
seriously impeding the right of transit passage. Indeed, it was the lack of
consensus that led the IMO to approve only a PSSA in the Torres Strait and
recommend, but not require, the use of pilots while engaged in transit passage
through it. Roberts, supra note 314, at 103-04. "Such a requirement could
only be voluntary." U.S. Delegation, MEPC 52 Delegation Report, Jul. 18-22,
2003, par. 3.
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impose such a regime on all vessels engaged in innocent passage
through the territorial sea.478 As the Russian legal expert V.D.
Bordunov noted, "the sovereignty of the State may not be used as
grounds for enlarging legislative power distinct from that granted by
the [LOS Convention], nor for appropriating additional powers aimed
' 79
at enforcing the laws extending to transit passage. A
If this precedent
claiming additional legislative power were emulated widely elsewhere
or were extended to include enforcement measures against vessels
actively engaged in passage, it could have a major adverse impact on
freedom of navigation throughout the world.
The seventh relevant question is whether the exercise of
jurisdiction under the circumstances would be consistent with
Australia's treaty obligations. If there were an FCN treaty in effect that
specifically spoke to the issue, Australia would have to comply or it
would be in violation of its obligations. The LOS Convention, to
which Australia has been party since October 1994, is the most
applicable. Under the LOS Convention, no state may impose a
restriction on passage that would have "the practical effect" of
impairing or impeding the inclusive right of transit passage.480 Several
maritime States, including the United States, Singapore, Russia, South,
Korea, China, and Japan, argue that this mandatory pilotage
requirement would have just such an effect. 481 However, UNCLOS
and customary international law permit a coastal state to impose
prudent and necessary laws and regulations to prevent pollution and
promote maritime safety in its territorial sea under the territoriality

478
The United States cited the potential adverse precedent as a major
concern in its February 2007 demarche to the Australian government: "This
action could also serve as an adverse precedent for strait states to burden transit
passage in other straits used for international navigation of critical importance."
SECSTATE WASHDC message 091524Z Feb 07, 5, V.
479 Victor D. Bordunov, The Regime of Transit Passage Under the
1982 Convention, 12 MARINE POL'Y 219,225 (1988).
480
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 42(2). See id., art. 44 ("States
bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage ....
")
481 U.S. Delegation, MEPC 52 Delegation Report, Jul.
18-22, 2003,
par. 3. "Some of these delegations forcefully expressed opposition to
compulsory pilotage in straits used for international navigation, noting in their
view such pilotage could only be voluntary." Id.
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principle.482 And although no UNCLOS provision refers to pilotage,
much less to mandatory pilotage for vessels merely engaged in
innocent or transit passage. Under Australia's scheme, the exercise of
the enforcement jurisdiction would not take place until the vessel is
voluntarily present in port, which would normally be consistent with
customary international law.
At the same time, Australia seeks to impose a compulsory
pilotage requirement when the IMO has only approved a recommended
pilotage scheme. For vessels that do not intend to visit Australia's
ports directly after passing through the Torres Strait, therefore,
enforcing the provisions would not be consistent with international law,
because it would hamper or impair transit passage through an
international strait. By its terms, UNCLOS does not authorize a strait
state unilaterally to impose restrictions on transit passage designed to
protect the environment and safety of navigation, but at the most to
"refer [any such] proposals to the competent international organization
[the IMO] with a view to their adoption. 483 However, UNCLOS is an
evolving treaty, and actions within the IMO and by individual States
continue to modify its practical application. It may be that the
international community will someday consider mandatory pilotage an
appropriate requirement for coastal States to impose on vessels
transiting straits, particularly in cases where the ecology of the strait is
particularly sensitive. The appropriate way for this to happen,
however, is on a case-by-case basis and with formal approval by the
IMO.
Eighth, the criminal and administrative sanctions that Australia
plans to impose for violation of the law or regulation appear to be
reasonable and within the constraints of international law. While one
might interpret "prosecution" to extend to criminal sanctions including
jail sentences, sanctions the severity of which are beyond that permitted
in international law, Australia's enforcement scheme for the mandatory
pilotage requirement through the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
involves only the potential for a large fine. Additional administrative
sanctions, including notification to the flag state and the IMO of those

482

See id., arts. 21 ("Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating

to innocent passage") and 41 ("Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in
straits used for international navigation").
483 UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 41(4). See also id., art. 42(1)(a).
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vessels that fail to employ a pilot, would be fully consistent with
Australia's rights and obligations under international law. 4"
Ninth, the goal of protecting this particular PSSA from
ecological disaster and maintaining safe and unobstructed transit
through the Torres Strait is important not only to Australia but to the
entire international community. The U.N. General Assembly and the
IMO have recognized the ecological fragility of the Great Barrier Reef,
the northern portion of which extends into the Torres Strait.43 5 The
IMO has gone so far as to approve a scheme to recommend the use of
pilots for vessels transiting through the Torres Strait. Moreover, a
collision or grounding in the Strait would have ramifications for the
entire international shipping community. Of course flag States could
require that their vessels employ pilots while transiting the Torres
Strait. Moreover, if a compelling case could be made that protecting
this PSSA in this way were vital, the IMO could approve the full extent
of the associated protective measures (APM's) Australia and Papua
New Guinea has proposed. After careful consideration, the IMO
decided not to approve a mandatory pilotage scheme. It is likely that
the international community did not consider this APM sufficiently
important to justify Australia's unilateral action.
The tenth question is the extent to which Australia's law and
regulatory scheme is consistent with state practice. Requiring pilots
while passing through restricted, busy, hazardous, or ecologically
fragile waters as a condition of port entry is well established in the
international community. Singapore, Japan, China, the United States,
and other States that object to Australia's mandatory pilotage scheme
require pilots as a condition of port entry for large commercial vessels
and tankers. The unique wrinkle here, with no parallel state practice, is
the requirement that foreign commercial vessels use a pilot even when
the vessel is not bound for a destination under Australian jurisdiction.
The concern is aggravated by the potential exercise of civil (and
possibly criminal) jurisdiction many years later.
According to
Australia's legislative action, Australia will prosecute the master and/or
owner of a vessel that fails to use a pilot while transiting the Torres
Strait any subsequent occasion it enters an Australian port. This claim
to a continuing exercise ofjurisdiction is unique and troublesome.

484

States").

485

See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 218(4)("Enforcement by port
See Ottesen, supra note 316, at 507-514.
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The eleventh question involves whether the competent
international organization has approved of the regulation. As Dr.
Rothwell observed: "If. . . a coastal state can work within existing
international fora to have a regime of compulsory pilotage accepted for
certain waters, then it may legitimately seek to enforce such a
requirement within its territorial sea." 486 In this case, however,
because of opposition from certain other maritime States and the
shipping industry, the relevant competent international organization,
the IMO, did not approve the mandatory pilotage scheme that Australia
had proposed. The IMO only approved a voluntary pilotage scheme for
passage through the strait and recommended that flag States require
vessels to employ pilots consistent with Australia's scheme. While the
international community has consistently approved port state
regulations that require the use of pilots as a condition of port entry,
until the IMO approves a mandatory requirement scheme for the Torres
Strait as an APM for this PSSA, exercise of jurisdiction over vessels
merely engaged in transit passage to a non-Australian port on the
voyage in question is inconsistent with international law.487
The twelfth question involves whether another state has a greater
interest in regulating the activity. As a general rule, the flag state has
the priority claim to exercise jurisdiction over its vessel. Obviously,
the vessel's flag state could require that all of its vessels use Australian
pilots when passing through the Torres Strait. This is what the IMO
recommended, and the flag state may have an interest in doing so to
better ensure the safe navigation of its vessels through the Strait.
However, most open registry or flag of convenience States are
unwilling to impose a requirement that will increase, even marginally,
the costs of doing business, unless the requirement is a universal
standard. To do otherwise would place their ships at an economic
disadvantage.
Thirteenth, there is little likelihood of a serious conflict between
Australia and any other state with an interest in regulating this
particular activity. Australia and Papua New Guinea appear to be of
one accord on this issue and, while Papua New Guinea has not
announced any implementing regulations similar to Australia, nothing
would prohibit that nation's authorities from doing so. If Australia
imposes a fine on the master and/or operator of a foreign-flag vessel,
486

Donald R. Rothwell, NavigationalRights and Freedoms in the Asia

PacificFollowing Entry Into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, 35 VA. J.
INT'L L. 587, 605 (1994-1995).

487

Id. at 604-05 ("Compulsory pilotage").
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that vessel's flag state may file a diplomatic protest against Australia's
exercise of jurisdiction. However, any such conflict would likely be
resolved through diplomatic, political, or legal channels. Moreover, as
a matter of international comity, even a flag state is likely to complain
only if it perceives that Australia has discriminated or otherwise treated
one of its flag vessels unfairly.
As one of the foreign-flag States whose vessels would be most
affected by Australia's new regulations, however, Singapore has
objected strenuously to the mandatory pilotage scheme for vessels
merely engaged in transit passage. Likewise, the United States has
sent several notes to the Australian government protesting this action,
reserving the rights of U.S. nationals and ships flying its flag using the
Torres Strait and not directly bound for an Australian port. 48 8 Given
the purposes Australia has given for this scheme, to protect the
environmentally fragile Torres Strait and the indigenous peoples who
live and work there, however, no other state has a greater interest.
Fourteenth, Australia and Papua New Guinea sought IMO
approval for its mandatory pilotage scheme. Moreover, Australia has
notified the international community of this law and the consequences
of not complying with it. The scheme does not deny port access, but
rather imposes a fine upon vessels that fail to comply with the scheme
and then enter an Australian port. Presumably, the legal procedures
give the foreign-flag vessel an opportunity for a legal hearing to
demonstrate that the imposition of the fine under the circumstances is
unfair or inconsistent with international law.
Fifteenth, there will be few adverse practical consequences as a
result of enforcing this mandatory pilotage scheme. During busy transit
periods, vessels may begin to back up on either end of the strait while
they wait for pilots to become available. Vessel operators will have to
pay a pilotage fee that they previously did not have to pay. Some
masters will likely argue that paying for a pilot is insufficiently
beneficial to be worthwhile. At the margins, this view might result in
some commercial vessels avoiding the Torres Strait and, potentially,
trade with Australian ports that require passage through the Torres
Strait. In the long run, however, enhancing navigational safety through
the Torres Strait and avoiding an ecological disaster will likely save
money. Australia is too large a market to avoid merely because of a
SECSTATE WASH DC message 091524Z Feb 07 ("Torres Strait
Compulsory Pilotage: Third Demarche"), 5, VII.
488
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pilotage fee. In any case, shippers will merely pass the cost of any such
fee along to consumers for products being shipped through the Torres
Strait. In other words, Australian consumers and those engaged in the
international shipping trade to and from Australia will pay the costs.
Finally, the only other possible way to achieve the goal of having
qualified pilots on commercial ships while they are engaged in
transiting the Torres Strait is for the international community to
approve, or for all flag States to impose, a mandatory pilotage
requirement. So far, member States of the IMO have been unwilling to
go that far. Until another ecological disaster in the Torres Strait or
other restricted international waterway mobilizes the international
community to act, either possibility is unlikely. While there are
significant costs associated with a mandatory pilotage scheme, the
purpose is not merely a full-employment bill for Australian pilots. If
having a qualified pilot on board to assist safe navigation prevents the
massive ecological damage and cleanup costs associated with a single
disastrous collision or grounding in the waters of the Torres Strait,
these regulations would be worthwhile.
While the shipping industry, representatives of flag of
convenience States, and proponents of unrestricted freedom of
navigation might well object to Australia's legislation, these
regulations, as they relate to vessels engaged in a voyage to or from an
Australian port, seem objectively reasonable. On the other hand, with
respect to vessels simply engaged in transit passage through the Torres
Strait, on a voyage to or from ports outside of Australia, the restrictions
are unjustified. It will be interesting to see how Australian courts, and
the international community, particularly international shipping
companies, react to the first cases in which Australian authorities seek
to impose a large fine on a vessel's new owners for something that the
vessel had done in years past. A legal challenge by the flag state of the
vessel, perhaps in the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, is
likely to occur at some point. "Ultimately this may well be the only
way to resolve the divergent views over the legal basis of compulsory
''4
pilotage measures in a strait used for international navigation. 89
D. Harmonizing National and International Standards and
Expectations. Even where the port state can demonstrate that the
proposed regulation is important and, under the factors discussed
above, objectively reasonable, it is important to harmonize the
proposed regulation with relevant international standards and
expectations. The best way to accomplish this is to obtain the approval
489

Roberts, supra note 314, at 107.
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of the "competent international organization" charged with regulating
the particular activity. If a port state wanted to establish a traffic
separation scheme for vessels engaged in innocent passage through its
territorial sea on the way into internal waters, international law requires
that it take into account "the recommendations of the competent
international organization., 490 Before establishing such schemes within
international straits used for international navigation, the LOS
Convention requires that the "States bordering the straits shall refer
proposals to the competent international organization with a view to
their adoption."4 9' Within the "exclusive economic zone", a coastal
state may "adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from vessels conforming to and giving
,,492 effect to
generally accepted international rules and standards ....
Based on
comity and efficiency, all States should seek to harmonize their
national expectations, standards, and procedures with those of the
international community.
UNCLOS provides for coordinating proposals that effect
international shipping, particularly with respect to navigational safety
and the protection of the marine environment, within the IMO process.
The IMO has proven particularly adept at reaching consensus, and then
harmonizing national and international standards and expectations for a
wide variety of issues ranging from vessel construction through bilge
water discharge standards. The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of
International Maritime Traffic, which the IMO has updated regularly,
emphasizes the importance of simplifying and reducing to a minimum
the administrative burdens imposed on international shipping "to
facilitate and expedite international maritime traffic .... 493
XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
For the continuation and expansion of world trade by sea, policy
makers must seek to ensure that ocean trade continues to flourish and
grow. This requires promoting access to key ports with minimal
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 22(3)(a).
Id., art. 41(3). Moreover, any such proposals "shall conform to
generally accepted international regulations." Id., art. 41(2).
492
Id., art. 211(5). See also id., art. 211(6)
493 FAL Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. See FAL Convention, 2002
Amendments, Jan. 10, 2002, 18 U.S.T. 411, 591 U.N.T.S. 265 (entered into
force May 1, 2003).
490
491
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restrictions and conditions.
Toward this end, international law
presumes that the ports of every coastal state should be open to all
foreign commercial vessels, and a port may be closed or a vessel denied
access to the port only when important interests of the coastal state
justify the closure.
At the same time, the world community must be sensitive to the
legitimate concerns of port states to protect important national interests,
including homeland security, their laws related to fiscal, immigration,
sanitation, and customs matters, combating the scourge of illegal drugs,
protecting the coastal environment, and other matters directly related to
the port visit of a vessel. To promote and protect these and other
important interests, port states have a right to close their ports or to
impose conditions on port access and exit with respect to a broad range
of important interests directly related to the vessel's visit, including
national security, navigation, safety, health, immigration, and customs,
and to prevent degradation of the marine environment. A port state
may restrict access to all foreign vessels, subject only to any rights of
entry clearly granted under an applicable treaty and those vessels in
distress due to force majeure.
To avoid using international trade as a heavy-handed and
ineffective diplomatic tool designed to reward or punish foreign States,
however, a port state should not impose port access or exit
requirements on foreign merchant vessels, or exercise jurisdiction on
foreign-flag vessels in port, even those designed to promote important
goals, not reasonably related to the visit of the vessel in question on the
specific occasion. Toward this end, absent specific, identifiable
concerns with respect to the vessel or state in question, port states
should treat all foreign-flag vessels equally, and not discriminate in the
prescription and enforcement of its laws.
The application of the law of the port state should not have the
practical effect of denying or impairing the traditional rights of the sea,
including freedom of navigation in international waters, and the
exercise of the rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage in coastal waters. Moreover, denial of
port access or imposing unreasonable conditions on port access has an
adverse impact on the port state's ability to engage in international
trade. As a result, such restrictions harm the economy of both the port
state and, to a less direct extent, the world community at large.
Given the crucial importance to international trade in today's
global economy, incremental costs, short delays, or minor disruptions
can have a profoundly adverse impact. In this regard, harmonizing and
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coordinating conditions on port entry throughout the world community,
with similar expectations, requirements, forms, and procedures, can
achieve the goals without imposing as much of an administrative
burden. Wisely balancing the benefits to be achieved from imposing
conditions on port entry, such as intelligently devised security
requirements, against the costs and burdens associated with each, is
essential. International lawyers and policy makers must strive to ensure
that access to the world's ports is as free as reasonably possible and that
conditions on entry and exit are directly and effectively related to the
important interests of the port state and the world community at large.
The goal of all States should be to promote and ensure safe, secure,
efficient, and environmentally sound international ocean trade.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

International law presumes that the major ports of every
coastal state will remain accessible to all foreign commercial
vessels and that a port may be closed or entry conditioned only
when important interests of the coastal state justify such
action.

2.

Port states have a right to close their ports or to impose
conditions on port access and exit with respect to a broad
range of important interests directly related to the vessel's
visit, including national security, navigation, safety,
environmental protection, health, immigration, and customs.

3.

Port states may not impose port access or exit requirements on
foreign merchant vessels, even those designed to promote
important goals, not reasonably and directly related to the
specific voyage of the vessel in question.

4.

Port states may not unreasonably discriminate among foreignflag vessels in the application of laws governing port access or
in the exercise of jurisdiction in port.

5. Port states may close their ports to foreign warships, fishing
vessels, and private recreational craft for any or no reason, or
may impose any precondition on entry or departure that the
state deems appropriate.
6.

In an emergency distress situation constituting force majeure
due to hazardous weather conditions or other danger
representing a risk to life or loss of the vessel, a foreign-flag
commercial vessel should be allowed to take shelter in any
convenient coastal water or port until such time as the
emergency condition ends. During such emergency visits, the
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port state should refrain from exercising any jurisdiction over
the vessel other than to verify its claim offorce majeure.
7.

However, even in cases of force majeure, a port state may
prevent or condition entry when the vital interests of the state
so require it. In such cases, coastal States in the area have an
obligation to render assistance to save the lives of mariners in
distress at sea and attempt to mitigate marine pollution.

8.

The United States must generally comply with its obligations
under international law, and courts will assume that Congress
intended to do so, limiting the apparent jurisdictional scope of
the statutes. However, nothing prevents Congress from
disregarding such international legal obligations, and U.S.
courts will enforce the language of any such statute, so long as
congressional intent to do so is clearly manifested in the
statute.

9.

Applicable bilateral and multilateral treaties may provide for
unrestricted port access to the merchant vessels of certain
States under specified conditions. Denial of access, except for
failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations directly
related to the visit, would be a violation of such a treaty.

10. Under customary international law, a port state may generally
enforce laws that relate to activities of a foreign vessel that
take place while the vessel is in port, or that took place in the
waters of the port state prior to the vessel's entry into port or
as the vessel leaves port, except those related solely to the
"internal affairs" of the vessel. Such "internal affairs" are the
legal responsibility of the flag state.
11. A port state may only impose charges and fees on foreign-flag
commercial vessels calling on a port related to services
actually rendered, as well as for non-discriminatory customs
fees and other taxes.
12. The application of the law of the port state should not have the
practical effect of denying or impairing freedom of navigation
in international waters or the exercise of the rights of foreignflag vessels to engage in innocent passage, transit passage, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage through coastal waters.
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13. Denial of port access or imposing unreasonable conditions on
port access has an adverse impact on the port state's ability to
engage in international trade. As a result, such restrictions
harm the economy of both the port state and, less directly, the
world community at large.
14. International lawyers and policy makers must strive to ensure
that access to the world's ports is as free as reasonably
possible and that conditions on entry and exit of foreign-flag
commercial vessels are directly and effectively related to the
important interests of the port state and the world community
at large.
15. Any imposition of conditions on port access or exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign-flag commercial vessels in port in
violation of international law gives rise to a right to seek
redress through legal, diplomatic, or other appropriate means.
16. Even if international law permits a coastal state to deny or
restrict access to foreign-flag vessels, the coastal state must
have domestic authority and must follow prescribed
procedures when doing so. To the extent practicable, the
denial decision must be communicated to the vessel in a
timely manner, and the vessel should have the due process
right to appeal the decision.
17. To the extent practicable, the conditions foreign-flag
commercial vessels must meet to obtain port access and the
requirements and administrative procedures for complying
with them, including required data and administrative forms,
should be as simple as possible and consistent worldwide.

